Rana v. Bishop Ins. of Hawaii, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 10097,10097 |
| Citation | 713 P.2d 1363,6 Haw.App. 1 |
| Parties | Yash RANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BISHOP INSURANCE OF HAWAII, INC., a Hawaii corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In construing a statute, the court's objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature obtained primarily from the language of the statute itself.
2. Where the language of the law in question is plain and unambiguous, the court's duty is to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.
3. Where the statutory language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, judicial construction and interpretation are warranted.
4. Courts may resort to legislative history in construing a statute.
5. The language in Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 294-2(10) and -3(c) of the Hawaii No-Fault Law is plain and unambiguous and indicates a clear legislative intent to prohibit stacking of no-fault basic coverages.
6. The legislative history of the No-Fault Law evinces a legislative concern to reduce and stabilize automobile insurance costs prevailing prior to its enactment and to provide and maintain reasonable premium rates for no-fault basic coverage. It may be discerned therefrom that the legislative intent is to prohibit stacking which will lead to higher premiums for no-fault basic coverage.
7. Since state courts are the final arbiters of the state's own law, they are not bound by the federal court's interpretation of the state's statutes.
8. The analogy of the no-fault statute to the uninsured motorist statute regarding "stacking" of policies and coverages is faulty because those statutes were enacted for entirely different purposes.
9. Once a valid notice of appeal on the merits is filed, the lower court loses jurisdiction of the case to determine the award of attorney's fees and costs.
Mark N. Henry (A. Peter Howell with him on the brief), Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.
David L. Stretch (Roy F. Hughes with him on the brief; Libkuman, Ventura, Ayabe & Hughes, of counsel), Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.
Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and TANAKA, JJ.
Plaintiff Yash Rana (Rana) appeals from the summary judgment in favor of Bishop Insurance of Hawaii, Inc. (Bishop), which dismissed Rana's complaint seeking payments of no-fault earnings loss benefits based on "stacking" no-fault insurance coverage on the seven automobiles owned by him and insured by Bishop. Rana also appeals from the order denying his motion for allowance of attorney's fees and costs.
The issues on appeal and our answers are:
1. Whether the Hawaii no-fault law, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 294 (1976, as amended) (No-Fault Law), precludes "stacking" of no-fault basic insurance coverages where the injured named insured has a single insurance policy covering seven vehicles. Yes.
2. Whether upon the filing of a valid notice of appeal on the merits, the trial court lost its jurisdiction to consider the award of attorney's fees and costs. Yes.
We therefore affirm the summary judgment, but reverse the order denying attorney's fees and costs.
The facts are not in dispute. In 1982, Bishop issued to Rana a "Business Auto Policy" insuring seven automobiles owned and utilized by Rana in his taxicab business. 1 1 On December 6, 1982, Rana was injured in an automobile collision 2 while operating one of those automobiles. He sought payments of no-fault earnings loss benefits of $2,000 per month, his actual monthly loss, on the theory that the "stacking" of no-fault basic coverage of $800 earnings loss benefits per vehicle under the policy was permitted and that the "stacked" aggregate limit would be seven vehicles times $15,000 or $105,000. Bishop, however, paid him the monthly statutory limit of $800 for his monthly earnings loss and terminated the payments at $15,000.
On June 13, 1983, Rana sued Bishop seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that he was "entitled to 'stack' the coverages and limits of all seven automobiles under the one policy," (2) a money judgment for his actual earnings loss, (3) punitive damages, and (4) attorney's fees, interest, and costs. Thereafter, Rana moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Bishop's liability under the policy and Bishop moved for summary judgment. After a joint hearing on the motions, Rana moved for allowance of attorney's fees and costs.
On July 2, 1984, the circuit court denied Rana's motion and granted Bishop's motion for summary judgment. Rana filed a timely notice of appeal on July 31, 1984. On August 12, 1984, the court denied Rana's motion for attorney's fees, and Rana filed an amended notice of appeal on August 20, 1984.
