Kozol v. Washington State Department of Corrections
| Decision Date | 09 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | 45601-0-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STEVEN P. KOZOL, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ERIC JACKSON, and GREG JONES, Respondents. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Steven P. Kozol appeals the superior court's orders denying his motion to file a second amended complaint, granting the Department of Corrections' (DOC) motion to dismiss his Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act[1] (UDJA) complaint challenging a prison disciplinary infraction, and dismissing his claims with prejudice. Because Kozol's claims were not within the scope of the UDJA, the superior court did not err in dismissing Kozol's UDJA claims and we affirm that order. But because the superior court should have allowed Kozol to amend his complaint to include his proposed statutory writ of certiorari, we reverse the order denying the motion to amend in part and remand to allow Kozol to amend his complaint to include the statutory writ and for further proceedings.
Kozol is an inmate confined in a DOC facility. On April 6, 2011 following a disciplinary hearing, DOC disciplinary hearings officer Greg Jones found Kozol guilty of a serious prison disciplinary infraction committed on September 10, 2010. Jones sanctioned Kozol to 10 days cell confinement and required him to send some of his personal property consisting of "music-related items" out of the prison system. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 68. Kozol appealed the infraction and DOC Associate Superintendent of Programs Eric Jackson affirmed Jones's decision.
In January 2013, Kozol filed a complaint in the Thurston County Superior Court against the DOC requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Kozol moved to amend his complaint, this time including a claim for monetary damages; the DOC did not oppose this motion. But the DOC moved to dismiss any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under CR 12(c). The superior court dismissed with prejudice any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the DOC. The court also granted Kozol's motion to amend.
Kozol's amended complaint added Jones and Jackson as defendants. Kozol asserted that Jones, acting in his official capacity, had violated his (Kozol's) due process rights by failing to timely provide Kozol with copies of all of the evidence used against him at the infraction hearing as required under WAC 137-28-290(2)(f) and by failing to allow Kozol to present documentary evidence in his defense as required under WAC 137-28-300(6). Kozol further asserted that Jackson, acting in his official capacity, had filed a false public record in violation of RCW 40.16.030[2] when he filed the decision affirming Jones's decision.
Kozol asked the superior court to enter a declaratory judgment under the UDJA finding that (1) the DOC and the individually named defendants had violated WAC 137-28-290(2)(f) and WAC 137-28-300(6), (2) Jackson's act of filing the appeals decision amounted to a filing of a false public record and "constitutes a felony violation of RCW 40.16.030, " and (3) the guilty finding was "unlawful and void." CP at 19. He also asked that the court prohibit the DOC from using this infraction against him in any way. In addition, Kozol requested significant monetary damages for the injuries caused by the alleged violations of the WACs and Jackson's alleged act of filing a false public record.
The DOC again moved for dismissal under CR 12(c). It argued that the superior court did not have jurisdiction over a felony allegation filed in a civil action, that there was no private cause of action for violations of ch. 137-28 WAC, that Kozol's challenges to his infraction were more properly presented as a personal restraint petition (PRP), and that Kozol could not obtain declaratory relief under the UDJA on his prison disciplinary infraction claim.
Relying onBainbridge Citizens United v. Department of Natural Resources, 147 Wn.App. 365, 198 P.3d 1033 (2008), the DOC argued that the UDJA could not be used to determine if an agency had properly applied or administered an agency regulation or to enforce the criminal law. Citing Kitsap County v. Smith, 143 Wn.App. 893, 180 P.3d 834 (2008), Kozol[3] asserted that the UDJA applied because they involved issues of public importance and the interpretation and application of a criminal statute or rule and this was the only way he could obtain review within the Washington court system. Kozol also argued that he could not file a PRP because he could not establish that he was under restraint as defined by RAP 16.4.
