Kossol v. Ashton Condominium Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1993
• Docket Number: 1993,No. 14,14
• Citation: 637 A.2d 827,1994 WL 10861
• Parties: Jerome KOSSOL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. ASHTON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 827

637 A.2d 827

Jerome KOSSOL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. ASHTON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 14, 1993.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Nov. 24, 1993.

Decided: Jan. 6, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1994.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 92C-02-166.

REVERSED.

Before VEASEY, C.J., MOORE, WALSH, HOLLAND, JJ., and HARTNETT, Vice Chancellor (constituting the Court en Banc).

ORDER

MOORE, Justice.

This 6th day of January, 1994, it appearing that:

1) Defendant, Jerome Kossol ("Kossol"), appeals from a decision of the Superior Court granting judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ashton Condominium Association, Inc. ("Ashton"), for reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $1,186. The award of attorney fees is based on an action previously decided in the Justice of the Peace Court, which resolved Ashton's suit to collect payment from Kossol of common expenses relating to the maintenance and operation of the Ashton Condominiums. In that suit Ashton also sought attorney fees. However, the claim for such fees was withdrawn. We are satisfied from the record that this was plaintiff's unilateral act without any agreement on the subject by Kossol. Kossol argues that the award of attorney fees is barred by the doctrine of res judicata as well as the related rule against splitting actions. We conclude that the Superior Court erred in determining that the present action for attorney fees was a proper splitting of the original action. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata bars the claim.

2) Ashton manages and administers the maintenance, repair and replacement of common elements at the Ashton Condominiums in accordance with the Unit Property Act of Delaware. See 25 Del.C. §§ 2201-2241. In furtherance of its obligations, Ashton assesses and collects the necessary funds from unit owners for payment of the common expenses. See 25 Del.C. §§ 2211 and 2212.

3) Kossol withheld the payment of common expenses in a dispute with the builder of the complex, Linpro Ashton Condos Limited Partnership. Consequently, Ashton sued in the Justice of the Peace Court in October 1990, demanding payment of the past assessments. On February 11, 1991, Ashton took a default judgment against Kossol in the amount of $1,294.00. ¹ After receiving notice of the proceeding, Kossol retained legal counsel, who successfully reopened the judgment.

4) The Justice of the Peace Court conducted a trial with both parties present on April 19, 1991. During the trial, Kossol's counsel objected to the assessment of attorney fees on notice and accuracy grounds. As a result, Ashton withdrew that part of its claim, which the Justice of the Peace Court characterized as "amend[ing] the complaint to eliminate attorney fees from this action." At the conclusion of the trial, the Justice of the Peace Court awarded judgment in favor of Ashton in the amount of $249.00. ²

5) On October 28, 1992, Ashton's counsel sent a letter to Kossol, demanding payment of $1,257.50 for legal fees incurred by Ashton in connection with the Kossol litigation. ³ After Kossol rejected Ashton's demand, Ashton filed this suit in February 1992 in the Justice of the Peace Court, seeking the recovery of $1,257.50 plus costs and additional attorney fees of $350.00. On February 7, 1992, with no representative of Ashton present, judgment was entered in favor of Kossol. Subsequently, Ashton appealed to the Superior Court seeking a trial de novo.

6) After a full hearing, including the exchange of legal briefs, the Superior Court entered judgment in Ashton's favor in the amount of $1,186.00. ⁴ Kossol moved for reargument, asserting that the claim for attorney fees was barred by the rule against splitting causes of actions. The Superior Court denied Kossol's motion, and this appeal followed.

7) The rationale for the rule against splitting actions was stated in Webster v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Del.Super., 348 A.2d 329 (1975):

The common law rule against the splitting of one cause of action is rooted in the need to protect a defendant from a multiplicity of suits and their attendant harassment. An equally compelling consideration is one founded on public policy: piecemeal litigation of a single cause of action is contrary to the orderly administration of justice.

Id. at 331 (citations omitted).

8) The rule against claim splitting is an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata. Maldonado v. Flynn, Del.Ch., 417 A.2d 378, 382-83 (1980). In Epstein v. Chatham Park, Inc., Del.Super., 153 A.2d 180 (1959), Justice Wolcott, sitting in Superior Court, discussed the doctrine of res judicata in general terms:

The doctrine of res judicata, briefly stated, is that a final judgment upon the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction may, in the absence of fraud or collusion, be raised as an absolute bar to the maintenance of a second suit in a different court upon the same matter by the same party, or his privies.

Id. at 184. The doctrine is judicially-created and is based on public policy requiring a definite end to litigation. It permits a litigant to press his claims but once, and requires him to be bound by the determination of the forum he has chosen, so that he may have one day in court but not two. Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., Del.Supr., 148 A.2d 770, 775 (1959).

9) Under Delaware law, res judicata bars litigation between the same parties if the claims in the later litigation arose from the same transaction that forms the basis of the previous adjudication. Maldonado, 417 A.2d at 381; Ezzes v. Ackerman, Del.Supr., 234 A.2d 444 (1967); Steigman v. Beery, Del.Ch., 203 A.2d 463 (1964). Even if a substantive theory of recovery asserted in a subsequent lawsuit is different from that presented in prior litigation, when the second action is based on the same transaction as the first, the claim has been split and must be dismissed. Maldonado, 417 A.2d at 382. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. f & j.

10) When a defendant claims that the doctrine of res judicata bars the subsequent action, he or she must show that the elements of res judicata exist. First, the same transaction must form the basis for the prior and subsequent suits. Second, the plaintiff must have neglected or failed to...