Kovac v. S. Dakota Reemployment Assistance Div.
| Docket Number | 30105-r-SRJ |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2023 |
| Parties | BRITTAIN KOVAC, Petitioner and Appellant, v. SOUTH DAKOTA REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE DIVISION, Respondent and Appellee. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS APRIL 25, 2023
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA L. KLINGER Judge
MARIAH C. BLOOM Aberdeen, South Dakota Attorney for petitioner and appellant.
SETH A. LOPOUR COURTNEY S. CHAPMAN of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, P.C. Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for respondent and appellee.
[¶1.] The circuit court dismissed Brittain Kovac's administrative appeal from a final decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation's (DOL) Reemployment Assistance Division (RAD), determining the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Kovac appeals. We reverse and remand.
[¶2.] The facts are limited and largely undisputed. On January 24 2022, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) entered findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that Kovac was ineligible to have received $20,278.00 in federal pandemic unemployment benefits and ordered her to repay them. On February 17, 2022, the Secretary of the DOL affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Secretary's letter decision included a notice that Kovac had 30 days to appeal the decision to the circuit court. The last day for Kovac to timely file an appeal was March 22, 2022.[1]
[¶3.] On March 15, 2022, Kovac mailed an appeal letter addressed to the circuit court administrator for the Sixth Circuit Court in Hughes County. The letter shows it was also emailed to a Sixth Circuit court reporter and faxed to a number in the Sixth Circuit Administrator's office. The letter was also addressed to the DOL and RAD and showed it was faxed to both offices. The letter requested reconsideration of the ALJ's and DOL's decision and further stated "Should the S.D. Department of Labor and Reemployment Assistance not waive this overpayment please consider this letter my notice of appeal in this matter to the 6th district circuit court of South Dakota in Hughes County." A date stamp shows Sixth Circuit Administration received the mailed letter on March 17, 2022.
[¶4.] On March 22, 2022, a deputy clerk of courts for Hughes County sent Kovac a letter acknowledging that the clerk's "office is in receipt of her letter and a fax requesting to file an administrative appeal involving the [DOL]." The clerk informed Kovac that the appeal letter and fax "requesting to file an administrative appeal" was being returned unfiled because a South Dakota Supreme Court rule prohibits the clerk's office from accepting faxed or emailed pleadings.[2] The letter also informed Kovac that a case filing statement is required "to initiate a case." The clerk included a form case filing statement in the letter to Kovac. Finally, the letter advised Kovac that payment of a $70 filing fee or a request for waiver of the fee was required for the clerk to file a notice of appeal. The clerk's office provided directions to resources that would assist Kovac if she made another attempt to file.
[¶5.] Kovac made a second attempt to file a notice of appeal on April 6, 2022, including a completed UJS-338 motion and notice for hearing form, a case filing statement, and a check for the $70 filing fee. A deputy clerk for Hughes County again returned the notice of appeal "unfiled" to Kovac with a letter explaining that Kovac's pleadings did "not meet the requirements set forth in [SDCL] 1-26-31."[3] The clerk's office also returned Kovac's filing fee because it had "determined that a $70 dollar filing fee is not required to file an administrative appeal relating to Reemployment Assistance." At this point, Kovac, who had been representing herself, retained legal counsel. Counsel filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Kovac on April 26, 2022.
[¶6.] RAD moved to dismiss Kovac's appeal, arguing it was untimely. The circuit court held a hearing on RAD's motion. At the hearing, RAD asserted the case should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because a timely notice of appeal is necessary to transfer jurisdiction from the executive to the judicial branch. Kovac responded that the appeal was timely filed, and the clerk of courts erroneously returned it as unfiled. She further argued that SDCL 15-6-5(h), the provision requiring a case filing statement, does not require a separate document, and her first document contained all the information necessary to comply with the rule. Kovac also argued that her notice of appeal substantially complied with the statutory requirements for filing an appeal from an administrative agency to the circuit court. The circuit court ordered both parties to provide supplemental briefing on the definition of "file" and whether Kovac's original notice of appeal complied with SDCL 1-26-31 since it was delivered to the circuit court administrator rather than the clerk of courts' office.
[¶7.] In her supplemental brief, Kovac argued that a document is filed when it is received by the appropriate office, and therefore, her notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of courts on or before March 22, the date the clerk acknowledged receiving it. On the other hand, RAD argued that filed means a document has been delivered to and accepted by the clerk of courts and the document becomes part of the public record.
