Kruse v. State
Decision Date | 12 July 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 4D16–1422,4D16–1422 |
Citation | 222 So.3d 13 |
Parties | Ronnie Travis KRUSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Richard B. Greene, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We grant in part the appellee's motion for rehearing to clarify the charge to be tried on remand. We substitute the following opinion for the original opinion which we issued on May 31, 2017. We deny the remainder of appellee's motion for rehearing without further comment.
Appellant Ronnie Travis Kruse was charged with felony battery on an elderly person (over the age of sixty-five) with prior conviction, and was convicted of the lesser included offense of felony battery with prior conviction. He argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. We agree, and reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
In May 2015, appellant had an altercation with the victim outside of the victim's home. According to the victim, appellant came from across the street and started screaming at him, accusing him of either selling or giving drugs to a present third person. The victim claimed that appellant grabbed him, threw him into the bushes, and broke his jaw by hitting him in the face.
Victim did not contact legal authorities about the incident, but they came to him two days later after appellant called a detective whom he knew to inform him that he had hit the victim during the altercation. According to the third party, appellant put his finger near victim's face, causing victim to initiate physical contact by swiping appellant's finger away.
At trial, appellant described what happened as follows:
On cross-examination, appellant said he feared the victim was going to harm him even though the victim was sixty-five and somewhat feeble. He stated that he only meant to get the victim off of him, not to "beat that man up," and maintained that he was "not guilty of anything but defending myself."
During closing argument, defense counsel at times made points seemingly related to self-defense. She began her argument by stating, She asserted that the victim "escalated" the situation, and that the testimonies established the victim as the first person to make physical contact when he slapped away appellant's hand. She described the altercation as "a mutual fight between [the victim] and [appellant]."
Notably, during the State's rebuttal argument as the prosecutor contended that there was no justification for what appellant did, appellant interrupted and blurted out, "[i]t's called self-defense."
Despite the testimonies and defense counsel's arguments, defense counsel did not request for the jury to be instructed on self-defense. Later, the jury asked the court, "[i]s affirmative defense applicable in this case?" Defense counsel agreed with the court to answer, "[y]ou were not instructed on an affirmative defense."
The question presented is whether this court should find on direct appeal that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury instruction on self-defense. "An attorney renders ineffective assistance of counsel through conduct that exceeds the bounds of reasonable professional assistance, without which, there is a reasonable probability that the client would have enjoyed a different result." Monroe v. State , 191 So.3d 395, 403 (Fla. 2016). As such, "[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact and is therefore subject to de novo review." Jones v. State , 137 So.3d 446, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Bowman v. State , 748 So.2d 1082, 1083–84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ).
"[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims should rarely be raised on direct appeal because they are generally fact-specific," Michel v. State , 989 So.2d 679, 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and as a result, appellate courts do not usually address such claims "until a defendant seeks postconviction relief because such courts are limited to reviewing the record directly before them." Monroe , 191 So.3d at 403. "However, such a claim can be raised where the face of the record demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel." Michel , 989 So.2d at 681 ; see also Jones , 137 So.3d at 449 . We find that relief on direct appeal is warranted because the record before us demonstrates that appellant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial.
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, two elements must be met:
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.
Jones , 137 So.3d at 449 (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright , 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) )); see also Capiro v. State , 97 So.3d 298, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ( ) counsel's performance was deficient to the point that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and 2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense").
As to the first element, the record shows that appellant's counsel never requested any instruction on the justifiable use of force despite the evidence supporting a self-defense claim. Defense counsel elicited testimony from appellant asserting that the victim was the aggressor who first made physical contact and "tried to push" appellant out of the yard. Defense counsel...
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