Kriel v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 19 June 1869 |
| Citation | 68 Ky. 362 |
| Parties | William Kriel v. Commonwealth. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
1. When the State makes out an unlawful homicide with a deadly weapon, and identifies the accused as the perpetrator, it has shown all that is essential to conviction.
2. Necessary self-defense, or misadventure, or insanity, moral or mental, as an excuse, comes as a defense.
3. Sanity is always presumed by law. This universal presumption can only be rebutted by satisfactory evidence; that is, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence, whether produced by the one side or the other, that the perpetrator of a homicide, not in necessary self-defense, nor by mere unintentional accident, was irresponsibly insane when the deed was perpetrated; for evidence, merely raising a doubt as to mental soundness, would not be sufficient to repel the legal presumption of soundness.
4. It is the legal duty of all juries to convict the perpetrator of an unjustifiable and, prima facie, inexcusable homicide, unless the evidence rationally convinces them that at the time of the killing, the perpetrator was laboring under such a state of mental aberration and disease as to deprive him of a knowledge of right and wrong; or if he knew this, still to take from him the moral power to resist his morbid inclination to its perpetration.
5. A mere doubt of sanity, however rational, is wholly insufficient to rebut this legal presumption, and can never be a justification to a jury to acquit; whilst, on the other hand--
6. If the preponderating evidence convinces the jury that the perpetrator was in such a mentally diseased condition as to destroy his free agency, they should not convict merely because they might entertain a rational doubt as to this. The presumption of sanity must be overcome by a preponderance in the prisoner's behalf.
7. A rational doubt as to whether a homicide had been committed or as to the perpetrator, should very rationally lead to an acquittal; but if acquittal should result from a mere doubt of sanity, then the legal presumption of soundness would amount to but little, if anything.
8. A mere doubt of sanity has never entered as an element into that rational doubt which should produce acquittal.
9. Mental or moral insanity, however recent, to such an extent as to destroy free agency and moral responsibility, on being established by satisfactory evidence, will excuse the prisoner.
10. Malice is an essential ingredient in murder; but this, too is to be presumed from the violence and wantonness of the assault, and character of the weapon used.
11. When sudden passion has been produced from reasonable cause this will repel the presumption of malice, and palliate the offense to manslaughter; and--
12. Our Criminal Code gives the prisoner the benefit of a rational doubt as to which grade of offense has been committed.
13. Drunkenness from mere social hilarity, though wrong in the perpetration, may be of such a character, and to such a degree, as to show that the mind was incapable of preconceived malice or intentional homicide, and reduce the homicide to manslaughter; but as this state of mind is superinduced by the wrongful act of the perpetrator, a due regard for the interest of society, and the personal security of every one, precludes it from being a satisfactory excuse, and an entire exemption from punishment.
14. Excuse, because of drunkenness, is at all times to be received with great caution, and, because it is so easily perverted, and the danger so great of revenge, for real or imaginary cause of pre-existing offense or malice, under such cover.
15. " If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused, at the time of the alleged killing, they must acquit him, and it is immaterial how that insanity was superinduced." This instruction is erroneous. It required of the jury, before they could convict, that they should believe the prisoner was sane beyond a rational doubt at the time of the killing.
16. Misnomer in the indictment. Accused was indicted for killing " Barbara Kriel, the wife of the defendant." The evidence showed that her name was Margaret Kriel. In the court below no objection to the evidence was made on that account, and no motion made to withdraw it from the jury. After conviction this court cannot suppose the misdescription of the given name, when placed in juxtaposition with the further description that she was his wife, could have misled him, or in any manner prevented him from a fair trial. (See sec. 127, Criminal Code. )
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.
WM. L. JACKSON and SELBY HARNEY, For Appellant,
CITED--
Criminal Code, secs. 327, 328, 334, 335, 242, 344, 124, 264, 629, 226.
4 State Trials, 748; 6 Ib., 259.
2 Russell on Crimes, pp. 926-7, 732-3, 828, 725.
1 Ib., 481, 832; 2 Greenleaf on Ev., p. 673.
2 Phillips on Ev., 423, 759, 725.
18 B. Mon., 792; Thurman vs. Virgin and wife.
4 Bibb, 349; Haly vs. McCay.
1 J. J. M., 422; Royal vs. Bryan.
4 B. Mon., 476; Chrisman vs. Gregory's heirs.
6 J. J. Mar., 606; Fowler vs. Woodyard.
2 Bush, 82; Commonwealth vs. Shields.
3 Bibb, 486; Commonwealth vs. Keen.
1 Met., 376; Payne vs. Commonwealth.
16 B. Mon., 596; Graham vs. Commonwealth.
1 Duvall, 232; Commonwealth vs. Smith.
3 Dana, 31; Honore vs. Maney.
2 Bibb, 33; Mahan vs. Jane.
1 J. J. M., 320; McKinney vs. Commonwealth.
1 Mar., 579; Haggin vs. Christian.
1 J. J. M., 52, 432; 1 B. Mon., 82.
4 B. Mon., 476, 522; 7 B. Mon., 196.
14 B. Mon., 484; 16 Pick., 120; 4 Blackstone, 196.
3 Met., 6; Commonwealth vs. Perigo.
31 Miss. (2 George ), 504; Cotton vs. State.
4 Mass., 391; Commonwealth vs. Drew, & c.
1 Bush, 11; Hensley vs. Commonwealth.
3 Bush, 112; Sparks vs. Commonwealth.
JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, For Appellee,
CITED--
Wharton's Amr. Crim. Law, sec. 950.
