Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 07 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. M2009-00011-SC-R11-HC,M2009-00011-SC-R11-HC
• Citation: 313 S.W.3d 751
• Parties: Terrance Lavar DAVIS v. STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

313 S.W.3d 751

Terrance Lavar DAVIS v. STATE of Tennessee.

No. M2009-00011-SC-R11-HC

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

February 11, 2010 Session.

May 7, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel, for the appellant, the State of Tennessee.

Jay Norman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Terrance Lavar Davis.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a concurring opinion. GARY R. WADE, J., filed an opinion concurring separately, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., joined.

We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to address the legality of a plea-bargained sentence requiring the defendant, being sentenced for two cocaine offenses committed in a school zone, to serve twenty-two years of a Range I sentence at "100%." The defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal because it makes no provision for the possibility of early release on parole. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the defendant's sentence is not illegal, and he is therefore not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant Terrance Lavar Davis ("Defendant") was charged with (1) felonious possession of over twenty-six grams of cocaine in a school zone; (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (3) delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone; and (4) delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.¹ Defendant pleaded guilty to the first and third of these charges and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years;² the remaining two counts were dismissed. In conjunction with entering his pleas, Defendant signed two petitions to enter a plea of guilty in which he acknowledged that he was subject to being sentenced as a Range II offender. Pursuant to his plea agreement, however, Defendant was actually sentenced as a Range I offender. Each of the petitions to enter a plea of guilty bears the notation "(EFFECTIVE SENTENCE 22 YRS @ 100%)." Further, each of the two judgments of conviction bears the notation "100%" entered by hand in the same line indicating that Defendant was sentenced to incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC").

Although the transcript of the plea hearing is not in the record,³ we have gleaned some additional background from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion denying the petition for post-conviction relief Defendant filed after entering his pleas. See Davis v. State, No. M2005-01902-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 3290822 (Tenn. Crim.App. Nov. 13, 2006). During the post-conviction hearing, Defendant "admitted that when he entered his pleas the trial judge told him his sentence was twenty-two years at 100%." Id. at *2. Defendant's counsel also testified at the hearing and stated that "he told Defendant he would have to serve 100% of his sentence." Id. Following the hearing, "the post-conviction court found that Defendant was informed by counsel and the trial court that he was receiving a sentence of twenty-two years that must be served at 100%." Id. at *5. The post-conviction court also "noted that Defendant had above average intellect, was familiar with criminal proceedings, was represented by a competent attorney, was aware of the charges against him and the potential penalties, and avoided federal prosecution, and received concurrent sentences as a result of his pleas." Id. The trial court denied post-conviction relief and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at *6.

Following his unsuccessful effort to obtain post-conviction relief, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 9, 2007. Defendant admits in his petition that, pursuant to his plea agreement, "his sentences are to be served with a release eligibility set at one hundred percent," but contends that a 100% release eligibility renders his judgments and sentences void and illegal. The trial court denied relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Defendant's sentences are illegal and remanded. Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. May 6, 2008). This Court granted the State's application for permission to appeal and remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn.2008). Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-SC-R11-HC (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2009). Following remand and reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again reversed the trial court and remanded. Davis v. State, No. M2009-00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn.Crim.App. April 8, 2009). We granted the State's application for permission to appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether to grant relief upon review of a petition for habeas corpus is a question of law. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn.2000). Accordingly, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the conclusions of the court below. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn.2005).

ANALYSIS

This case requires us once again to examine a particular sentence and determine whether it is beyond a trial court's jurisdiction to impose and therefore requires us to grant habeas corpus relief. A brief review of our statutory sentencing scheme and the principles of habeas corpus jurisprudence as applied to sentences is helpful to our analysis.

I. Statutory Sentencing Scheme

A. Range Classification

Under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2006 & Supp.2009), a trial court's first obligation in imposing sentence is to "determine the appropriate range of sentence." Id. § 40-35-210(a). Two alternatives exist for determining a defendant's appropriate range of sentence. One alternative requires the trial court to make findings of fact about how many prior felony convictions the defendant has and to determine the felony classes to which those prior convictions belong. See id. §§ 40-35-105 to -109. On that basis, the trial court determines that the defendant is either a standard Range I offender, id. § 40-35-105; a multiple Range II offender, id. § 40-35-106; a persistent Range III offender, id. § 40-35-107; a career Range III maximum offender, id. § 40-35-108; or an especially mitigated Range I reduced offender, id. § 40-35-109. The other alternative allows the defendant and the State to negotiate a plea bargain that includes a range classification.⁴ Thus, as in the present case, a defendant who would otherwise be classified as a multiple Range II offender may negotiate a plea bargain which includes a standard Range I offender classification instead.

The classification of a defendant for sentencing range purposes is significant because the higher ranges carry longer sentence terms. For instance, the Range I sentence for a Class A felony is fifteen to twenty-five years. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(1). The Range II sentence for a Class A felony is twenty-five to forty years. Id. at (b)(1). The Range III sentence for a Class A felony is forty to sixty years. Id. at (c)(1). It therefore benefits defendants to seek the lowest possible range classification, either through contesting the State's proof about prior convictions or through plea negotiations.

Once the appropriate range is determined, and after considering any mitigating and enhancement factors that apply, the trial court imposes a specific term of years within that range. Id. § 40-35-210(c). Alternatively, a plea bargain may include both a range classification and an agreed-upon term of years. The trial court (or plea bargaining parties) must also determine (1) the manner in which the defendant will serve his or her sentence, for example, incarcerated in the TDOC or on probation, id. at (b), and (2) if the defendant is being sentenced for more than one conviction (or is currently serving another sentence), whether the terms imposed for each conviction are to be served concurrently or consecutively, id. § 40-35-115.

B. Early Release

1. Parole

The sentencing range is important for another reason. For most felonies, a defendant ordered to serve his or her sentence incarcerated in the TDOC becomes eligible for early release on parole⁵ upon reaching his or her "release eligibility date" ("RED"). Id. § 40-35-501(a)(1). A defendant's RED is expressed as a percentage of his or her sentence and is generally determined by reference to the defendant's sentencing range classification. Thus, "release eligibility for each defendant sentenced as a Range I standard offender shall occur after service of thirty percent (30%) of the actual sentence imposed less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant." Id. at (c) (emphasis added). And, "release eligibility for each defendant sentenced as a Range II multiple offender shall occur after service of thirty-five percent (35%) of the actual sentence imposed less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant." Id. at (d) (emphasis added). The RED is based on service of a progressively greater percentage of the defendant's sentence as his or her sentencing range increases. A defendant's RED is indicated on his or her uniform judgment document by checking a box labeled, e.g., "Mitigated 20%," "Standard 30%," or "Multiple 35%." As is clear from the term "shall occur" in section -501, felony inmates are generally entitled to be considered for parole after a date certain.⁶

As with most general rules, however, there are exceptions. For instance, our legislature has specified that, for a few enumerated violent offenses, "there shall be no release eligibility." Id. at (i)(1). That is, defendants convicted of these...