Marriage of Williams, In re
| Decision Date | 05 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 14648-1-III,14648-1-III |
| Citation | 84 Wn.App. 263,927 P.2d 679 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Glenda Lee WILLIAMS, Respondent, and Stanley James Williams, Appellant. Panel Two |
Richard F. Monahan, Roach, Monahan & Lowry, Walla Walla, for Appellant.
Ronald K. McAdams, McAdams, Ponti & Wernette, Walla Walla, for Respondent.
In the decree dissolving her 27-year marriage, Glenda Williams received the family home, approximately one-half of the community possessions, one-half of the community debts, and maintenance equal to one-half of her husband's retirement. Along with his portion of the community possessions, debts and retirement, Stanley Williams received his share of the equity in the family home. Several issues are raised by Stanley on appeal, most notably his insistence that the trial court improperly based the maintenance award on retirement benefits that are not currently accessible and that include four years of premarital military service. Stanley also contends Glenda's gambling dissipated the community assets. We affirm.
Glenda filed for divorce in August 1993 and Stanley moved out of the family home in October 1993. The couple's two children were emancipated, although still living at home. Stanley, who has a high school degree, was a full-time street crew supervisor for the city of Walla Walla. His gross salary was about $3,000 a month. Glenda, who also has a high school degree, was holding down three jobs until just before trial: a full-time position with a medical clinic, a weekend job at K-Mart, and a seven-days-a-week night job caring for an elderly woman. Her total salary for these jobs grossed about $2,500 a month. One week before trial, Glenda lost her clinic job, so she was only making $1,300 at the time of trial. 1
Trial began in May 1994. Stanley was entitled to retire in April 1994, after 30 years with the city, but he decided to continue working. The trial court awarded Glenda maintenance equal to one-half of Stanley's total retirement accrued during the marriage, including four years of military service retirement accrued before marriage. 2 This award was characterized by the court as a property settlement rather than true maintenance, representing what Glenda would have received if Stanley had retired in April. The court directed him to elect a joint and survivor annuity option in his retirement so that she would continue to receive benefits after his death.
Evidence at trial showed Glenda had spent anywhere from $400 a month (her estimate, taking into account winnings as well as losses) to $2,400 a month (his estimate, based on checks cashed at taverns and cash advances on credit cards) gambling during the latter years of their marriage. The trial court found that $10,000 to $12,000 were spent on gambling, but refused to characterize the gambling costs as dissipation of the marital assets because gambling is legal and encouraged in Washington. The court found that money spent on gambling was no different from money spent on any other entertainment and declined to adjust the property settlement to reflect it.
In the final decree, Glenda received property valued at approximately $71,000 plus one-half of her husband's retirement and her own social security benefits. Stanley received property valued at approximately $74,000 plus the rest of his retirement and social security benefits. Glenda's share of the community debts was about $19,600, and Stanley's share was about $22,100. Most of the debt assigned to Glenda related to home improvement loans, while most of the debt assigned to Stanley related to credit card balances arguably tied to Glenda's gambling. Stanley was directed to pay Glenda monthly maintenance of $703, representing her portion of his retirement benefits, terminating upon his retirement or the death of either party. Each party was directed to pay his or her own attorney fees. Stanley's motion for reconsideration was denied and this appeal followed.
Stanley first contends the court erred in awarding maintenance. He asserts Glenda does not qualify for a maintenance award because she is capable of meeting her needs independently. Even if the maintenance award is treated as a property settlement, he argues, it is not just or equitable because it is based on retirement benefits that are not now available and that include premarital military benefits.
We begin by noting that trial court decisions in marital dissolution proceedings are rarely changed on appeal. In re Stenshoel, 72 Wash.App. 800, 803, 866 P.2d 635 (1993). The party who challenges a maintenance award or a property distribution must demonstrate that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. In re Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 168, 179, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); In re Terry, 79 Wash.App. 866, 869, 905 P.2d 935 (1995).
