Kruse v. Board of Directors of Lamoni Community School Dist., 56487

• Decision Date: 31 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 56487,56487
• Citation: 231 N.W.2d 626
• Parties: Bonnie M. KRUSE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LAMONI COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Lamoni Community School District, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 626

231 N.W.2d 626

Bonnie M. KRUSE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LAMONI COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Lamoni Community School District, Appellees.

No. 56487.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 31, 1975.

Reynoldson, Brown & Van Werden, Osceola, for appellant.

Barnes, Schlegel & Walter, Ottumwa, for appellees.

Considered en banc.

MASON, Justice.

This appeal by plaintiff Bonnie M. Kruse, a teacher in the Lamoni Community School District, presents the question whether the procedure employed by defendants, the school district and the Board of Directors of the district, in moving to terminate plaintiff's teaching contract constituted sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements so as to effectively and validly terminate the continued employment of Mrs. Kruse and bar an action by her for breach of contract based upon her discharge.

Plaintiff had instituted an equitable action in the Decatur district court alleging her teaching contract had been improperly terminated by defendants and asked that the termination be declared null and void and defendants be compelled to specifically perform the teaching contract, including all obligations and benefits derived thereunder. Plaintiff further asked payment of all benefits accruing under the provisions of her contract.

After defendants' answer was filed but before trial the parties jointly requested the court to adjudicate certain law points based upon stipulated facts. Rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure. The court in its reling dismissed plaintiff's petition at her cost. This appeal stems from that ruling.

Plaintiff is a teacher duly qualified and accredited by the State of Iowa to teach in both elementary and secondary schools. In the pursuance of her career, Mrs. Kruse was hired by the Lamoni Community School District to teach social studies May 11, 1968. The teaching contract (Exhibit A) was effective for the 1968--1969 school year. Apparently satisfied with her first year performance, the school board renewed Mrs. Kruse's contract for another year March 17, 1969.

February 19, 1970, however, plaintiff received by certified mail a letter dated February 18 and entitled: 'NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF TEACHER'S CONTINUING CONTRACT.' (Exhibit C). The letter informed Mrs. Kruse her continuing teaching contract for the year 1969--1970 had been terminated effective as of the close of the 1970 school year pursuant to a majority vote of the school district Board of Directors. The notice also informed plaintiff it was in conformity with Section 279.13, The Code, 1962, which provided for termination of teaching contracts by a majority vote of the Board of Directors and of the teacher's right to protest the action of the board and to a hearing thereon if such were requested within 20 days of the receipt of the notice.

February 26 plaintiff wrote the school board protesting the termination and requested a private hearing thereon. It was further stated plaintiff had not received any communications regarding the 'incidents and reasons' for the school board's decision, and such was requested to be furnished plaintiff in writing.

March 19 plaintiff received a letter dated March 18 from Superintendent of Lamoni Schools, L. C. Johnson, concerning the fact the school board would grant plaintiff a private hearing as well as present her with a written statement of the specific reasons for the termination. This hearing took place before the school board March 23. Plaintiff appeared with her attorney, L. P. Van Werden of Osceola. The written statement, however, was not provided as promised.

Prior to the hearing, plaintiff received a letter dated March 21 from Mrs. Hazel Sprague, school district secretary, requesting that a written resignation be filed. The correspondence also provided it took precedence over the 'Notice of Consideration of Continuing Contract' sent plaintiff February 18. In reality, this must have been in reference to the notice of termination of the same date, previously referred to.

At any rate, March 26 plaintiff received an unsigned letter from 'The Lamoni Community School District Board of Education' stating: 'Two years of employment in the Lamoni Public School System have not indicated the ability to provide course content or maintain academic environment conducive to learning experiences. Said teacher declared to be wanting in adequate strength, capacity, and qualifications to fulfill the job of Social Studies Teacher.' (Exhibit G).

