Kraus v. Board of Ed. of City of Jennings, 57597

• Decision Date: 12 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 57597,No. 2,57597,2
• Citation: 492 S.W.2d 783
• Parties: Lawrence J. KRAUS, a minor, by T. E. Lauer, Next Friend, Respondent, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF JENNINGS, State of Missouri, a Body Politic and Corporate, et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 783

492 S.W.2d 783

Lawrence J. KRAUS, a minor, by T. E. Lauer, Next Friend, Respondent, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF JENNINGS, State of

Missouri, a Body Politic and Corporate, et al., Appellants.

No. 57597.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

March 12, 1973.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

April 9, 1973.

Phillip Frederick Fishman, St. Louis, for respondent.

Erwin Tzinberg, J. William Newbold, Ziercher, Tzinberg, Human & Michenfelder, Clayton, for appellants.

DONNELLY, Judge.

This case involves the constitutionality of regulations pertaining to the length of hair of male students in the public schools of this State.

On June 28, 1971, the Board of Education in Jennings, Missouri, as a result of previous fights and disturbances between 'long haired' and 'short haired' students in the Jennings High School, adopted a dress code. On or about September 7, 1971, plaintiff Kraus, a minor, seventeen years of age, was refused permission to register as a senior student because his hair was too long.

On October 14, 1971, plaintiff filed this action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. His petition reads, in part, as follows:

'WHEREFORE, plaintiff Kraus respectfully prays that because the acts sought to be restrained are continuing and constitute immediate danger of increasing irreparable damage and injury to plaintiff's rights pending this court's granting of a temporary injunction, this Court grant a Temporary Restraining Order to the same effect which would:

'(a) Restrain defendants during the pendency of this action from refusing to admit plaintiff to the High School;

'(b) Restrain defendants during the pendency of this action from enforcing or attempting to enforce against plaintiff any rule or regulation which regulates the length of his hair;

'(c) Restrain defendants during the pendency of this action from refusing to allow plaintiff to make up any school work he may have missed since September 7, 1971;

'(d) Order defendants to expunge any disciplinary actions from his academic record.

'ADDITIONALLY, plaintiff prays that this Court grant a Permanent Injunction:

'(e) Enjoining defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce any rule or regulation not pertaining to health or safety which regulates the length of any student's hair.

'(f) Enjoining defendants from disciplining, punishing, or in any other way acting discriminatorily or prejudicially toward plaintiff solely because of the length of his hair or because of his participation as party plaintiff in this action.'

On November 8, 1971, the trial court heard the matter and ruled 'in favor of plaintiff and against defendants.' On November 22, 1971, the trial court entered Conclusions of Law, which read, in part, as follows:

'4. That defendants have demonstrated a need for a dress code to maintain proper discipline but that this Court believes itself to be bound by Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit on October 27, 1971, which Court concluded that an almost identical hair-length code adopted by the St. Charles Board of Education was unconstitutional in violation of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

'5. That the defendants' rules and regulations dealing with hair length and style are therefore unconstitutional and therefore, void.'

On November 30, 1971, defendants' after-trial motions were overruled, and an appeal to this Court followed.

On March 7, 1972, the transcript of the record was filed in this Court. On June 19, 1972, Kraus moved to dismiss the appeal because 'the issue before the Court is moot, since Respondent graduated from Jennings Senior High School on June 8, 1972 * * *, and is therefore no longer subject to any rules or regulations promulgated by appellants.'

The order of the trial court declared the dress code unconstitutional and void. We agree the issue before this Court is moot insofar as Kraus is concerned. It is not moot insofar as appellants' operation of the school is concerned. The motion is denied.

In Bishop v. Colaw, supra, 8th Cir., 450 F.2d 1069, 1075, 1076 (October 27, 1971), the Court struck down the dress code regulation governing the hair length and style of male students in the St. Charles, Missouri, High School. The Court held that Stephen Bishop 'possessed a constitutionally protected right to govern his personal appearance while attending public high school,' and that the school administration had failed to carry 'the burden of establishing the necessity of infringing upon Stephen's freedom in order to carry out the educational mission of the St. Charles High School.'

We must conclude that the trial court erred in considering itself bound by the Bishop case. State court judges in Missouri are bound by the 'supreme law of the land,' as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States (Art. VI, Constitution of the United States.) We are not bound by general declarations of law made by lower federal courts. In United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 7th Cir. 432 F.2d 1072, 1075, 1076, cert. denied 402 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1658, 29 L.Ed.2d 148, the Court said:

'The Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or federal proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the decisions of that court on national law have binding effect on all lower courts whether state or federal. On the other hand, because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.

'(5, 6) Of course in a given factual setting when a lower federal court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its adjudication is the law of the case and its judgment is binding on all other courts, subject only to the appellate process. But that is not the situation here.'

In King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 9th Cir., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (June 25, 1971), the Court upheld provisions of dress codes providing for limitations on the length of hair of male students in two California schools, and said:

'This is not a question of preference for or against certain male hair styles or the length to which persons desire to wear their hair. This court could not care less. It is a question of the right of school authorities to develop a code of dress and conduct best conductive to the fulfillment of their responsibility to educate, and to do it without unconstitutionally infringing upon the rights of those who must live under it. We do not believe that the plaintiffs have established the existence of any substantial constitutional right which is in these two instances being infringed. We are satisfied that the school authorities have acted with consideration for the rights and feelings of their students and have enacted their codes, including the ones in question here, in the best interests of the educational process. A court might disagree with their professional judgment, but it should not take over the operation of their schools. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).'

In Freeman v. Flake, 10th Cir., 448 F.2d 258, 261, 262 (September 28, 1971), the Court upheld similar...