It is within the trial court's discretion to grant a maintenance order in an amount and for a period of time the court deems just. RCW 26.09.090(1). Some of the factors the court must consider include: the postdissolution financial resources of the parties; their abilities to meet their needs independently; the duration of the marriage; the standard of living they established during their marriage; their ages, health and financial obligations; and the ability of one spouse to pay maintenance to the other. RCW 26.09.090(1); Terry, 79 Wash.App. at 869, 905 P.2d 935. The court's paramount concern is the economic condition in which the dissolution decree leaves the parties. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d at 181, 677 P.2d 152.
Here, the court found that the marriage was long term and that Stanley earned more than twice what Glenda earned, assuming she cut back to "a normal one job situation." More important, the court did not attempt to justify Glenda's monthly payments as maintenance, but rather as a property settlement. In the court's words:
The award of maintenance is based upon the proposition that, if husband retired, wife would be receiving immediately a portion of his state retirement pension. The intent is to award her now maintenance in a sum equal to one-half of what she would receive, based upon Option 2 (joint and survivor annuity).
Unlike typical maintenance awards, the payments do not terminate upon Glenda's cohabitation or marriage, but only upon the death of either party or Stanley's retirement. As the court stated in the presentment hearing:
Further supporting the fact that this award is actually a property settlement is its tie to a specific property allocation: Stanley's vested and matured pension benefits. In re Hurd, 69 Wash.App. 38, 45, 848 P.2d 185 (), review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1020, 863 P.2d 1353 (1993).
The trial court properly included Stanley's pension benefits--actually deferred compensation--in the community's assets to be divided. In re Chavez, 80 Wash.App. 432, 436, 909 P.2d 314, review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1016, 917 P.2d 576 (1996). Maintenance was computed by determining the value of the pension at the time it matured in April 1994 ($1,406) and dividing it by two. When Stanley actually retired, Glenda was to receive one-half of the amount representing the number of months the couple was married divided by the total number of months Stanley worked. This is the approved method of dividing retirement benefits and pensions. Id. Although the four years of premarital military benefits were, strictly speaking, Stanley's separate property, they had been credited to his city retirement plan. At any rate, the status of property as community or separate is not controlling. In re Olivares, 69 Wash.App. 324, 329, 848 P.2d 1281, review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1009, 863 P.2d 72 (1993). Even if the trial court mischaracterizes the property, the allocation will be upheld as long as it is fair and equitable. Olivares, 69 Wash.App. at 330, 848 P.2d 1281.
Whether we review the award of monthly payments here as maintenance or as a property settlement, the ultimate question is whether, under the circumstances, the award is just. RCW 26.09.080, .090; In re Bulicek, 59 Wash.App. 630, 633, 636, 800 P.2d 394 (1990). See also In re Barnett, 63 Wash.App. 385, 388, 818 P.2d 1382 (1991) (). Distribution of the marital assets and liabilities is discussed below. In terms of monthly salary, however, the maintenance payments reduce Stanley's gross income to around $2,300 and raise Glenda's gross income to anywhere from around $3,200, assuming she keeps all three jobs, or around $1,900, if she reduces her work load to one full-time job. The trial court intended to provide Glenda enough income to quit the two part-time jobs. All in all, we agree with the Bulicek court that provision of maintenance until retirement benefits are available was "a thoughtful resolution of the maintenance and pension issues that allows ... a continuous stream of income." Bulicek, 59 Wash.App. at 635, 800 P.2d 394.
Stanley next contends the trial court divided the marital property and debts inequitably. In particular, he contends Glenda's gambling debts should have been treated as dissipation of the marital assets. He also argues the value of his accrued vacation and sick leave should not have been included in his assets, because he may end up using both rather than cashing them out.
As with maintenance, the trial court's paramount concern when distributing property in a dissolution is the economic condition in which the decree leaves the parties. Terry, 79 Wash.App. at 871, 905 P.2d 935....
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