Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club
| Decision Date | 29 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1574,87-1574 |
| Citation | 435 N.W.2d 746 |
| Parties | Kevin KORSMO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAVERLY SKI CLUB, American Water Ski Association, Dan Coufal and Richard Meyer, Defendants-Appellees, and Frank and Ruth Clewell, and Waverly Ski Land, Inc., Other Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Dennis P. Ogden and Roxann Barton Conlin of James, Galligan & Conlin, P.C., Des Moines, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jim D. DeKoster of Swisher & Cohrt, Waterloo, and Ivan J. Ackerman of Engelbrecht, Ackerman & Hassman, Waverly, for defendant-appellee Waverly Ski Club.
Dorothy L. Kelley of Jones, Hoffman & Huber, Des Moines, for defendant-appellee AWSA.
Richard N. Winders of Herrick, Langdon & Landon, Des Moines, for defendant-appellee Coufal.
Timothy W. Hamann of Clark, Butler, Walsh & McGivern, Waterloo, for the defendant-appellee Meyer.
Heard by DONIELSON, P.J., and SACKETT and HABHAB, JJ.
Summary judgment was granted on the ground that plaintiff's suit was barred by a release form he had signed. Plaintiff appeals and contends the summary judgment was erroneous because there are genuine issues of material fact about the meaning, scope, and proper construction of the release. He also contends there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether he had knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risks contemplated by the purported release.
Kevin Korsmo entered a water skiing tournament. He signed a standard tournament entry form which contained a clause releasing the sponsors and operators of the tournament from liability for injuries to participants. He did not read the release clause before signing the standard entry form.
During the tournament Kevin was seriously injured in an accident. He later filed the present lawsuit against several defendants, including the two sponsors of the tournament, the owner and driver of the boat, and the owners of the real estate where the accident occurred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sponsors of the tournament and the owner and driver of the boat. The district court held that Korsmo's suit against these defendants was barred by the release form he had signed when he entered the tournament.
Our review of this case is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. Findings of fact are binding upon this court if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1).
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c). On appeal, we must determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. South Story Bank & Trust Co., 327 N.W.2d 214, 215 (Iowa 1982).
The trial court determined that summary judgment was proper due to the exculpatory provisions of the entry form. To reach this conclusion, the trial court first decided that an exculpatory provision in an entry form to a sporting competition is not violative of public policy and may be enforced. This decision has not been challenged on appeal.
I. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the meaning and construction of the standard tournament entry form and reasonable minds could differ on how the document should be construed. Plaintiff claims the language of the entry form is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one construction. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, this question should have been submitted to the jury. We disagree.
The entry form which plaintiff signed contained the following paragraph:
In consideration of your accepting this entry, I hereby, for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, and/or for the minor for whom I am signing:
1. Release and forever discharge the sponsoring club of the above named tournament, the American Water Ski Association and any television broadcasting or news gathering agency that may be assigned rights to cover the tournament, their agents, servants and all persons connected with these competitions, of and from any and all rights, claims, demands and actions of any and every nature whatsoever that I may have, for any and all loss, damage or injury sustained by me and my equipment, or by the minor for whom I am signing, or by his equipment before, during and after said competitions; ...
Plaintiff claims the mere use of the words "release and forever discharge" makes the form ambiguous. A "release" does not relate to future claims but instead refers to past or existing claims. According to the plaintiff, the most likely meaning of this language in the entry form is to have persons seeking to participate in the tournament release any claims they might presently have relating to prior Waverly Opens before they will be allowed to participate in the present tournament. Furthermore, the use of the words "these competitions" is broader than just this Waverly Open. There is uncertainty at least whether this language includes past Waverly Opens and other American Water Ski Association (AWSA) events or the current tournament. Finally, plaintiff asserts the clause is ambiguous because it does not release named persons from "negligent acts."
When considering a motion for summary judgment, every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the resisting party and a fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Northrup v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1985). Applying this standard, the trial court correctly found that it cannot reasonably be disputed that the exculpatory language contained in the entry form refers to the competition for which the entry form was submitted.
A release is a contract, and its validity is governed by the usual rules relating to a contract. Stetzel v. Dickenson, 174 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Iowa 1970). In the construction of written contracts, the cardinal principle is that the intent of the parties must control; and, except in cases of ambiguity, this is determined by what the contract itself says. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(14). Construction of a contract is the process of determining its legal effect and is always a question of law for the court. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981).
The language of the agreement provides that the participant releases certain persons "from any and all rights, claims, demands and actions of any and every nature whatsoever ... sustained by me ... before, during, and after said competitions." It is clear that the parties intended to be released from any claims arising from participation before, during, or after the Waverly Open for which the entry form was completed. The language is clear; therefore, the intent is determined by what the contract says. The use of the word "release" does not make the clause ambiguous in that release can apply to both existing and future...
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Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 18269
...occurred as long as it is reasonable to conclude the parties contemplated a similarly broad range of accidents." Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa App.1988) (emphasis added) (citing Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill.2d 82, 46 Ill.Dec. 139, 141, 413 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (1980)). ......
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Galloway v. State Of Iowa
...concluded the “[p]ublic interest is served by allowing the parties the freedom to enter into such agreements.” Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa Ct.App.1988) (concluding “exculpatory provisions [in releases executed by adults waiving their own claims for personal injurie......
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Huber v. Hovey, 91-2000
...the releasee's own negligence. The court of appeals has upheld a similar release against the same attack. See Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 747-49 (Iowa App.1988) (release not ambiguous as to the types of injuries the parties intended to include). The district court correctly ......
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Progressive Insurance Company v. Reed, No. 6-682/05-1696 (Iowa App. 11/30/2006)
...in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced." Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1453 (4th ed. 1968)). The parties agree the release is a contract. Stetzel v. Dic......