[¶8.] The circuit court issued a memorandum opinion determining under the three-day mail rule and time computations set forth in SDCL 15-6-6(a) and (e), the last day for Kovac to timely file an appeal was March 22, 2022. After analyzing this Court's precedents, the circuit court cited Abdulrazzak v. S.D. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 2020 S.D. 10, ¶¶ 14-17, 940 N.W.2d 672, 676-77, to define filing. Applying Abdulrazzak, the circuit court concluded a document is considered filed when the clerk of courts is in receipt of the document, meaning the clerk has taken physical possession of it. Despite the clerk's reference to being in "receipt" of Kovac's notice, the circuit court concluded that the clerk did not take physical possession because the notice was returned unfiled.
[¶9.] The circuit court further reasoned that a notice of appeal is only considered filed if it complies with statutory filing requirements for appeal. It determined that Kovac's failure to pay a filing fee and include a case filing statement demonstrated non-compliance with the overarching statutory scheme. The court analogized Kovac's case to Hansen v. S.D. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 1999 S.D. 135, 601 N.W.2d 617, where this Court upheld the dismissal of an inmate's appeal because the notice of appeal did not include a filing fee or waiver of the fee as required by SDCL 16-2-29(3)(j) and Supreme Court Rule codified at SDCL 15-26A-4(4). The circuit court determined the appeal was also noncompliant because SDCL 1-26-32.1 incorporates the Rules of Civil Procedure in SDCL chapter 15-6 to administrative appeals and SDCL 15-6-5(h) requires a case filing statement for all administrative appeals to the circuit court. The circuit court applied SDCL 16-2-47 to determine that the clerk of courts acted well within its discretion by rejecting Kovac's notice. "A clerk of courts may refuse to file or docket any document that the law does not require or authorize a clerk to file or docket." SDCL 16-2-47.
[¶10.] The circuit court further rejected Kovac's claim that substantial compliance with SDCL 1-26-31 was sufficient to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction. And, in the alternative, the court concluded that Kovac did not substantially comply with the appeal statute because she sent her notice to the Sixth Circuit Administrator's office and failed to include the case filing statement.
[¶11.] The circuit court dismissed Kovac's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to Kovac's failure to timely perfect an appeal. Kovac appeals, raising the single issue of whether the circuit court erred when it granted RAD's motion to dismiss.
[¶12.] We review a circuit court's dismissal of an administrative appeal "for lack of appellate jurisdiction 'as a "question of law under the de novo standard of review."'" Abdulrazzak, 2020 S.D. 10, ¶ 9, 940 N.W.2d at 675 (quoting Upell v. Dewey Cnty. Comm'n, 2016 S.D. 42, ¶ 9, 880 N.W.2d 69, 72). "Further, when statutory interpretation is relevant to the inquiry 'statutory interpretation is also a question of law, reviewed de novo.'" Id. (quoting Upell, 2016 S.D. 42, ¶ 9, 880 N.W.2d at 72). And "we review 'legal questions arising under the rules of civil procedure de novo, utilizing our established rules for statutory construction.'" Id. (quoting Leighton v. Bennett, 2019 S.D. 19, ¶ 7, 926 N.W.2d 465, 467-68).
[¶13.] "In administrative appeals, a circuit court's appellate jurisdiction depends on compliance with statutory conditions precedent." AEG Processing Ctr No. 58, Inc. v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue & Regul., 2013 S.D. 75, ¶ 8, 838 N.W.2d 843, 847 (citing Schreifels v. Kottke Trucking, 2001 S.D. 90, ¶ 9, 631 N.W.2d 186, 188). We have consistently stated that compliance with SDCL 1-26-31 is an essential condition precedent to a circuit court's appellate jurisdiction because it transfers jurisdiction from the executive to the judicial branch. Abdulrazzak, 2020 S.D. 10, ¶ 11, 940 N.W.2d at 675 (quoting Slama v. Landmann Jungman Hosp., 2002 S.D. 151, ¶ 4, 654 N.W.2d 826, 827). We have further stated that substantial compliance will not be accepted as a substitute to strict textual compliance with jurisdictional prerequisites. AEG, 2013 S.D. 75, ¶ 23, 838 N.W.2d at 850 ()....
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