Revised Statutes, 2 Stanton, 414.
Criminal Code, secs. 247, 127.
1 Met., 6; Tipper vs. Commonwealth.
Wm. Kriel having been indicted, tried, and found guilty of the murder of his wife, has appealed to this court for a reversal of the judgment and sentence of death. His only defense was that of insanity, produced from habits of dissipation and excessive drinking of ardent spirits.
The following instructions were given to the jury at the instance of the plaintiff and defendant, and by the court of its own accord.
For the Commonwealth:
1. " Felonious homicide may be either murder or manslaughter.
2. Murder is the killing of a human being by another with malice aforethought.
3. Malice, in its legal sense, denotes a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause.
4. Malice is implied by the law from any deliberate cruel act committed by one person against another, however suddenly done.
5. If homicide be committed by the use of a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the person slaying, the law implies that the act was done with malice.
6. By the term aforethought is meant a pre-determination to kill, however sudden or recently formed in the mind before killing.
7. Before the jury can acquit Kriel on the grounds of insanity from delirium tremens (if they believe all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did the killing with a deadly weapon and without any provocation), they should be satisfied, from the whole of the testimony taken together, that he was laboring under a fit of delirium tremens at the time he shot; and the jury cannot presume its existence, at the time of the killing, from proof of antecedent fits, from which he recovered.
8. In order to acquit the prisoner, Wm. Kriel, on the ground of insanity (if the jury are satisfied, to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, that he killed Margaret Kriel, his wife, with a deadly weapon, and without any provocation), they should be satisfied that the evidence, all considered together, preponderates towards establishing the fact that he was, at the time he killed Margaret Kriel, his wife, deprived of the force and natural agency of his mind, and that his moral and intellectual faculties were so disordered, by long-continued indulgence in intoxicating liquors, as to induce mental disease, and to deprive his mind of its controlling and directing power, and that he did not have, at the time, sufficient power of self-control to govern his actions.
9. If the jury believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all the evidence in this case, that the accused is guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, they should find him guilty."
For the Defendant:
1. " The crime of murder is the killing of a human being within the peace of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by a person of sound mind and discretion, with malice aforethought.
2. If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to any material fact, they must acquit.
3. If the jury believe that, at the time of the alleged killing, the accused was a person of unsound mind, they must acquit.
4. If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused at the time of the alleged killing, they must acquit him; and it is immaterial how that insanity was superinduced.
5. That, to convict the accused, the jury must be satisfied, from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he shot his wife deliberately and maliciously, with intent to kill her, and that, at that time, he was a man of sound memory and discretion."
" If the jury should find the defendant not guilty, and they acquit him on the ground of insanity, they must state that fact in the verdict."
On application of the jury, after they had retired, and being brought into cou...
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Rose v. Commonwealth
... ... to the identity of deceased and it is not contended that the ... mistake in his first name was prejudicial to defendant or ... prevented him from having a fair trial. Therefore, we are not ... inclined to regard this as a variance between the indictment ... and the proof. Kriel v. Com., 5 Bush. 262, 68 Ky ... 362; Skelton v. Com., 92 S.W. 298, 28 Ky. Law Rep ... 1351; Rice v. Com., 105 S.W. 123, 31 Ky. Law Rep ... There ... were six eyewitnesses to the shooting; three of whom ... testified for the Commonwealth, two for the defendant, and ... the ... ...
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Jolly v. Commonwealth
... ... the true rule. It is true that this case, in so far as it ... lays down the rule applicable to insanity from voluntary ... intoxication, was overruled in Shannahan v. Com., 71 ... Ky. 463, but it has not been otherwise criticized. On the ... contrary, it is referred to with approval in Kriel v ... Com., 68 Ky. 362, where the instruction above quoted was ... also given. It was also given and approved in Brown v ... Com., 77 Ky. 398. These cases are in accord with the ... great weight of modern authority, and were recently followed ... in Abbott v. Com. (Ky.) 55 S.W. 196. In lieu ... ...
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Skelton v. Com.
...any other Mrs. Harvey had been insured by the company of which he is agent. The alleged variance was therefore not material. In Kriel v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. 362, the accused indicted for killing Barbara Kriel, his wife, the evidence showed that her name was Margaret Kriel. In the lower cou......