Konschak v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States
| Decision Date | 01 July 1932 |
| Docket Number | 29,025 |
| Citation | 243 N.W. 691,186 Minn. 423 |
| Parties | ANDREW KONSCHAK v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Carver county to recover under the double indemnity provision of a policy issued by defendant covering the life of plaintiff's son. The case was tried before Tifft, J. and a jury. Plaintiff recovered a verdict of $2,977.50, the amount of his claim for double indemnity and interest, and defendant appealed from the judgment entered pursuant thereto. Affirmed.
Insurance -- life -- death by accidental means.
1. In an accident insurance case, where death ensues as the unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen result of an intentional act, it occurs by accidental means, even if there is no proof of mishap, mischance, slip, or any occurrence out of the ordinary.
Insurance -- life -- death by accidental means -- burden of proof.
2. Where death occurs by external violence and there is no evidence whatever as to the means of such violence, the burden of proof upon the beneficiary in an accident insurance policy is sufficiently supported by the presumption that the violence was due to accidental means.
Kellogg Morgan, Chase, Carter & Headley, for appellant.
C E. Warner and Mark F. Crotty, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff beneficiary in an action to recover on the double indemnity clause of a life insurance policy. This clause provided that twice the face of the policy was to be paid to the beneficiary upon proof that the death of the insured resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively, and independently of all other causes by external violence and purely accidental means.
August 8, 1928, Anthony Konschak, the insured, was engaged on road work near the town of Chaska. It was a hot day, and in the afternoon the road crew suspended work. Anthony spent the afternoon reading and lying around the yard at his home at or near Chaska. He assisted with the preparation of the evening meal, and late in the evening disappeared from the premises. As far as this record is concerned, his next appearance was in a caboose at the station of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad at New Richland, about 65 miles from Chaska. He was there attended by a doctor, who found that he had a fractured skull, a fractured right elbow, and fractured bone of the right leg. He was taken to the hospital at Waseca, where he died the afternoon of the ninth. The doctor testified that in his opinion the death was the result of the injuries just mentioned. The record was silent as to how he received those injuries. At the close of the evidence in the trial court the defendant moved for a directed verdict, the jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was denied, and a judgment was entered. The case comes here upon appeal from that judgment.
1. It is the contention of the appellant that there is a failure of proof as to whether or not the injuries received were the result of accidental means. That it was caused by external violence cannot well be disputed. It is the contention of the appellant that it must affirmatively appear from the evidence that the means which caused the death were accidental; that it is not enough that the death may have been the unexpected result of some intentional act done by the insured without mischance, slip, or mishap.
Upon this feature of the case this court is committed to the more liberal doctrine that where the death is the unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen result of an intentional act, it occurs by accidental means, even though there is no proof of mishap, mischance, slip, or anything out of the ordinary in the act or event which caused such injury or death. Taylor v. New York L. Ins. Co. 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912, 60 A.L.R. 959; Farrar v. Locomotive Engineers Mut. L. & A. Ins. Assn. 143 Minn. 468, 173 N.W. 705. In this view we are supported by such well considered cases as Wiger v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 205 Wis. 95, 236 N.W. 534. In that case it was held that the term "accidental means" must be interpreted according to the usage of the average man. In the case of Lewis v. Ocean A. & G. Corp. 224 N.Y. 18, 21, 120 N.E. 56, 57, 7 A.L.R. 1129, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court, said:
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