The superior court rejected Kozol's argument that he could request declaratory judgment on the issue of whether Jackson had violated a criminal law. It distinguished Kitsap County where the court needed to determine if a criminal statute had been violated before it could resolve the UDJA action. The superior court then stated that the UDJA "is intended for specific situations where there is a need for a court to come in and define the rights and responsibilities of the parties" and that the issues must be of "great public importance, " but neither was present in this case. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 4, 2013) at 15. The court also stated that Kozol's complaint addressed a single disciplinary hearing and that application of the DOC's rules in one instance was not a matter of widespread importance. Additionally, the court found that because Kozol could file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, he had another available remedy.
After announcing that it was granting the DOC's motion to dismiss Kozol's UDJA claims, the superior court commented on Kozol's request for damages. The superior court stated that it was unclear whether Kozol was attempting to also proceed, under "some kind of tort theory" that might be able to go forward. RP (Oct. 4, 2013) at 16. The superior court advised the parties that it would hear argument about whether Kozol was attempting to bring a tort claim when the parties next appeared to present the orders on the DOC's motion to dismiss the UDJA claims.
Shortly before the next hearing, Kozol moved to file a second amended complaint. Kozol's proposed second amended complaint (1) purported to dismiss any damages claims, (2) attempted to recharacterize his previous UDJA claims as seeking a declaration of "all inmate['s]" rights under the WACs, (3) alleged that the DOC had violated its own regulations, and (4) requested a constitutional and/or statutory writ of certiorari. CP at 108. The DOC argued that this motion to amend was untimely because the superior court had already dismissed all claims except for a possible tort claim.
At the next hearing, the superior court addressed Kozol's second motion to amend. The court stated that the newly proposed amended UDJA claims were essentially new claims because they would require examination of the prison disciplinary system as a whole rather than just the procedure that was applied to Kozol. The court also stated that although it was possible that Kozol could pursue a writ of certiorari, that legal theory was also broader than the claims Kozol originally alleged. Accordingly, the superior court denied Kozol's second motion to amend; it also signed the order granting the DOC's motion to dismiss and dismissing Kozol's claims with prejudice.
Kozol appeals the order granting the DOC's motion to dismiss and dismissing his claims with prejudice and the order denying his second motion to amend.
Kozol argues that the superior court erred in dismissing his UDJA claims. We hold that the superior court properly dismissed these claims because they were not within the scope of the UDJA.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling dismissing a case under CR 12(c).[4] P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPICorp., 176 Wn.2d 198, 203, 289 P.3d 638 (2012). We examine the pleadings "to determine whether the claimant can prove any set of facts, consistent with the complaint, that would entitle the claimant to relief." Parrilla v. King County, 138 Wn.App. 427, 431, 157 P.3d 879 (2007). On a CR 12(c) motion, we presume that the allegations asserted in the complaint are true. Parrilla, 138 Wn.App. at 431-32.
One of the grounds the superior court cited for the dismissal was that Kozol's claims were outside the scope of the UDJA. The superior court was correct.
The UDJA allows courts to "declare rights, duties, status and other legal relations" between parties. RCW 7.24.010. Kozol sought a declaration that the DOC had failed to follow the hearing procedures required under ch. 137-28 WAC and related injunctive relief, such as prohibiting the DOC from using the infraction against him in any way. He was not seeking to establish what requirements the regulations imposed and the DOC was not asserting that Kozol misinterpreted those regulations. Furthermore, Kozol was not seeking a declaration of status or any other legal relationship between the parties. And as we noted in Bainbridge Citizens United, declaratory judgment is proper to determine the facial validity of an enactment, not its application or administration. 147 Wn.App. at 374 ( to reach the issue of whether the Department of Natural Resources properly applied or administered certain regulations under the UDJA). Thus, this was not a proper action under the UDJA.
Kozol argues this approach unnecessarily limits the UDJA and that the UDJA allows courts to determine whether a party's actions violated the law. He cites several cases that he asserts provide examples of courts determining if a party violated the law. But these cases either involve declaratory judgments under statutes...
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