Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 21 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 95-176,F,1,95-176
• Citation: 911 P.2d 1049
• Parties: 107 Ed. Law Rep. 310, 15 A.D.D. 421 Christopher KOOPMAN, a minor child, By and Through his next friends, Mike and Linda KOOPMAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTremont County School DistrictBoard of Trustees, Craig Loper, Mark McClanahan, Larry Thompson and Harry Rushing, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1049

911 P.2d 1049

107 Ed. Law Rep. 310, 15 A.D.D. 421

Christopher KOOPMAN, a minor child, By and Through his next friends, Mike and Linda KOOPMAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, Fremont County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees, Craig Loper, Mark McClanahan, Larry Thompson and Harry Rushing, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 95-176.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 21, 1996.

John T. Pappas of Western Law Associates, P.C., Lander, for Appellant.

Paul K. Knight of Mullikin, Larson & Swift L.L.C., Jackson, for Appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

Appellant Christopher Koopman, by and through his next friends, Mike and Linda Koopman, appeals from the summary judgment which was granted in favor of Appellees Fremont County School District # 1, Fremont County School District # 1 Board of Trustees, Craig Loper, Mark McClanahan, Larry Thompson, and Harry Rushing. The district court found that Koopman had not exhausted the administrative remedies which were available to him.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Koopman presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the district court [err] in granting the defendant[s'] motion for summary judgment by holding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's claims and relief sought in this matter could have been brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 ("IDEA") and therefore the plaintiff[ ] should have exhausted [his] administrative remedies prior to pursuing [his] claims in a court of law?

2. Even if, for any reason, this Court finds that the claims of the plaintiff[ ] could have been appropriately raised under the provisions of IDEA, based upon the undisputed facts of this case, would the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies [have] been excused under the exception of futility or other applicable exception?

FACTS

In January 1992, Koopman, who was a special education student at Lander Valley High School, enrolled in the Naval Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps program which was offered at the high school. A Training Corps field trip was scheduled to be taken during the spring of 1992. The local Training Corps instructors informed Koopman that he would not be allowed to go on the field trip because of his medical problems. Koopman suffered from a seizure disorder, chronic back pain, and asthma. The instructors were concerned that Koopman's medical condition would pose a risk to Koopman and others who were on the field trip. Koopman's mother offered to accompany Koopman on the trip, but the instructors still refused to allow him to go.

A second field trip was scheduled to be taken in the fall of 1992. The instructors again refused to allow Koopman to take part in the trip because of his medical condition. The instructors also refused to allow Koopman to participate on the Training Corps rifle team. Koopman's parents met with the instructors to discuss the decision to restrict Koopman's Training Corps activities; however, the instructors still refused to allow Koopman to participate.

After the instructors denied Koopman permission to participate in a third field trip which was scheduled to be taken in the spring of 1993, Koopman's parents contacted the high school principal. The principal spoke with the instructors about the parents' concerns, but the decision to restrict Koopman's Training Corps activities was not altered. Although Koopman could have contested the instructors' decisions under the administrative procedures which were available to him, he did not seek any additional relief from the school district at that time. Koopman elected not to enroll in the Training Corps program in the fall of 1993.

Koopman filed this lawsuit in May 1994 after the appellees denied his governmental claim. Koopman's complaint included claims under the "Rehabilitation Act of 1973," 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1990 & Supp.1995), and the "Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990," 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990). He also stated claims for negligent supervision of employees and negligent instruction. The appellees moved for a summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion, reasoning that, because Koopman had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies which were available to him under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Supp.1995) (the IDEA), he was barred from asserting his claims in the district court. Koopman appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County School District No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo.1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo.1995). We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Kahrs, 901 P.2d at 406.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Congress passed the IDEA in an effort to help state and local agencies meet the burden of providing disabled children with a suitable education. ¹ 20 U.S.C. § 1400; see also Natrona County School District No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Wyo.1988). In order for the states to qualify for federal funding under the IDEA, they had to have a policy in effect which guaranteed that all disabled children would receive a "free appropriate public education." Hayes Through Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir.1989). See also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310, 108 S.Ct. 592, 597, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). The State of Wyoming specifically guarantees that all disabled children receive a free appropriate public education, and it receives funding under the IDEA. Ryan, 764 P.2d at 1024-27; see also Wyo.Stat. §§ 21-2-501 (1992) and 21-2-502 (1994).

Congress imposed explicit procedural safeguards and requirements in the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The procedural provisions encouraged maximum parental involvement in the children's education. Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d at 811; Learning Disabilities Association of Maryland, Inc. v. Board of Education of Baltimore County, 837 F.Supp. 717, 721 (D.Md.1993).

Primary among the procedural safeguards employed by IDEA is the requirement that states provide parents of disabled students the right to seek review of any decision concerning their children's education.

Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.Supp. 14, 16 (E.D.N.Y.1995). The procedural specifications also placed some responsibility with the parents for protecting their children's education rights. See Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d at 812. These responsibilities in many cases included an express requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. Id.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) states:

Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of children and youth with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part, the procedures under subsections (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part.

(Emphasis added.) The exhaustion requirement serves a number of important purposes which include:

"(1) permitting the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues requiring these characteristics; (2) allowing the full development of technical issues and a factual record prior to court review; (3) preventing deliberate disregard and circumvention of agency procedures established by Congress; and (4) avoiding unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any error."

Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d at 814 (quoting Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th Cir.1987) (citations omitted)).

Koopman did not follow the administrative procedures which were available to him in this case. He contends, however, that he was not required to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies because he was seeking compensatory damages and the IDEA provided only injunctive or other prospective relief. Section 1415(f) requires that, if the relief sought is available under the IDEA, the parties must exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies even when they do not actually pursue a claim under that act. Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d at 812. In other words, parties cannot circumvent the IDEA's exhaustion requirements by asserting claims under other laws while they deliberately avoid asserting a cognizable claim under the IDEA. Hope, 872 F.Supp. at 17. In this case, we must, therefore, decide whether the relief which Koopman sought in his lawsuit was available under the IDEA.

The courts which have considered whether monetary damages are available under the IDEA have not reached consistent results. Compare Board of Education of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond ex rel. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.1986) (monetary damages available under the IDEA) with Valerie J. v. Derry Cooperative School District, 771 F.Supp. 492 (D.N.H.1991) (monetary damages not generally available under the IDEA). However, in determining whether a claimant should have exhausted his administrative remedies under the IDEA, some courts have considered more than the type of remedy requested in the complaint when they were defining the term "relief." See, e.g., Hayes Through Hayes, 877 F.2d 809; Hope, 872 F.Supp. 14. They have looked at the policies which were behind the IDEA and...