Kraft v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CIV,2 |
| Citation | 431 P.2d 917,6 Ariz.App. 276 |
| Parties | Richard A. KRAFT, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 269. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Miller & Pitt, by David J. Leonard, Tucson, for appellant.
Rees, Estes & Browning, by Paul G. Rees, Jr., Tucson, for appellee.
Richard A. Kraft sought a declaratory judgment to have Allstate Insurance Company declared liable to him under the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile liability policy issued to him by that company. The superior court trial was to the court, sitting without a jury, on stipulated facts. Judgment was granted the insurance company declaring it to be free of liability to Kraft. On January 13, 1964, Kraft had sustained bodily injuries in an automobile collision while he was a passenger in an automobile driven by Ralph R. Ramsey. Ramsey's vehicle, while stopped at an intersection, was struck head-on by an automobile owned and driven by Willard Cook, an uninsured motorist. Ramsey had an automobile liability policy with Travelers Insurance Company providing uninsured motorist protection with the limitation that a party was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits if he had received the maximum allowed by the policy under the liability coverage. Kraft's Allstate Insurance Company policy specified that the uninsured motorist coverage did not apply:
'To bodily injury of an insured sustained while in or upon, entering into or alighting from, any automobile, other than an owned automobile, If the owner has insurance similar to that afforded by this Section and such insurance is available to the insured; * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
Kraft made a claim against Ramsey and his insurer, Travelers Insurance Company, for damages suffered from Ramsey's alleged negligent operation of his automobile. Kraft contended that his injuries were caused by the combined negligence of Cook and Ramsey. Travelers Insurance Company, recognizing a possible exposure to liability under Ramsey's personal liability coverage, paid Kraft $10,000 under that portion of the policy. 1 For this payment, Kraft and his wife executed a 'covenant not to sue or prosecute, further,' reserving all rights against Allstate Insurance Company and Cook, the uninsured motorist.
The superior court resolved the issue of coverage in favor of Allstate Insurance Company for the reason that Ramsey had insurance:
'* * * similar to that afforded by Coverage S (Allstate policy) * * * and such insurance was available to the plaintiff, Richard A. Kraft, at the time of the collision and became unavailable to the plaintiff, Richard A. Kraft, as the result of his negotiations with the Travelers Indemnity Company and the execution and delivery to the Travelers Indemnity Company of a 'COVENANT NOT TO SUE OR PROSECUTE FURTHER' by the plaintiff, Richard A. Kraft, and his wife, Patricia Kraft. * * *'
The facts being undisputed, we are at liberty to draw our own legal conclusions from them. Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 91 Ariz. 253, 371 P.2d 879 (1962); Arizona State Tax Commission v. First Bank Building Corp., 5 Ariz.App. 594, 429 P.2d 481 (1967). Allstate Insurance Company contends that Ramsey's insurance policy was 'other insurance' which relieved it of liability under the terms of its policy. The exclusion provision of the Allstate Insurance Company policy requiring (1) existence of 'other insurance' and (2) that such other insurance be available, poses the question: 'Was such other insurance 'available'?' Critical to the determination of this question is the provision of the Travelers Insurance Company policy which we have previously paraphrased, limiting liability under the uninsured motorist protection coverage as follows:
'(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is insured under this Part shall be reduced by
'1. All sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of
'(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured automobile and
'(ii) any other person or organization jointly or severally liable together with such owner or operator for such bodily injury including all sums paid under Coverage A. * * *'
(Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that Travelers Insurance Company was relieved under the uninsured motorist coverage provision to the extent that the policy limits had been expended to pay sums '* * * which the insured shall become legally obligated as damages. * * *'
We must determine whether 'other similar insurance available' means insurance proceeds that an insured may collect and spend, or simply, as Allstate Insurance Company contends, 'other' insurance existing on paper. Or, stated another way, does the word 'available' mean actually available to the insured, or, as found by the trial court, available at the time of the accident?
' Uninsured motorist' insurance coverage is designed to close the gap in protection afforded under Financial Responsibility Acts which do not protect those injured by financially irresponsible motorists and hit-and-run drivers, Maryland Casualty Company v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420, 421 (1965); 12 Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:623, and has been made compulsory in a number of states. In 1965, the Arizona legislature enacted such legislation. See A.R.S. § 20--259.01, Added Laws 1965, Ch. 34, Sec. 1. The appellant concedes that this statute is inapplicable because its effective date was subsequent to the issuance of the Allstate policy. He points out that 'other insurance' provisions have been held void in several jurisdictions. See Vernon v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964); Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965); Sellers v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Fla., 185 So.2d 689 (1966). He admits, however, and we agree, that these decisions are not controlling here, as they were based upon the finding that the 'other insurance' provisions of the policies were contrary to their particular state statutes.
In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Wells, 209 F.Supp. 784 (D.C.1962), 2 the court was confronted with the same problem--construing the word 'available.' There, Travelers' uninsured motorist coverage contained an excess-type 3 'other insurance' provision and Travelers contended that 'available' meant 'available at the time of the accident.' However, the other insurance, when Travelers' insureds asserted their claims, was exhausted by payment to others injured in the same accident. 4
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