Krause v. Catholic Community Services
| Decision Date | 20 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 17566-1-I,17566-1-I |
| Citation | 737 P.2d 280,47 Wn.App. 734 |
| Parties | Agnes KRAUSE (Sneddon), Appellant, v. CATHOLIC COMMUNITY SERVICES, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., D.A. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General Social and Health Services, Seattle, amicus curiae in support of respondent.
Agnes Jean Krause appeals the superior court orders terminating her parental rights in James Sneddon and Teddy O'Leary. 1 Her appeal presents these main issues: (1) whether the Washington parental rights termination statute, which requires clear, cogent and convincing evidence of the termination allegations, is unconstitutional where one of the allegations is a prior dependency determination based upon a preponderance of the evidence and (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the termination of parental rights here.
Krause is the mother of James Sneddon, born on October 11, 1980, and Teddy O'Leary, born on June 5, 1982, who were 5 years old and 3 years and 4 months old, respectively, at the time of the termination proceedings. Krause suffers In March 1981 when James was 5 months old, he was removed from Krause's custody while she was living in Utah and he was placed in foster care. Shortly thereafter Krause was placed in the University of Utah Medical Center Psychiatric Unit and subsequently was committed to the Copper Mountain Mental Health Intensive Therapy Unit for about four months. At 2 1/2 years of age, James was returned to Krause's care and was taken to Seattle by his mother, with whom he remained for two months until he was again removed from her care and returned to Utah in May 1983 because of a manic episode which Krause experienced.
from a manic-depressive illness with acute manic phases. During the four years prior to the termination proceedings, she had been hospitalized at least four times for acute psychotic episodes. During such an episode she exhibits extreme behavior and displays a lack of judgment, disorientation, and impulsiveness. Krause has an underlying personality disorder which prevents her from having insight into her illness so that she is unaware of her behavior during manic episodes. For about two years before the termination proceedings, Krause had been relatively stable with occasional giddy episodes resulting in poor judgment in her supervision of Teddy. The trial judge found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that Krause will suffer similar episodes in the future, when she will be an extreme danger to her children
When Teddy was between 3 weeks and 4 months old, a public health nurse who visited the home on five occasions found Krause's parenting to be appropriate. In May 1983 when Teddy was 11 months old, he was removed from Krause's care when she had a manic episode during which she was observed throwing her belongings out of her second-story apartment window and dangling Teddy from the same window. At that time, Teddy was physically emaciated and emotionally disturbed. The return to Krause's care and separation from his Utah foster family had caused James severe emotional damage for which he required psychological treatment. Krause was committed to Harborview In July 1984 Krause married Steven Krause, who has been hospitalized numerous times for paranoid schizophrenia. He has responded favorably to medication but may pose an extreme danger to others if he does not receive medication.
Medical Center for treatment of her manic-depressive illness. On June 13, 1983, agreed orders were entered finding James and Teddy to be dependent children
After trial on petitions to terminate Krause's parental rights in James and Teddy, the trial court made findings pursuant to the parental rights termination statute, including a finding that termination was in each child's best interests, and issued termination orders as to both children. Krause appeals the orders.
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that
[b]efore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.
See In re Ferguson, 32 Wash.App. 865, 868, 650 P.2d 1118 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Wash.2d 589, 656 P.2d 503 (1983). Krause argues that under Santosky v. Kramer, the Washington parental rights termination statute is unconstitutional in requiring as an element of parental rights termination a finding of a prior determination of the child's dependency which under RCW 13.34.130 need be shown by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 2
In People in the Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 635 (Colo.1982), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected this same argument raised in an attack upon the Colorado statutory scheme providing for the termination of parental rights We now consider whether a decree of dependency or neglect based on facts found by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard can serve as a predicate for termination of parental rights. We conclude this is constitutionally permissible.
Accord, People in the Interest of L.L., 715 P.2d 334, 336 (Colo.1986).
no intimation in Santosky that the factual foundation for the requisite adjudication of abuse or neglect [, which provides the foundation for the termination of parental rights,] must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, ...
