Koola v. Cambridge Two, LLC
Decision Date | 23 November 2016 |
Docket Number | 2016-UP-485 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Johnson Koola, Appellant, v. Cambridge Two, LLC; Albert V. Estes, Individually; Cambridge Lakes, LP; Stephen R. Heape, Individuallyandas General Partner of Cambridge Lakes, LP; Cambridge Lakes Apartment Homes, a/k/a Cambridge Lakes Apartments, LP, a/k/a Cambridge Lakes Apartment Homes, LP; Classic Properties of Charleston, Inc.; Cambridge Contracting, LP; Trademark Properties, Inc.; Carolina One Charleston Home Team Properties, LLC; Charleston Home Team, LLC; Carolina One; and William E. Jenkinson, IV, Individually, Of whom Trademark Properties, Inc., and Carolina One are the Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2015-000111 |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted October 1, 2016
Appeal From Charleston County R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Johnson Koola, of Mount Pleasant, pro se.
Michael Christopher Scarafile, of Carolina One Real Estate of North Charleston, for Respondent Carolina One.
Robert Michael Ethridge and Suzanne Elizabeth Deters, both of Carlock Copeland & Stair, LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent Trademark Properties, Inc.
Johnson Koola appeals two circuit court orders granting summary judgment to Carolina One and Trademark Properties (collectively Respondents). Koola argues the circuit court (1) prejudiced him and violated the South Carolina Constitution by arguing legal issues on behalf of Trademark, (2) violated his due process rights and denied him equal protection under the law, and (3) erred by finding Respondents were not required to provide Koola with a disclosure pursuant to the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act[1] (HPA).[2] We affirm.[3]
First, no evidence in the record supports Koola's assertion the circuit court argued on behalf of Trademark. Therefore, we hold the circuit court did not prejudice Koola or promulgate its own rules of procedure. See Rule 210(h), SCACR (this court will not consider any fact that does not appear in the record) ; Culbertson v. Culbertson, 273 S.C. 103, 105-06, 254 S.E.2d 558, 559-60 (1979) ( ); Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 74, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1996) ( ).
Second, Koola abandoned his due process and equal protection arguments because he failed to cite any supporting authority for these assertions in his brief to this court. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ().
Third, we find the circuit court committed no error in determining no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Respondents' liability under the HPA. See McMaster v. Dewitt, 411 S.C. 138, 143, 767 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 2014) (); Rule 56(c), SCRCP ( ); Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 329-30, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009) (). The circuit court correctly found Respondents were not required to provide the HPA disclosure to Koola. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-31-430 (2007) (requiring "the lessee, sole owner, or co-owner" of a building being converted into a condominium to provide a written disclosure of the building's condition to all prospective purchasers (emphasis added)); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 321, 194 S.E. 139, 142 (1937) () .[4]
Because we find no error in the circuit court's HPA disclosure ruling, we decline to address any remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) ( ).
AFFIRMED.[5]
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Notes:
[1] S.C. Code Ann. § 27-31-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp. 2015).
[2] Specifically, Koola lists his issues as...
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