At this, plaintiff's attorney wrote Secretary Sprague April 13 protesting the termination and requesting a public hearing relative thereto with at least fifteen days prior notice. April 27, such hearing was held. Plaintiff and her attorney as well as four members of the school board were present. With plaintiff's consent further action on the contract termination was delayed until May 4.

May 5 Mar. Sprague wrote plaintiff the school board had, by roll call vote, sustained its earlier actions terminating the teaching contract. Decatur County Superintendent of Schools sustained the school board's actions July 24, whereupon plaintiff appealed to the State Board of Public Instruction which declined to hear the appeal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff then filed her petition in the Decatur district court, as previously mentioned.

The foregoing facts are without dispute. They are disclosed in the stipulation of the parties which appears in the appendix.

The joint application for adjudication of law points filed in this matter essentially requested a legal adjudication of the following: (1) whether section 279.13, The Code, 1966, as amended, was sufficiently complied with in the termination of plaintiff's contract, and (2) whether plaintiff was denied due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the State and federal constitutions. This constitutional issue consisted of the following questions: (1) Was the termination arbitrary, capricious, and without cause?; and (2) Did the shool district lack the legal power to terminate the contract without reason and without advance notice to plaintiff of her alleged teaching deficiencies in order that she might remedy the same?

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's petition with costs after finding: 'A school district may discharge a teacher for cause (Sec. 279.24, Code) or terminate a teaching contract without cause (Sec. 279.13, Code). There must be substantial compliance with the statute. * * * (citing authority). When the teacher meets with the Board and participates in a meeting where the complaints before the Board are considered, want of notice or defect of notice is not material. * * * (citing authority). This Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the statute.'

Section 279.13, The Code, 1966, as amended by Acts of the Sixty-second General Assembly, chapter 240, section 1, which was in force at the time material herein provides in relevant part:

'Said contract shall remain in force and effect for the period stated in the contract and thereafter shall be automatically continued in force and effect for equivalent periods * * * until terminated as hereinafter provided * * *. (T)he board may by a majority vote of the elected membership of the board, cause said contract to be terminated by written notification of termination, by a certified letter mailed to the teacher not later than the tenth day of April; provided, however, that at least ten days prior to mailing of any notice of termination the board or its agent shall inform the teacher in writing that (1) the board is considering termination of said contract and that (2) the teacher shall have the right to a private conference with the board if the teacher files a request therefor with the president or secretary of the board within five days; and if within five days after receipt by the teacher of such written information the teacher files with the president or secretary of the board a written request for a conference and a written statement of specific reasons for considering termination, the board shall, before any notice of termination is mailed, give the teacher written notice of the time and place of such conference and at the request of the teacher, a written statement of specific reasons for considering termination, and shall hold a private conference between the board and teacher and his representative if the teacher appears at such time and place. * * * In event of such termination, it shall take effect at the close of the school year in which the contract is terminated * * *. The term 'teacher' as used in this section shall include all certified school employees, including superintendents.'

By its enactment of the foregoing statute the legislature prescribed the procedural steps to be pursued by the Board of Directors when considering termination of a teaching contract.

Discharge for cause at any time during the school year is covered by section 279.24, The Code, which provides:

'Discharge of teacher. The board may, by a majority vote, discharge any teacher for incompetency, inattention to duty, partiality, or any good cause, after a full and fair investigation made at a meeting of the board held for that purpose, at which the teacher shall be permitted to be present and make defense, allowing him a reasonable time therefor.'

I. In seeking reversal plaintiff contends: (1) the school board's attempted termination of her contract was null and void by reason of the board's failure (a) to comply with the procedural mandates of section 279.13 and (b) to notify plaintiff before the private hearing of the board's reasons for considering terminating the teaching contract which deprived plaintiff of constitutional due process of law; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's petition without trial on the merits.

Plaintiff argues the question is compliance with section 279.13, The Code, 1966, as amended, and that a study of the statute reveals 'several...