Kolsti v. Guest, 1233
| Decision Date | 18 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 1233,1233 |
| Citation | 576 S.W.2d 892 |
| Parties | Carol KOLSTI et al., Appellants, v. Calvin R. GUEST et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Randall B. Wood, Ray & Wood, Austin, for appellants.
Shannon H. Ratliff, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilore, Austin, for intervenor.
R. C. Slagle, III, Sherman, for appellees.
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal by the trial court dismissing appellants' petition (asking for a declaratory judgment and writ of injunction) for the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction.
Appellants, Carol Kolsti, Harold Hammett and Mary Jo Spradlin, filed their petition for declaratory judgment and to enjoin the State Democratic Executive Committee and its Chairman from including on the general primary election ballot of the Democratic Party a certain referendum issue. The referendum issue in question inquired whether the voter is for or against the 1979 Legislature enacting a law to permit pari-mutuel wagering on horse races by local-county option.
On March 13, 1978, the State Democratic Executive Committee held its statutory meeting to pass a resolution directing its Chairman to certify the candidate names and referenda to be placed on the general primary election ballot. The Committee was presented with petitions which ostensibly contained more than 76,065 signatures of voters of the Party requesting that the pari-mutuel wagering referendum appear on the ballot. The Committee adopted a resolution authorizing a ballot which included the referendum issue. The basis for this suit was that the petitions contained insufficient valid signatures to require the Committee to place the issue on the ballot pursuant to Article 13.33, Texas Election Code. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order but subsequently on March 31, 1978, dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction. In its order of dismissal the court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint lodged against the petitions and the action of the Committee in authorizing the referendum issue for the ballot because the actions of the Committee were of a political nature into which the court could not inquire. Thereafter, on April 3, 1978, appellants gave notice of appeal from the trial court's dismissal order and filed a motion with the Austin Court of Civil Appeals for leave to file an original proceeding in that court to enjoin the State Democratic Executive Committee and its Chairman from including said referendum issue on the primary election ballot. As reported in 565 S.W.2d 556, the Court of Civil Appeals by its Per Curiam opinion on April 7, 1978, denied the motion for leave to file the petition for injunction holding that it is beyond the powers of the courts to enjoin an election or any incident to it; that an election is essentially the exercise of political power, and during its progress, is not subject to judicial control.
Appellants have prosecuted this appeal from the trial court's order of dismissal on one point of error in which they apparently complain that the trial court erred by failing to hear the complaint that the petition contained insufficient valid signatures to require the State Democratic Executive Committee to place the referendum on the ballot. Appellants in their brief concede that the Austin Court of Civil Appeals by its Per Curiam opinion, supra, effectively sustains the trial court insofar as the request for injunction is concerned. However, appellants contend that the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to a declaratory judgment to accord appellants a construction of Article 13.33, Texas Election Code. We disagree.
A case becomes moot when it appears that one seeks to obtain a judgment upon some alleged controversy when in reality none exists, or when he seeks judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy. McNeill v. Hubert, 119 Tex. 18, 23 S.W.2d 331, 333 (); Swank v. Sharp, 358 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1962, no writ); Stephenson v. State, 515 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1974, writ dism'd); Greene v. Gregg, 520 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1975, no writ).
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State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano
...no writ). A court lacks jurisdiction if it lacks the power to render the particular relief awarded or the issue is moot. See Kolsti v. Guest, 576 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1979, no writ). In announcing his oral decision, Judge stated he was relying upon "18a," obviously referring to R......
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...that in some instances, intervening elections can moot appeals by extinguishing the controversy between the parties. See Kolsti v. Guest , 576 S.W.2d 892, 893–94 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1979, no writ). However, Seeberger alleges that the existence of a dispute over attorney's fees is sufficient to ......
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In the Interest of A.T.M., No. 12-07-00243-CV (Tex. App. 5/29/2009)
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