Koger v. Hollahan
| Decision Date | 19 November 1940 |
| Citation | 198 So. 685,144 Fla. 779 |
| Parties | KOGER v. HOLLAHAN. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1940.
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Arthur Gomez, Judge.
Personal injury action by Ethel Koger, a minor, by her next friend, D D. Koger, against George L. Hollahan. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brings error.
Judgment reversed, with directions.
Carson, Petteway & Stembler and Forrest Sullivan all of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Knight & Green, of Miami, for defendant in error.
We are asked to pass on the propriety of the order of the circuit judge sustaining a demurrer to the declaration and entering a judgment against the plaintiffs. The declaration consisted of two counts which are very similar in their allegations, the one charging that the plaintiff in error. Ethel Koger, when injured, was riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by George L. Hollahan, Jr., with the knowledge and consent of the defendant, George L. Hollahan, and the other alleging that she was riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by the defendant and entrusted by him to George L. Hollahan, Jr. In both counts it was stated that the plaintiff in error paid nothing for the transportation.
We have stated above that part of the inducement necessary to a decision of the first question. In reply to it we must determine whether under the so-called 'Guest Statute', Chapter 18033, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937 any liability for injury to the guest of the operator of a car extends to the owner in a case of gross negligence.
In considering the second and only remaining question we will discuss the sufficiency of the allegations of the declaration to show negligence that was gross, but for the purpose of answering the first one we will assume that the pleading was in that respect sufficient.
It is well to state here that the circuit judge in sustaining the demurrer gave as his opinion that the statute 'was not intended to place liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle for the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the operator * * * where the guest was the guest of the operator and not of the owner.'
At the outset attention should be directed to the title of the act which related to the 'Liability of an Owner or Operator of a Motor Vehicle to a Guest or Passenger Transported Without Payment therefor,' and in the body of the law it is provided 'That no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle' etc.
The expressions 'gross negligence' and 'wilful and wanton misconduct' as used in this particular statute have been held by the Court to be synonymous, O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817, so the points involved in the present controversy are not complicated by any distinction between these terms in the law.
Long before the enactment of the act it was settled law in this State that the owner of an automobile, a dangerous instrumentality, who entrusted it to another, was liable for injury caused to someone else by the negligence of the person to whom he had committed it.
Applying that rule to the instant case, then, the defendant would have been, but for the 'guest statute', liable to the plaintiff for the ordinary negligence of the driver of the defendant's automobile which he was using with the owner's permission. Thus, the question to decide is whether it was the purpose of the legislature in enacting Chapter 18033 to absolve the owner, in such circumstances, from any responsibility for the negligence of the driver of his car resulting in the injury of the driver's guest, or whether it was intended only that in such situation it would be necessary to recovery for the injured person to prove the higher degree of negligence. We are inclined to the latter view. It will be noted that both the title of the act and the part of it we have quoted refer to the liability of persons in two capacities, and that the disjunctive 'or' is employed. So, if the language in the body of the act were transposed, it would simply read that no guest conveyed by the owner or operator should have a cause of action against the transporter, whether owner or operator, in case of accident unless the damage resulted from gross negligence, but this does not imply that if the operator is a person other than the owner the latter escapes liability. We do not find in the act, bearing in mind the former decisions of this Court and of other courts which have been followed, that it was meant to change the existing rule that the owner would be liable to the guest of one to whom he had entrusted his car.
A comparison of the facts related in the case of Green v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532, decided prior to the adoption of the guest statute, and the facts alleged in the declaration now under scrutiny reveals no material difference. The only distinction we see in the rule of law is that in the former case the owner was held responsible for ordinary negligence, while under the statute his liability does not attach unless the plaintiff can establish gross negligence or the equivalent, wilful and wanton misconduct. It seems logical that if the owner, under the facts outlined in Green v. Miller, supra, was answerable for damage to a guest resulting from the ordinary negligence of the person using his automobile he would have been likewise responsible for negligence of the higher degree.
The sole purpose of the legislature in passing ...
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Orme v. Burr
... ... statute, are synonymous. See O'Reilly v ... Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817; Koger v ... Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886; ... Juhasz v. Barton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So.2d 476; ... Cormier v. Williams, 148 ... ...
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Herrod v. Schimmelfing, 71--262
... ... 201, 4 So.2d 525; Revell v. Carraway, supra; Martin v. Clum, Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 149; Lockridge v. Dial, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 662; Koger v. Hollahan, 1940, 144 Fla. 787, 198 So. 685, 131 ... ...
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Peyton v. Delnay, 71
...Titus v. Lonergan, supra, 322 Mich. 112, 33 N.W.2d 685; Kocks v. Collins, supra, 330 Mich. 423, 47 N.W.2d 676; Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886; White v. Center, 218 Iowa 1027, 254 N.W. Appellants' questions 1, 2 and 18 have been answered above. We have reviewed ......
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Hardwick v. Bublitz
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