Webster v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 348 A.2d 329
• Parties: Judith WEBSTER, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Illinois, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 27 October 1975
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 329

348 A.2d 329

Judith WEBSTER, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a

corporation of the State of Illinois, Defendant.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Submitted Aug. 18, 1975.

Decided Oct. 27, 1975.

Upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. Denied.

Stephen B. Potter, Wilmington, for plaintiff.

F. Alton Tybout, Tybout & Redfearn, Wilmington, for defendant.

WALSH, Judge.

Plaintiff, Judith Webster, initiated this action to reocver for so-called 'no-fault insurance' benefits under the provisions of her contract of insurance with the defendant, State Farm Insurance Company. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff has split her cause of action since she failed to join State Farm as a defendant in a separate tort action filed against the operator of the automobile whose alleged negligence caused the accident which gave rise to the claim for no-fault benefits.

The precipitating accident occurred on July 19, 1972, and during the ensuing twelve months plaintiff applied for and received no-fault benefits from State Farm for medical expenses and lost wages. A disagreement arose between plaintiff and State Farm concerning her entitlement to benefits beyond the twelve month period. In 1974, plaintiff filed suit in this Court against the alleged tort-feasor for damages in excess of those provided by her no-fault benefits (Webster v. Drozdov, et al., Civil Action No. 499, 1974). The matter ultimately proceeded to trial and on February 24, 1975, resulted in an award of damages. ¹ On March 21, 1975, plaintiff commenced the present action to recover those damages not claimed in the previous action by reason of the statutory exclusion reflected in 21 Del.C. § 2118(g). ²

In essence, the Court is asked to decide whether a plaintiff may maintain two separate actions--one against a tort-feasor and the other against her no-fault insurance carrier, both arising out of a single accident, without violating the common law rule against splitting a cause of action or the provisions of Delaware's No-Fault Insurance Statute (21 Del.C. § 2118).

Plaintiff contends that while the accident was the precipitating cause of both lawsuits the causes of action are distinctly different since the prior litigation was based on negligence while the present suit involves a contractural dispute between herself and her no-fault insurance carrier. Indeed, plaintiff argues, the statutory prohibition against the introduction of proof of no-fault damages is a clear intimation that the recovery for such damages should be no part of the third-party litigation. State Farm, on the other hand, argues that the language of § 2118(g) does not preclude recovery of the no-fault benefits from plaintiff's own insurance carrier in the same lawsuit and, had plaintiff originally joined State Farm in her action against Drozdov, not only would the no-fault dispute be resolved but State Farm would have been in a position to assert its subrogated interest for benefits already paid.

The common law rule against the splitting of one cause of action is rooted in the need to protect a defendant from a multiplicity of suits and their attendant harassment. White v. Metzer, Del.Super., 2 Storey 449, 159 A.2d 788 (1960). An equally compelling consideration is one founded on public policy: piecemeal litigation of a single cause of action is contrary to the orderly administration of justice. I Am.Jur.2d Actions § 128.

Two factors loom large in a determination of whether there has been a splitting of a cause of action. First, whether there are different bases for recovery and secondly, whether there is an identity of parties. ³ While traditional concepts aid in this analysis, the effect of the Delaware No-Fault act must be the dominant consideration since statutory restrictions may override policy considerations.

Are these actions distinguishable on the bases of recovery? The first suit was clearly a tort action involving both disputed liability and the measure of damages. In the absence of no-fault benefits, the plaintiff would have pleaded and claimed for all damages attributable to the accident. The no-fault statute, however, requires that plaintiff look to different entities for total recovery--her own insurance carrier for special damages under $10,000 and the alleged tort-feasor for general unlimited damages. This suit arises Ex contractu, with the primary issue not negligence but causation and medical ascertainability of damages within twelve months of the accident.

From the viewpoint of identity of parties or privity the lawsuits are obviously dissimilar. The Delaware cases which have applied the prohibition against splitting involved a common defendant. In Levitt v Simco Sales Service of Penna., Del.Super., 11 Terry 552, 135 A.2d 910 (1957), the Court dismissed an action for personal injuries on behalf of a plaintiff who had earlier sued the same defendant in another state for property damage arising from the same accident. The Court there noted that the emphasis must be placed on the tortious acts rather than the injury resulting therefrom. Similarly, in Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., Del.Super., 2 Storey 286, 156 A.2d 788 (1959), Judge Christie refused to permit a second action by a subrogated insurer in the name of its insured against the same defendant who, in an earlier suit, had demonstrated its non-liability for the same accident. The Court ruled there could be no separate adjudication of a claim which could have been asserted in the earlier suit on behalf of the real party in interest--the insured.

Of course, it can be argued that both plaintiff and State Farm are pursuing a common interest--to lay all damages at the door of the defendant tort-feasor. Thus it would appear appropriate to seek that result in one lawsuit rather than two. The weakness of this position is apparent. State Farm is the wrong party to assert a splitting on these lines since the prejudice of multiple suits is not upon it but upon the tort-feasor and his carrier. State Farm was not a party in interest in the first suit, made no effort to assert its...