People in the Interest of A.M.D., supra at 636, the Colorado court arrived at its conclusion after applying the same test applied by the Santosky court--the fundamental fairness three-factor balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The three factors which must be balanced to determine the nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings are
the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. at 1395. See In re Chubb, 46 Wash.App. 530, 533-34, 731 P.2d 537 (1987).
In applying the balancing test to the question before it, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the private interest affected in a parental rights termination proceeding, which is commanding, weighs against the use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at any necessary step in such a proceeding. However, in considering the second factor, the risk of error from using a preponderance standard, the court concluded that the increased risk of the erroneous termination of parental rights by using a preponderance standard in adjudicating dependency is minimal at most. People in the Interest of A.M.D., supra at 636-37; In re Chubb, supra, 46 Wash.App. at 535, 731 P.2d 537.
In explaining its conclusion, the court examined and compared the Colorado statutory criteria for establishing dependency or neglect with the termination standards Finally, the Colorado court concluded that the State had a substantial interest in maintaining a preponderance standard at dependency or neglect adjudicatory hearings since the primary purpose of such proceedings is to help preserve and mend familial ties through State intervention, and heightening the standard of proof would tend to cast the State in the role of an adversary to the parents in an effort to gather and present evidence to meet the elevated standard, contrary to its legislatively contemplated role as a helping intervenor. People in the Interest of A.M.D., at 639-40; see In re Chubb, supra, 46 Wash.App. at 535-36, 731 P.2d 537.
which, the court held, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and noted that it is difficult to conceive of any set of circumstances under which the parental rights termination standards would be met and yet the criteria for adjudicating a child as neglected or dependent would not also be satisfied. People in the Interest of A.M.D., supra at 637-38
In concluding that the establishment of the underlying dependency determination by a preponderance of the evidence accords the parties to a parental rights termination proceeding due process of law, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that under the balancing test as applied to the Colorado statutes, the private interest affected is fully protected, the risk of error in factfinding is not appreciably increased, and the substantial governmental interest in helping families with dependent children address the causes of dependency is advanced. People in the Interest of A.M.D., supra at 640-41; People in the Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 316 (Colo.1982).
Similarly, when the three-factor balancing test is applied to the Washington parental rights termination statutory scheme, the prior dependency determination by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate the due process rights of the parties to a termination proceeding. 3
First, as pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, the private interest affected in a parental rights termination proceeding, which is weighty, militates against the use of the preponderance standard at the dependency proceeding. People in the Interest of A.M.D., supra at 636-37
However, under the Washington statutory scheme the private interest is adequately protected since the prior dependency determination can ripen into an order terminating parental rights only upon clear and convincing evidence of the termination standards. See In re Chubb, supra, 46 Wash.App. at 536, 731 P.2d 537. Moreover, as discussed below, in Washington as in Colorado, proof by clear...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Estate of Reugh
...340, 314 P.3d 729 (2013), review granted and case dismissed , 180 Wash.2d 1013, 327 P.3d 55 (2014) ; Krause v. Catholic Community Services , 47 Wash. App. 734, 748, 737 P.2d 280 (1987). A plaintiff’s right to sue cannot be objected to for the first time on appeal. Bittrick v. Consolidated I......
-
State v. Ross
...he was sorry, other than he was sorry he had been caught. Credibility determinations are for the trial court. Krause v. Catholic Comm'ty Servs., 47 Wash.App. 734, 747, 737 P.2d 280, review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1035 (1987). This factor was proven sufficiently to support an exceptional C. Soph......
-
In re Parental Rights to K.M.M.
...from additional services. See In re Welfare of H.S. , 94 Wash.App. 511, 528, 973 P.2d 474 (1999) (citing Krause v. Catholic Cmty. Servs., 47 Wash.App. 734, 747, 737 P.2d 280 (1987) ). Thus, in light of J.M.'s unwillingness to take advantage of the services that had already been provided to ......
-
In re Noelia M.
...The termination decision must be predicated upon present parental unfitness.” (Citations omitted.) Krause v. Catholic Community Services, 47 Wash.App. 734, 742, 737 P.2d 280, review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1035, 1987 WL 503439 (1987). “[A] prior dependency finding is only one factor to be consi......