Koonce v. State

• Decision Date: 21 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. A--14826,A--14826
• Citation: 456 P.2d 549
• Parties: Ronald Thomas KOONCE, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 549

456 P.2d 549

Ronald Thomas KOONCE, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A--14826.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

May 21, 1969.

Rehearing Denied July 9, 1969.

Second Rehearing Denied July 29, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A prospective juror may be excused on a challenge for cause when he states that his reservations about capital punishment would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt and the punishment.

2. A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.

3. The State may execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which veniremen were excluded for cause who made it clear that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.

4. Mere fact that prospective jurors have read newspaper or other publicity items critical of defendant does not, by itself, establish bias, prejudgment, or other disqualification on part of prospective jurors, and does not entitle defendant to postponement of trial for indefinite or substantial period of time.

5. Where there has been widespread adverse pretrial publicity about defendant, proper procedure in vast majority of cases is not to postpone trial indefinitely or for substantial period of time, but to proceed to trial and to determine on voir dire of panel and individual talesmen whether fair and impartial jury can be selected.

6. No person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety, provided it appears to the court, upon his declaration, under oath, or otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to him.

7. A photograph slide of the deceased victim may be introduced into evidence at a murder trial for the purpose of identification of the deceased where the photograph was made before any post-mortem surgery and showed only the marks of the crime perpetrated on the victim.

8. A trial judge may consider several sources of information available regarding a defendant's sanity when deciding if there is doubt of defendant's sanity sufficient to warrant a jury trial on that issue alone.

9. Where a defendant has been committed by court order for mental observation in a state hospital, the examining physician is not incompetent to testify as a rebuttal witness regarding his observation and examination of the defendant where insanity as a defense has been raised.

10. A defendant's statement given to police after he has been advised of his rights in compliance with the guidelines set down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, was properly admitted when the trial judge, absent the jury, heard evidence and made a finding that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

11. After an accused has been fully advised of his rights in accord with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, he may knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, refuse the offer of counsel, and answer questions or make a statement which would be admissible at his trial.

An appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County; Donald E. Powers, Judge.

Ronald Thomas Koonce was charged, tried, and convicted of the crime of Murder, was sentenced to death in the electric chair, and appeals. Judgment and sentence affirmed.

O. A. Cargill, Jr. and Stanley Pierce, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

G. T. Blankenship, Atty. Gen., Dale Crowder, Asst. Atty. Gen., John L. Clifton, Dist. Atty., Paul Vassar, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant in error.

BUSSEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, wherein the plaintiff in error, Ronald Thomas Koonce, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was tried and convicted of the crime of Murder and sentenced by the jury to suffer the penalty of death. Judgment and sentence was pronounced in accordance with the verdict of the jury on December 28, 1967, from which defendant has perfected this appeal.

The record reflects that during the early morning hours of June 10, 1967, Mrs. Verle (Betty) McCullough and her sister, Mary Alice Valliquette, were found brutally murdered in Mrs. McCullough's home, located in the community of Stroud, Lincoln County, Oklahoma. Defendant was arrested at his home in Stroud on June 13, 1967, and taken to the county courthouse where, after being advise of his rights, he was questioned and gave a statement admitting that he had committed the murders. Defendant was arraigned on this same day, after being advised of his rights, waived preliminary hearing, and was bound over for trial in the District Court. On June 27, 1967, upon application of the District Attorney, the defendant was committed to the Eastern State Hospital at Vinita, Oklahoma, for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days mental observation and examination, with the examining physician to report to the court on the sanity of the defendant. The examining physician reported defendant to be mentally competent to stand trial. Upon application of defense counsel, the case was remanded to the County Court of Lincoln County on June 16, 1967, for a preliminary hearing. Said preliminary hearing was conducted on October 19, 1967, and the defendant was bound over to stand trial on the charge in the District Court. On December 4, 1967, the cause was called for trial.

Testimony at the trial indicates that Mrs. McCullough's six year old son, who, along with a five year old and eighteen-month old sister occupied the home, confronted some neighbors who proceeded to the McCullough home and found the nude, bloody bodies of Betty McCullough and Mary Alice Valliquette. The neighbors then summoned the police.

The post-mortem examination of Mrs. McCullough was performed by Dr. Leo Lowbeer on June 12, 1967, and revealed that the deceased had been severely beaten, her skull fractured, and stabbed nine times. The examination also revealed the presence of a great deal of sperm in the sex organs of Mrs. McCullough. The examination of the body of Mary Alice Valliquette also revealed extensive beating, skull fracture, and nine stab wounds.

Defendant's companions on the night of the crime, Eddie Dean Ferguson, James Edward Stubbs, Jr., and Marvin Dale Howard, testified as to the occurrences on the night in question. It appears that after an evening of considerable beer and vodka drinking, this group proceeded to the McCullough home in Howard's car driven by the defendant. Parking the car about 100 yards in the back of the home, the defendant left the others and entered the home with a 22 semi-automatic rifle. The defendant was seen in the home, along with part of the rifle, through a window, by his companions. After approximately twenty minutes defendant left the home covered with blood and with pieces of the rifle and two knives. Defendant then drove the group to the Deep Fork River where he disposed of the rifle pieces and knives, washed off the blood, and left his shirt which was later recovered by the police.

There was other testimony offered for the State regarding the defendant's fingerprint found at the scene of the crime and human blood found on the jeans of the defendant. Defendant's companions, Howard and Ferguson, also testified that they had entered pleas of guilty to the crime of Accessory After the Fact of Murder and received five year suspended sentences. The defendant did not take the stand but his attorneys and mother did testify regarding defendant's background, conduct, and mental attitude. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and assessed the penalty at death.

On appeal it is defendant's first proposition that he was denied a trial by an impartial jury as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors as to whether they could vote for the death penalty. Defendant contends that such voir dire examination results in a jury which does not reflect a true picture as to the community's feelings regarding the penalty for the crime of Murder, and that such an examination emphasized the death penalty. Defendant concludes that former decisions of this Court allowing the disqualification of prospective jurors who had conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty have been overruled and that 'it is mandatory that this Court set aside and hold for naught the judgment and sentence of this trial court and to remand this cause * * * to abide by the decision of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).'

The decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, has been the subject of much confusion and comment far in excess of its actual effect. Thus, it is well to examine the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon for its precise holding and application. In Witherspoon the Supreme Court held:

'The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the State's assertion of a right to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say that they...