Krentz v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2006 |
| Citation | 910 A.2d 20 |
| Parties | Jerry and Christine KRENTZ v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION & PA Department of Transportation Appeal of Consolidated Rail Corporation. Jerry and Christine Krentz v. Consolidated Rail Corporation & PA Department of Transportation Cross Appeal of Jerry and Christine Krentz. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Craig J. Staudenmaier, Esq., Lucinda Carolyn Glinn, Esq., Harrisburg, for Consolidated Rail Corporation.
Nancy L. Winkelman, Esq., Philadelphia, for amicus curiae Association of American Railroads.
Joseph Edward Savoca, Esq., Erik M. Humme, Esq., Julie Brown Miller, Esq., Gary Gene Krafft, Esq., Harrisburg, for Jerry and Christine Krentz.
Daniel R. Goodemote, Esq., Harrisburg, for PA Department of Transportation.
Joseph Edward Savoca, Esq., Erik M. Hume, Esq., Julie Brown Miller, Esq., Gary Gene Krafft, Esq., Harrisburg, for Jerry and Christine Krentz.
Craig J. Staudenmaier, Esq., Lucinda Carolyn Glinn, Esq., Harrisburg, for Consolidated Rail Corporation.
Nancy L. Winkelman, Esq., Philadelphia, for Association of American Railroads.
BEFORE:CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.
We are required to answer two questions that this Court has not yet had occasion to address: (1) whether the Occupied Crossing Rule should be abandoned as a judicial anachronism in light of the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act;1 and (2) whether the Federal Rail Safety Act2 preempts 18 Pa.C.S. § 6907, the Pennsylvania "blocked crossing" statute. For the reasons that follow, we answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Order of the Superior Court that affirmed in part and reversed in part the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court).
We quote the facts giving rise to the instant action, which are essentially undisputed, as the trial court stated them:
On January 13, 1995, Jerry Krentz [Krentz] was driving south on North Water Street in Lititz, PA when he drove into a Conrail freight train. The train was stationary and completely blocking the railroad crossing. According to [Krentz], he actually drove under a black tanker car before he realized there was a train on the track. Shortly after [Krentz] struck the train, it began to move and he was dragged some distance before the engineer became aware of the accident and stopped the train. [Krentz] alleges that he received a variety of injuries as a result of the accident. . . .
At the time of the accident, the train was performing a "run around". This maneuver requires the engine to detach from the train, run alongside the train on an adjacent track, and re-couple with the train at the other end, allowing the train to reverse directions. This is necessary on the track where the accident occurred as it is a dead-end spur.
Krentz v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., No. 2361-1995, at 1 (Pa. C.P. Lancaster Dec. 31 2002) ) (spacing modified).
On March 15, 1996, Krentz and his wife, Christine Krentz (collectively, "the Krentzes") filed a Complaint raising claims of, inter alia,3 negligence for failure to warn (Count I)4 and negligence per se (Count II) against Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), which owned and operated the train that Krentz struck on January 13, 1995. Conrail filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer, which the trial court: (1) sustained with respect to Count I, thereby dismissing the Krentzes' claim of negligence for failure to warn; but (2) overruled with respect to Count II. In an Order issued on August 7, 1996, the trial court cited our decision in Cella v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 364 Pa. 82, 70 A.2d 638, 639 (1950), for the principle known as the Occupied Crossing Rule, according to which a railroad owes motorists no legal duty to warn of the presence of its train at a railroad crossing.
Thereafter, several years ensued, during which time the parties conducted discovery and offered various pretrial motions. Finally, on August 22, 2002, Conrail filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count II, arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 6907 (Section 6907), which prohibits trains from blocking railroad crossings in Pennsylvania, was preempted by both the Federal Rail Safety Act ("FRSA" or "Act") and the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA).5 On December 31, 2002, the trial court granted Conrail's Motion, thereby dismissing the remainder of the Krentzes' Complaint. Without reaching the issue of whether Section 6907 conflicts with the ICCTA, the trial court held that the FRSA preempts Section 6907. In his Opinion, Judge Louis J. Farina reasoned that, in order to comply with Section 6907, Conrail would have had to alter the length of its train or forego brake system testing, both of which are governed by federal regulations issued pursuant to the FRSA.
