Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews

• Decision Date: 08 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 09–13–00251–CV.,09–13–00251–CV.
• Citation: 482 S.W.3d 120
• Parties: KOUNTZE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. Coti MATTHEWS, on Behalf of her Minor Child Macy Matthews, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

482 S.W.3d 120

KOUNTZE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant

v.Coti MATTHEWS, on Behalf of her Minor Child Macy Matthews, et al., Appellees.

No. 09–13–00251–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

Submitted Dec. 4, 2013.

Decided May 8, 2014.

Thomas P. Brandt, Joshua A. Skinner, John D. Husted, Fannin Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

James Ho, Prerak Shah, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Dallas, TX, David W. Starnes, Beaumont, TX, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser, III, Liberty Institute, Piano, TX, for Appellees.

Charlotte Cover, Gibbs & Associates Law Firm, Mason, OH, for Intervenors, Randall Jennings, Missy Jennings, Ashton Jennings and Whitney Jennings.

Rebecca L. Robertson, American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, Houston, TX, Daniel Mach, Heather Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington DC, Jennifer Lee, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Texas Anti-Defamation League, Interfaith Alliance Foundation, Muslim Advocates, Union for Reform Judaism, Hadassah, Hindu American Foundation, Americans United for Separation of Church & State The Sikh Coalition.

Robert M. Cohan, Ryan D. Pittman, Jackson Walker, LLP, Dallas, TX, Marc D. Stern, General Counsel, Avital Blanchard, Assistant General Counsel, American Jewish Committee, New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae, American Jewish Committee.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Adam W. Aston, Deputy Solicitor General, Patrick K. Sweeten, Chief, Special Litigation Division, Michael Neill, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae, The State of Texas.

Sean D. Jordan, Kent C. Sullivan, Danica L. Milios, Jason C. Petty, Thomas W. Curvin, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae, Senators John Cornyn and Ted Cruz.

Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER, and HORTON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES KREGER, Justice.

This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court's denial of Kountze Independent School District's ("Kountze ISD") plea to the jurisdiction. Appellees, parents of certain cheerleaders from Kountze High School ("Parents"), brought suit against Kountze ISD and its former superintendent, Kevin Weldon, after Weldon issued a decree that prohibited the cheerleaders from including religiously-themed messages on the run-through banners used at the beginning of school football games. After a combined hearing on multiple motions, including Kountze ISD's plea to the jurisdiction, Kountze ISD's motion for summary judgment on its request for declaratory relief, and Parents' motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court issued its summary judgment order on May 8, 2013. In the order, the trial court denied Kountze ISD's plea to the jurisdiction and granted, in part, Parents' motion for partial summary judgment.¹

Kountze ISD appealed the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Appellate courts have authority to review interlocutory orders only when authorized by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex.2001). Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows an appeal from an interlocutory order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001[.]" Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp.2013). Kountze ISD is a governmental unit under section 101.001. See id. § 101.001(3)(B). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider this interlocutory appeal. See id. § 51.014(a)(8).

Kountze ISD asserts the trial court erred when it denied its plea to the jurisdiction because Parents' claims are moot and the trial court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Parents' claims. After review, we agree that Parents' constitutional claims and statutory claims under chapters 106 and 110 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code have been rendered moot. We reverse the trial court's order in part and render judgment that Kountze ISD's plea to the jurisdiction is granted as to these claims. We, therefore, vacate the October 18, 2012 temporary injunction. As to Parents' claims for attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act, we affirm that portion of the trial court's order denying Kountze ISD's plea to the jurisdiction and remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the parties are entitled to attorney's fees.

I. Factual Background

For a number of years, the Kountze High School Cheerleading Squad has prepared run-through banners for display and use at Kountze High School varsity football games.² The cheerleading squad generally holds a banner up for the football team to charge through as the players enter the field before each game. The run-through banners are usually displayed for only a short time before the players run through and destroy the banners. Though the messages have varied throughout the years, the run-through banners generally display a brief message intended to encourage the athletes and fans. The cheerleading squad decides the content of the banners and creates the banners before each game. The cheerleading squad's sponsors have traditionally reviewed and approved the content of the run-through banners to insure that the banners are appropriate for the event and do not demonstrate poor sportsmanship.

Prior to the start of the 2012 football season, the cheerleading squad decided to include references and quotes from the Bible on the banners as a way to provide a positive message of encouragement to athletes and fans. At the beginning of the 2012 football season, the cheerleading squad implemented this plan and began using run-through banners that included religiously-themed content.

On September 17, 2012, Superintendent Weldon received a letter from a staff attorney with the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF)³ . The FFRF attorney urged Weldon to take immediate action to prevent the use of run-through banners containing religious messages. She informed Weldon that the content of the banners must remain secular; otherwise, she contended the school district is in violation of the Establishment Clause. After receiving the letter and seeking legal advice, Weldon determined to restrict the use of religiously-themed messages on the run-through banners. On September 18, 2012, Weldon notified the campus principals that the run-through banners could no longer include religiously-themed messages and asked campus principals to convey this message to their staff and sponsors of student groups. Later that same day, a high school administrator made an announcement over the school's intercom system relaying Weldon's new policy. Weldon made this determination without having presented the issue to the Kountze ISD Board of Trustees.

On September 20, 2012, Parents filed an original petition, an application for a temporary restraining order, and a request for injunctive relief. On October 18, 2012, after a hearing, the trial court granted Parents' request for a temporary injunction, which prohibited Kountze ISD, Weldon, and others associated with Kountze ISD, from preventing members of the Kountze Cheerleading Squad from displaying run-through banners "containing expressions of a religious viewpoint at sporting events."

Parents have alleged a number of causes of action against Kountze ISD.⁴ Parents allege that Weldon's new policy is an unconstitutional restriction of the cheerleaders' speech, denies the cheerleaders' free exercise of religion, and denies them equal protection under the law. Parents sought injunctive relief and declaratory relief.⁵ Each claim stems from Weldon's creation of a new policy—prohibiting religious messages or symbols on run-through banners—and the school administrators' subsequent enforcement of that policy. Parents also sought attorney's fees under chapters 37, 106, and 110 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Kountze ISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, as well as a motion for summary judgment regarding its request for declaratory relief. Parents filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and granted, in part, both summary judgment motions.

II. Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claims that a plaintiff has asserted in the lawsuit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). We review the trial court's order on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.2004). In our de novo review, we do not weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claims, but we consider the plaintiff's pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002). The plaintiff bears the burden in a lawsuit to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). "[W]e construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent." Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555. If the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we will consider only the evidence relevant to the resolution of the jurisdictional issues raised. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.

III. Plea to the Jurisdiction

On appeal, Kountze ISD argues that Parents' underlying constitutional and statutory claims against Kountze ISD have been rendered moot in light of the school's change in policy.

A. The Mootness Doctrine

Mootness deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100–01 (Tex.2006). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a trial court's authority to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852...