Korenfeld v. United States, 161-162

• Decision Date: 22 November 1971
• Docket Number: 71-1328.,No. 161-162,Dockets 35413,161-162
• Citation: 451 F.2d 770
• Parties: Mordaqueo Moises KORENFELD, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

451 F.2d 770 (1971)

Mordaqueo Moises KORENFELD, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 161-162, Dockets 35413, 71-1328.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued September 30, 1971.

Decided November 22, 1971.

Thomas McGanney, New York City, for defendant-appellant.

Mervyn Hamburg, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Edward R. Neaher, U. S. Atty., E. D. of N. Y. and Sidney M. Glazer, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LUMBARD, MANSFIELD and OAKES, Circuit Judges.

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

Mordaqueo Moises Korenfeld pleaded guilty on June 1, 1970, before Chief Judge Mishler of the Eastern District of New York to the charge of conspiracy to import and sell cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-174 and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 12 years and a $20,000 fine. After judgment was entered Korenfeld moved pro se to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or, alternatively, to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35, F.R.Crim.P. Judge Mishler held a hearing on each of Korenfeld's claims and denied the motions. We affirm.

Korenfeld was indicted in the Eastern District of New York on April 18, 1970, and charged with being a member of an eleven-man cocaine smuggling ring which operated for four months in the spring of 1969 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-174.¹ At his arraignment on June 1, 1970, Korenfeld, who spoke English poorly, was represented by appointed counsel. An interpreter was also present. Korenfeld moved through counsel to enter a plea of guilty to one count of the three-count indictment. Judge Mishler made an extended inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including an explanation of the range of punishment to which Korenfeld would be subject. However, the judge did not tell Korenfeld that, under 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d), he would be ineligible for parole. When the defendant indicated that he still wished to plead guilty, the court accepted the plea and deferred sentence. Prior to imposing sentence on August 28, 1970, Judge Mishler asked whether Korenfeld was willing to explain his involvement in the crime, indicating that he had determined that the length of Korenfeld's sentence would depend on whether he was the "chief" of the conspiracy or "if he had a lesser position." Through the interpreter, the defendant extensively described his participation in the conspiracy. Judge Mishler also inquired whether the defendant had cooperated with the government and given new information about the narcotics operation. Korenfeld and the Assistant United States Attorney both explained that Korenfeld had spoken with the government at some length. After receiving this information, Judge Mishler concluded that the defendant's cooperation had been of little use to the government and, as the defendant's attorney conceded that it had not led to the prosecution or conviction of anyone, sentenced Korenfeld to 12 years imprisonment and a $20,000 fine.

Five days later, alleging that his plea had been tendered only on the assurance of counsel that he would receive a five year sentence, Korenfeld moved pro se to vacate the plea on the ground that it was not voluntary. Judge Mishler held a hearing on Korenfeld's claim, found that no such promise had been made, and dismissed the motion. Korenfeld also asked the court to reconsider the sentence in light of the cooperation that he had given the government. The judge reiterated that he felt that Korenfeld's claim of cooperation had been overstated and he refused to reduce the sentence.

Thereafter Korenfeld filed a second motion to vacate the plea claiming that its entry had been induced by fraud of counsel. Again the court held a hearing at which Judge Mishler himself raised for the first time the question whether his failure to inform Korenfeld of the latter's ineligibility for parole had affected the voluntariness of the plea. Korenfeld testified that he had never heard of the term "parole" until after he had entered the plea. His attorney also testified that he had not discussed ineligibility for parole with the defendant. The Assistant United States Attorney thought that he might have discussed parole sometime during the negotiations leading to the plea.

Judge Mishler again denied Korenfeld's motion. He agreed that lack of eligibility for parole was a consequence of a plea of guilty about which a defendant ought to be informed pursuant to Rule 11, F.R.Crim.P, but found that Korenfeld not only was unaware of the unavailability of parole at the time the plea was entered, but also was unfamiliar with the entire concept of parole, believing that he would be required to spend in prison the full length of the term. Consequently, Judge Mishler felt that the lack of knowledge about the unavailability of parole had not affected the defendant's decision in any way and thus the plea was still valid under F.R.Crim.P. 11.

Korenfeld's argument in this court is simply stated: Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), a defendant who pleads guilty after April 2, 1969, and is not informed of the consequences of his plea in conformity with Rule 11, F.R. Crim.P., must be given a chance to plead anew. We have held, in Bye v. United States, 2d Cir., 435 F.2d 177, decided October 14, 1970, that ineligibility for probation and parole is a "consequence" of a defendant's plea within the meaning of Rule 11. Korenfeld, who pleaded guilty on June 1, 1970, was not informed of his ineligibility for parole or probation. Therefore, his plea of guilty was invalid and he ought to be allowed to plead again.

Our resolution of Korenfeld's claim obviously turns on whether our holding in Bye is to be applied retroactively to pleas of guilty taken prior to October 14, 1970. In United States v. Welton, 439 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1971), we considered the retroactive effect of Bye. Welton had pleaded guilty on February 7, 1967 without being informed that he was ineligible for parole. In 1970, he claimed that this defect in the taking of the plea violated McCarthy and Bye and required that the plea be vacated and he be allowed to plead anew. Rejecting this claim, we said, "We see no reason to vacate judgments of conviction entered on or before the date of the Bye decision upon pleas of guilty unless the defendant can show both that he was unaware of his ineligibility for parole and that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known this." 439 F.2d at 826. Thus Welton held that for pleas accepted prior to Bye, the defendant would have to show that but for the failure to inform him of his ineligibility for parole, he would not have pleaded guilty.² As Judge Mishler found that failure to advise Korenfeld of his ineligibility for parole had no effect on Korenfeld's plea, he properly denied Korenfeld's petition. Korenfeld argues, however, that the court's holding in Welton does not control this case for he pleaded guilty after April 2, 1969, the date of the McCarthy decision while Welton pleaded guilty prior to the decision in McCarthy. Thus we are faced with the question whether Bye should be held retroactive to the date of the McCarthy decision. We hold that it should not.

In McCarthy, the Court had before it the question whether Rule 11, F.R.Crim. P., required that a judge personally ascertain that the defendant had made the plea "voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea" or whether the judge might rely on the representations of counsel that the defendant was pleading voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences of his decision. The Court held that the judge himself must personally address the defendant and if this were not done the defendant was entitled to plead anew without inquiring into the voluntariness of the plea. Nowhere in its opinion did the court indicate the precise content necessary to a Rule 11 inquiry. McCarthy was a decision dealing solely with procedure.

Later in the same term, the Court held, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1708, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), that, since in entering a guilty plea, a defendant is waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, his right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522, and his right to confront his accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, a proper waiver requires that a trial judge "canvass the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. If it does not appear in the record that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, the conviction must be reversed and the defendant allowed to plead anew. The court in no way intimated the precise terms of the inquiry that the trial judge should make of a defendant before accepting his plea.

Thus, until the time when Bye was decided, October 14, 1970, there was no guidance from the Supreme Court on whether a trial judge had to advise a defendant, pleading guilty to charges under certain statutes, of his ineligibility for parole before accepting a guilty plea to such charges. Prior to Bye, most district judges in this circuit did not inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole, relying on the fact that "every minimally competent attorney * * * knew this, and it was his professional duty so to inform his client in advising him to plead guilty." United States v. Welton, supra, 439 F.2d at 826. The only reported Second Circuit case to pass on this point was United States v. Caruso, 280 F.Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y.1967), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 399 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 904, 89 S.Ct. 1010, 22 L.Ed.2d 215 (1969). In Caruso, Judge Croake indicated that ineligibility for parole was not a "c...