The Krentzes appealed from the Order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Conrail, challenging the dismissal of Count II. In a published Opinion filed on December 7, 2004, a unanimous panel6 of the Superior Court reversed the trial court with respect to Count II but affirmed with respect to Count I. Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 865 A.2d 889 (Pa.Super.2004).7
The Superior Court first approved of the trial court's reliance on the Occupied Crossing Rule. Quoting the decision of a previous panel in Sprenkel v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 377, 666 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa.Super.1995), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 544 Pa. 634, 675 A.2d 1251 (Pa.1996), President Judge Del Sole, writing for the court, noted that "any change in the law in this area must come either from the legislature or our supreme court, which has perpetuated the occupied crossing rule." Krentz, 865 A.2d at 892 (quoting Sprenkel, 666 A.2d at 1102). Further, noting the existence of the Rule's exception for ultrahazardous circumstances, the Superior Court found "no error in the trial court's refusal to apply such an exception to this case." Id. (). Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the August 7, 1996 Order of the trial court sustaining the Preliminary Objections of Conrail, thereby dismissing the Krentzes' claim of negligence for failure to warn.
With respect to Count II, the Superior Court first drew a distinction between the FRSA, which "regulates the field of railroad safety," and Section 6907, which "is concerned with highway safety." Id. at 893. The Superior Court then proceeded explicitly to reject the rationale of the trial court and noted the possibilities of a jury's finding that: (1) the train in the instant case blocked the crossing for a reasonable length of time, "even if wholly attributable to federal safety regulatory requirements;" and (2) in a future case, if not in this one, "a blocking may be for a reason unrelated to any area of federal regulation." Id. at 894. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the December 31, 2002 Order of the trial court dismissing the Krentzes' claim of negligence per se and remanded the matter for trial.8
Both Conrail and the Krentzes petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal from the Order of the Superior Court. We granted their cross appeals on December 29, 2005.
The presently applicable standard of review is well settled:
An appellate court should affirm an order of a trial court . . . sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer where, when all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the complaint and all inferences fairly deducible from those facts are accepted as true, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. The court need not, however, accept any of the complaint's conclusions of law or argumentative allegations.
Small v. Horn, 554 Pa. 600, 722 A.2d 664, 668 (1998) (internal citation omitted). "Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it." Price v. Brown, 545 Pa. 216, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1996).
In sustaining Conrail's Preliminary Objections to the Krentzes' claim of negligence for failure to warn, the trial court invoked the Occupied Crossing Rule (OCR). On appeal, the Krentzes urge us to abrogate the OCR, which, according to the Krentzes, "conflicts with the express provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act." (Brief of the Krentzes as Appellants at 7). Should we decide to uphold the OCR, the Krentzes argue in the alternative that the OCR is presently inapplicable in light of the ultrahazardous circumstances surrounding Krentz's accident.
Pursuant to the Occupied Crossing Rule, "a railroad company cannot ordinarily be found negligent because it failed to station guards or light the car, or otherwise give warning of its presence in the highway." Cella v. Pa. R. Co., 364 Pa. 82, 70 A.2d 638, 640 (1950).9 The rationale for the Rule is that "common experience dictates that an object as large as a freight car is, of itself, sufficient notice of its presence to warn any person using the highway with ordinary care." Id. at 639.
The OCR is as securely affixed to our jurisprudence as train tracks are to the land that they traverse. See Wilson v. Pa. R. Co., 421 Pa. 419, 219 A.2d 666, 669 n. 1 (1966); Hogg v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co., 373 Pa. 632, 96 A.2d 879, 884-85 (1953); Yolton v. Pa. R. Co., 368 Pa. 429, 84 A.2d 501, 503 (1951); Cella, supra; Pa. R. Co. v. Driscoll, 336 Pa. 310, 9 A.2d 621, 630-31 (1939); Everetts v. Pa. R. Co., 330 Pa. 321, 198 A. 796 (1938); see also Dollison v....
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