Kruger v. Kruger
| Decision Date | 11 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 11178-7-I,11178-7-I |
| Citation | 679 P.2d 961,37 Wn.App. 329 |
| Parties | Donna KRUGER, Respondent, v. James A. KRUGER, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Donna Kruger, pro se.
George M. Newsham, Prince & Woodley, P.S., Seattle, for appellant.
Husband, James A. Kruger, appeals a judgment interpreting a modified decree of dissolution and fixing the amount owed for unpaid child support. We affirm the interpretation of the decree and remand for determination of the current amount owed for unpaid child support.
The original decree of dissolution was entered in 1968. An Order Modifying Decree of Dissolution was entered on February 1, 1974. This order provided that the husband owed unpaid child support in the amount of $4,550.50. It also provided for future support:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as set forth in the Decree, support for each child shall continue until age 21 years so long as such child is not sooner married, self-supporting, emancipated, and, above age 18, is engaged in a full time program of higher education, absent normal intervals for holidays or summer vacation.
(Emphasis added). With the exception of $600 paid in June 1976, the husband failed to pay child support until his wages were garnished in November 1980. Wife filed a motion asking the court to determine the amount of child support arrearage plus interest thereon and compel the husband to pay current support. The trial court concluded that the husband owed $15,578.72 in past support and ordered him to pay support for one child while he was enrolled in school.
Husband first assigns error to the trial court's interpretation of the modified decree. One of the children, Clay, missed school from September 1978 through June 1979 due to a back injury. At other times, he was only a part-time student because of his back problems. Another child, Darby, missed school from January through March 1981 because of lack of funding. In calculating the amount of unpaid child support, the trial court included the time during which Clay and Darby were enrolled in school after age 18. Husband contends that the phrase "so long as" must be read as words of limitation, meaning "until such time," not "during such time." We disagree.
Interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question of law for the court. Hammond v. Hammond, 26 Wash.App. 129, 131, 611 P.2d 1352 (1980). Since the language of the decree is ambiguous, we must determine the intent of the court that entered the decree. In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wash.2d 699, 704-05, 629 P.2d 450 (1981); Callan v. Callan, 2 Wash.App. 446, 448, 468 P.2d 456 (1970). The general rules of construction applicable to contracts, statutes, and other writings are used. Callan v. Callan, supra at 449, 468 P.2d 456. The purpose of providing for support beyond age 18 clearly was to encourage and aid the children in pursuing higher education and to decrease any financial disadvantage they might suffer in this regard as a result of their parents' divorce. See Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592, 598, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). The more restrictive reading of the clause urged by the husband would not further this purpose. The trial court did not err by calculating the support arrearage to include those periods between their 18th and 21st birthdays during which Clay and Darby were enrolled in full-time programs of higher education.
Husband next assigns error to the trial court's finding that the statute of limitations was tolled during his 1 1/2 year absence from the state during 1974 and 1975. The trial court included the $4,550.50 judgment that had been fixed in 1974 as part of the support arrearage.
The relevant statute of limitations, RCW 6.04.010, limits actions upon a judgment to 6 years (now 10 years). The rights and liabilities of the parties become fixed as to each installment of child support when it becomes due. St. Germain v. St. Germain, 22 Wash.2d 744, 757, 157 P.2d 981 (1945). Each installment of child support, when unpaid, becomes a separate judgment and bears interest from the due date. Roberts v. Roberts, 69 Wash.2d 863, 866, 420 P.2d 864 (1966); Valley v. Selfridge, 30 Wash.App. 908, 913, 639 P.2d 225 (1982). Relying upon the statutory forerunners of RCW 4.56.210 and RCW 6.04.010, the court in St. Germain held that 6 years after the installments of child support became due, they ceased to have any effect and afforded no basis for any proceedings to collect. The court stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Custody of C.C.M.
...interest from its due date. In re Marriage of Abercrombie, 105 Wash.App. 239, 243, 19 P.3d 1056 (2001) (citing Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wash.App. 329, 332, 679 P.2d 961 (1984)); Valley v. Selfridge, 30 Wash.App. 908, 913, 639 P.2d 225 (1982); Mathews v. Mathews, 1 Wash.App. 838, 842, 466 P.2d 2......
-
Marriage of Williams, In re
...(1995). Generally, the needs of the requesting party must be balanced against the other party's ability to pay. Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wash.App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). The court may also consider, however, "the extent to which one spouse's intransigence caused the spouse seeking a fee......
-
McKoon v. Hathaway
...the intent of the court that entered the decree. See Greenwood v. Greenwood, 746 A.2d 358, 361 (Me.2000); Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wash.App. 329, 679 P.2d 961, 962 (1984); Anderson v. Anderson, 59 Haw. 575, 585 P.2d 938, 944 Hathaway next argues that the divorce decree was insufficient to conve......
-
Buchanan v. Buchanan
...court, which must balance the needs of the spouse requesting them with the ability of the other spouse to pay." Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wash.App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). An important consideration, apart from the relative abilities of the two spouses to pay, is the extent to which one s......
-
Table of Cases
...Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.12[1][a] Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). . . . . .3.03[1]; 24.04[5]; 28.03[4]; 28.08[2]; 64.02[1]; 68.06[1][a], [2][b] Kshensky v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 22 W......
-
§24.04 General Principles
...to pay. In re Marriage of Williams, 84 Wn. App. 263, 272, 927 P.2d 679 (1996), review denied, 131 Wn.2d 1025 (1997); Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). In certain situations, an award of attorney fees is required by statute. For instance, if a court has found a par......
-
§64.02 Construction of A Decree
...2 Wn. App. 446, 468 P.2d 456 (1970). For example, the court may consider the purpose of the clause in question. Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). In Kruger, a support order required the husband to continue paying child support past the age of 18 until the child was age......
-
§68.06 Judgments, Judgment Liens, Equitable Liens, and Attachment Against Real Property
...for 10 years from the time each payment is due, rather than from the time a judgment for the arrearage is obtained. Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984); St. Germain v. St. Germain, 22 Wn.2d 744, 751, 157 P.2d 981 (1945). Because the judgment lien is created by the st......