In their respective briefs, both Rana and Bishop refer to the following provisions of the No-Fault Law, which as of the date of Rana's accident on December 6, 1982, read in pertinent part as follows:
§ 294-2 Definitions. As used in this chapter:
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(10) "No-fault benefits" with respect to any accidental harm shall be subject to an aggregate limit of $15,000 per person or his survivor and means:
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(C) Monthly earnings loss measured by an amount equal to the lesser of:
(i) $800 per month[.]
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§ 294-3 Right to no-fault benefits. (a) If the accident causing accidental harm occurs in this State, every person, insured under this chapter, and his survivors, suffering loss from accidental harm arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to no-fault benefits.
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(c) "Maximum limit". The total no-fault benefits payable per person or on his death to his survivor on account of accidental harm sustained by him in any one motor vehicle accident shall be $15,000, regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved or policies applicable.
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§ 294-5 Payment from which insurer.
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(c) No payment of no-fault benefits may be made to the occupants of a motor vehicle other than the insured motor vehicle or to the operator or user of a motor vehicle engaging in criminal conduct which causes any loss.
(d) The no-fault insurance applicable on a primary basis to accidental harm to which this chapter applies is the insurance on the vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident, or, if the injured person is a pedestrian (including a bicyclist), the insurance on the vehicle which caused accidental harm to such pedestrian (including a bicyclist).
If there is no such insurance on such vehicle, any other no-fault insurance applicable to the injured person shall apply.
No person shall recover no-fault benefits from more than one insurer for accidental harm as a result of the same accident.
§ 294-11 Required optional additional insurance. (a) In addition to the no-fault coverages described in section 294-10 every insurer issuing a no-fault policy shall make available to the insured the following optional insurance under the following conditions:
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(3) Additional coverages and benefits with respect to any injury, death, or any other loss from operation of a motor vehicle. An insurer may provide for aggregate limits with respect to such additional coverage so long as the basic liability coverages provided are not less than those required by section 294-10(a) (1) and (2).
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Rana contends that the above-quoted sections of the No-Fault Law do not prohibit, but permit, the stacking 3 of no-fault policies or coverages. Bishop, on the other hand, argues to the contrary. Based on the plain and unambiguous language in HRS §§ 294-2(10) and -3(c), buttressed by the statute's legislative history, we construe the No-Fault Law to preclude stacking.
In construing a statute, the court's "objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature," Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land & Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 297, 660 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983), obtained primarily from the language of the statute itself. Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 653 P.2d 420 (1982). Thus, "where the language of the law in question is plain and unambiguous, ... our duty is only to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning." In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 61 Haw. 572, 577-78, 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980). See also Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984). However, where the statutory language "is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, ... judicial construction and interpretation are warranted[.]" In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 61 Haw. at 578, 608 P.2d at 387. See also State v. Ui, 66 Haw. 366, 663 P.2d 630 (1983). And courts may resort to legislative history in construing a statute. Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of the City & County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 390, 447, 606 P.2d 866, 899 (1980); Educators Ventures, Inc. v. Bundy, 3 Haw.App. 435, 652 P.2d 637 (1982).
We apply the foregoing guidelines in construing the No-Fault Law.
We find the language in HRS §§ 294-2(10) and -3(c) to be plain and unambiguous. HRS §§ 294-2(10) states that no-fault benefits shall be subject to "an aggregate limit of $15,000 per person or his survivor," and HRS § 294-3(c), titled "maximum limit," provides that the "total no-[6 Haw.App. 7] fault benefits payable per person" in one accident shall be $15,000, "regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved or policies applicable." (Emphasis added.) In our view, the language of those sections indicates a clear legislative intent to prohibit stacking of no-fault basic coverages.
However, the case of Yamaguchi v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 706 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.1983), which construed the No-Fault Law to permit stacking, see Part I-B infra, indicates that the statutory language may be of doubtful meaning. We will therefore resort to legislative history to ascertain the intention of the legislature in construing the No-Fault Law.
In enacting the No-Fault Law in 1...
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