Kraus v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1963
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ina Claire KRAUS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, INC., and Raymond E. De Camp, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 27331.

Page 702

34 Cal.Rptr. 702

221 Cal.App.2d 736

Ina Claire KRAUS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, INC., and Raymond E. De Camp, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 27331.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Oct. 31, 1963.

Hearing Denied Dec. 18, 1963.

Samson, Goldwasser, Fry & Ritter, Los Angeles (Maurice Rose, Los Angeles, of counsel), for plaintiff and appellant.

Spray, Gould & Bowers, and Joseph L. Spray, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

KINGSLEY, Justice.

Access to the production lot of defendant studio is by means of a gate or turnstile. This turnstile resembles the ordinary revolving door, except that, instead of the usual glass panels, each panel or segment is composed of a series of metal bars. The gate is controlled by a button in the casting office, which button, when pushed, activates an electric current which releases a dog or catch. When the button is released, the dog re-engages, stopping the rotation of the gate. The evidence indicates: (a) that, in order to permit access, the control button must be kept depressed during the full period while a user passes through the gate; (b) that, occasionally, after use, the gate would stop mid-way between the engaging points for the catch, so that the gate could be moved, without activity by the controller, for approximately one-sixth of a full circle, after which it would be stopped by the catch; and (c) that, when the catch engaged, the gate, because of 'pay,' would rebound between three inches and a foot.

Plaintiff's minor daughter was engaged by defendant studio as an actress. Because of the daughter's minority, the presence of plaintiff with her daughter on the studio lot was required. Admittedly, plaintiff held the status of a business invitee, with all of the rights, duties and privileges which that status created between her and the defendants.

On the morning of August 29, 1959, the daughter was due to report at the studio for work at 7:30 A. M. The record indicates that they were a few minutes late and that the daughter entered the premises, using the turnstile, ahead of the mother, who had stayed behind to park her automobile. After securing a pass or voucher from the casting office, the mother approached the turnstile and started to pass through it. Under circumstances hereinafter discussed, she either ran into the metal bars, or was struck by them when the gate was unexpectedly stopped by reason of a premature release of the control button. She sustained injuries for which the present action was brought, naming as defendants the corporate defendant and the employee who had controlled the turnstile. After a trial before a jury, the jury returned a verdict for defendants. A motion for new trial was denied and the present appeal followed.

I

Appellant contends that the evidence does not support the verdict. The contention is without merit. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that defendant De Camp, who had operated the turnstile on the morning in question, was unfamiliar with its operation and that might have released the control button while plaintiff was only partly through the gate, thus causing it to stop, rebound and hit her. Her own testimony also negatived any conduct on her part amounting to contributory negligence. A verdict in her favor would not have been improper. However, the jury was not required to accept plaintiff's version. Not only was she subject to the ordinary implications of bias, attributable to any party, but some impeaching evidence was introduced against her. In addition, defendants' evidence not only would support a finding that De Camp was free from negligence, but also that plaintiff, already some 10 minutes late, ran toward the turnstile, with her arms loaded with purse and bundles, in an apparent effort to catch up with her daughter and eliminate any further delay in reporting, and that she ran blindly into the gate as a result of her own inattention. These are the familiar conflicts in testimony. The jury's determination against plaintiff, endorsed by the trial court's denial of a new trial, is binding on us and on her.

II

Appellant objects that error occurred in the action of the trial court in permitting the jury to view the turnstile, in allowing counsel for each party to demonstrate its operation to the jury, and in alleged improper control of the jury during the view and experimentation. Her contentions are: (a) the turnstile was not in the same condition as at the time of the accident; (b) the experiments were improper in that the jurors who participated knew beforehand that the gate would be stopped without warning, whereas plaintiff had had no such knowledge; and (c) the jurors were allowed to wander and to communicate with others.

The third point may be dismissed at once. The trial judge stated, on the record, that he had observed the conduct of the jurors during the view and experiment and that appellant's claims of misconduct were not true.

As to the other points: It is well settled that the granting or denial of a view of the premises, or the admission of experiments, lies in the discretion of the trial court. (Code of Civ.Proc. § 610; Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 738, 290 P.2d 488, 54 A.L.R.2d 10; Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel (1950) 36 Cal.2d 493, 225 P.2d 497; Shabshin v. Pacifici (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 192, 16 Cal.Rptr. 440; Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 262 P.2d 95.) As these cases point out, questions of similarity of conditions, and similar matters are primarily for the trial court in deciding to grant or not to grant permission for view or experiment; thereafter they go only to the weight of the demonstrative evidence and should be argued to the jury...