Traiser v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Acc. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 21 May 1909
• Citation: 88 N.E. 901,202 Mass. 292
• Parties: TRAISER v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS' EASTERN ACCIDENT ASS'N.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

202 Mass. 292

88 N.E. 901

TRAISER v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS' EASTERN ACCIDENT ASS'N.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 21, 1909

COUNSEL

Adams &amp Blinn, for plaintiff.

Wm. F Merritt and N. Thos. Merritt, Jr., for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

The defendant's agreement was that it would pay the stipulated amount to the beneficiary appointed under the certificate within 90 days from the receipt by its board of directors 'of proof satisfactory to said board of the death of' John Gourley, 'and that his death has been caused wholly and entirely by external, violent and accidental means.' Its liability accordingly did not arise until the presentation of such proof to its board, not only of the death, but also of the fact that the cause of the death was that wentioned in this stipulation. Hatch v United States Casualty Co., 197 Mass. 101, 83 N.E. 398 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 503; Union Institution for Savings v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 196 Mass. 230, 236, 81 N.E. 994, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459; North American Life Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212. In this respect the case differs from many of those relied on by the plaintiff, in which proof only of the death was called for, without such an additional requirement as is made here. Flynn v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, 152 Mass. 288, 25 N.E. 716; Taylor v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., 79 Mass. 434; Bowen v. National Life Association, 63 Conn. 460, 27 A. 1059; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 232, 24 L.Ed. 433.

It appeared at the trial that the plaintiff had furnished to the defendant, in accordance with this condition of the policy, certain proof which included, among other sworn statements, her own affidavit and that of one Johnston, the physician who had attended the deceased member after the accident which it was claimed caused his death. The defendant then sent to the plaintiff some additional questions which it asked to have answered by Dr. Johnston. The plaintiff without objection procured through her then attorney an affidavit from Dr. Johnston, answering those questions in detail, and transmitted it to the defendant. By this affidavit it appeared that a Dr. Canfield had been the regular physician of Gourley, and had seen him just before his death. The defendant thereupon sent to the plaintiff's then attorney a list of questions to be answered under oath by Dr. Canfield, and the attorney procured and sent to the defendant an affidavit from Dr. Canfield, answering those questions. The defendant's board of directors, treating these three sets of papers as the proof furnished by the plaintiff, rejected her claim; and this suit was then brought by her to recover upon the policy.

The justice at the trial ruled, at the request of the plaintiff, that the affidavits first furnished to the defendant by the plaintiff constituted the proof which she was required to furnish, and that the subsequent affidavits of Drs. Johnston and Canfield were not a part of such proof; and this presents the first question raised upon the defendant's exceptions.

The proofs to be furnished by the plaintiff were by the terms of the policy to be satisfactory to the defendant's board of directors. This, to be sure, does not mean that the judgment of the defendant's board was to be necessarily final on the matter, but only that the proofs must be such as ought to be satisfactory to reasonable men acting reasonably. Accordingly it ordinarily will be for the jury, looking at the proof actually furnished, to say whether it was such as reasonably should have satisfied the directors. Noyes v. Eastern Accident Association, 190 Mass. 171, 182, 76 N.E. 665, and cases cited; C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Railway, 199 Mass. 220, 85 N.E. 446; Cashman v. Proctor, 200 Mass. 272, 86 N.E. 284. But it was the duty of the directors to consider in the first instance the proof submitted by the plaintiff, to weigh it, and to make up their minds whether it ought to satisfy them as reasonable men. If they thought that further proof was needed to enable them to reach a conclusion, we see no reason why they should not call for it. And their right to do so has been affirmed or assumed in many decisions. See, for example, Martin v. Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co., 151 N.Y. 94, 106, 45 N.E. 377; Baldi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 275. In Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 1 B. & S. 782, the right of the directors to obtain and consider such further evidence or information, if any, as they should think necessary, was fully recognized. In Buffalo Loan Co. v. Knights Templar Association, 126 N.Y. 450, 453, 27 N.E. 942, 943, 22 Am. St. Rep. 839, in which only proof of death was required, the court said: 'The words 'satisfactory proof' entitled the association to demand that the fact of death should be shown with reasonable definiteness and certainty; and if the proofs furnished failed to satisfy the association of the fact of death, the association acting reasonably and in good faith could require further evidence.' In some cases, not only is it assumed that new proof may be called for, but it is held that the doing so is a waiver of objection which might have been taken to the sufficiency or seasonableness of that already presented. McElroy v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 88 Md. 137, 150, 41 A. 112, 71 Am. St. Rep. 400; Tripp v. Provident Fund Society, 140 N.Y. 23, 28, 35 N.E. 316, 22 L. R. A. 432, 37 Am. St. Rep. 529; Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 59 Kan. 521, 527, 53 P. 856; Hohn v. Interstate Casualty Co., 115 Mich. 79, 72 N.E. 1105. In Campbell v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 92 Mass. 213, additional proofs were furnished by the insured and were considered without objection; and the right of the insured to make additional proof and to correct errors in that already furnished was asserted. This point has never since been questioned, though upon the main point decided the case has been often doubted and limited. We find nothing at variance with this doctrine in Goldschmidt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 N.Y. 486, 7 N.E. 408, or Louis v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 58 A.D. 137, 68 N.Y.S. 683. It may well be that if the right to call for further proof is given by the terms of the policy to only one officer of the insuring company it cannot be exercised by another; and that is all that was decided in Tessmann v. United Friends of Michigan, 103 Mich. 185, 61 N.W. 261.

It is of some importance that the plaintiff acquiesced in the request of the defendant for these additional affidavits, and furnished them through her attorney, who must be taken on the record to have acted with her consent and by her authority. We need not consider what her rights would have been if she had not done so but had elected to stand upon the proof already furnished. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 175 Ill. 332, 51 N.E. 637.

We are of opinion that the justice erred in ruling that the affidavits of Johnston and Canfield were not a part of the preliminary proof, furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant in accordance with the requirement of the policy.

The question whether upon this complete proof it would have been open to the jury to say that the board of directors, acting as reasonable men, ought to have been satisfied,...