Monroe v. State
| Citation | 191 So.3d 395 |
| Decision Date | 28 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. SC14–2296.,SC14–2296. |
| Parties | Ralph MONROE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Michael Robert Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Angela Renee Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
This case is before the Court to review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Monroe v. State, 148 So.3d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
. In its decision the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
DO F.B. V. STATE, 852 So.2d 226 (Fla.2003)
. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
On May 25, 2011, Sandra Grant, a teacher at the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Developmental Research School (FAMU DRS) was speaking to another teacher in a school hallway when she noticed odd behavior by T.J., an eight-year-old male student. T.J. had approached a restroom, but hesitated when he saw Petitioner Ralph Monroe, then a high school senior at FAMU DRS, knock on the restroom door from the hallway. T.J. told Grant and the other teacher that he could not enter the restroom then because Monroe would “bother” him. When Grant inquired further, T.J. said,
The incident was referred to Special Agent Terry Thomas of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who conducted a forensic interview with T.J. During that interview, T.J. stated that his birthday was on February 4. T.J. told Thomas that while he was using the restroom, a “big kid” approached him in the stall, touched his penis, inserted a finger into his anus, and asked if he wanted to play a game. T.J. told the big kid that he did not want to play, and when the question was repeated, T.J. replied “no” again and walked away. He also told Thomas that this person had approached him on more than one occasion, while he was eight years old. (T.J. had turned eight years old on February 4, 2011). T.J. identified Monroe from a photo array during the interview.
Following that interview, Thomas traveled to Stillman College in Alabama, where he interviewed Monroe regarding T.J.'s allegations. Monroe initially denied the allegations, but eventually confessed that he had asked T.J. if he wanted to play a game and touched T.J.'s penis in the restroom of the school. The State Attorney's Office filed a second amended information against Monroe that charged him with the following four counts: (I) sexual battery upon T.J., a person less than twelve years of age, by digitally penetrating his anus, and Monroe was eighteen years of age or older; (II) lewd and lascivious molestation of T.J. by touching the breasts, genitals, genital area, or clothing covering those areas of T.J., and Monroe was eighteen years of age or older; (III) sexual battery upon T.J., and Monroe was less than eighteen years of age; and (IV) lewd and lascivious molestation of T.J., and Monroe was less than eighteen years of age.
During trial, the State presented testimony from Grant, Thomas, an additional investigator, and T.J.1 T.J., who was unable to specifically identify Monroe during trial, testified that a person approached him in the school bathroom after he had pulled down his pants, asked him about playing a game, touched his penis, and then inserted a finger into his anus. During trial, T.J. testified that this incident occurred only once, which was contrary to the information he gave Thomas during the forensic interview. The recording of that interview, as well as the recording of Monroe's inculpatory statement to Thomas, were entered into evidence.
The central issue during trial focused on whether Monroe had approached T.J. before or after Monroe's eighteenth birthday on February 27, 2011. During the direct examination of T.J., the following exchange resulted:
After the State rested, the trial court asked defense counsel if they intended to move for judgment of acquittal. Defense counsel declined, and the court stated, “I find there's a prima facie case, that judgment of acquittal would be fruitless at this time.” Defense counsel then rested without presenting any evidence.
During closing statements, both parties discussed the date that Monroe had approached T.J. The State made the following argument:
Defense counsel also addressed the date of the incident:
With respect to ... Element No. 3, that Mr. Monroe was 18 years or older, you can't speculate. You can't speculate that it's possible that he did this during the 23 days. If it's possible, then there's reasonable doubt. If it's possible that this occurred when he was 17 years old, the State has not proved its case. And I would submit that you must find the defendant to have been 17 years old—age at the time.
The jury instructions also explained that Counts III and IV were the lesser-included offenses for both sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation.
The jury convicted Monroe of Count I, sexual battery against a child by a person eighteen years of age or older, and Count II, lewd and lascivious molestation on a child by a person eighteen years of age or older. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment for Count I, forty years' imprisonment for Count II, and designated him a sexual predator.
Monroe appealed his convictions and sentences to the First District, which ultimately affirmed the sentences. Monroe, 148 So.3d at 852
.2 Monroe conceded that the sufficiency issue was not preserved during trial because defense counsel did not move for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 857–58. The First District therefore considered whether a fundamental error, as defined by F.B. and Young, had occurred. Id. at 858. Monroe asserted that a fundamental error resulted because the State failed to prove his age at the time of the offenses, and the penalties for the crimes varied drastically based on the age of the defendant. Id. A conviction for sexual battery against a child under the age of twelve carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a defendant that is eighteen years old, but if the defendant is under the age of eighteen, the judge has greater discretion in sentencing. Id. (citing §§ 794.011(2)(a)(b)
, 775.082(1) -(3), Fla. Stat. (2011) ).
In F.B., this Court held that the State's failure to prove an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt does not constitute fundamental error. 852 So.2d at 227
. In that case, a juvenile offender was charged with and adjudicated delinquent for petit theft of items valued at $100 or more, but less than $300. Id. The State did not present evidence about the value of the items, but F.B. did not object or move for judgment of acquittal during trial; the issue of sufficiency was first raised on appeal. Id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that defendants must preserve a claim that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of an element of a crime for appellate review, but certified conflict with T.E.J. v. State, 749 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). F.B., 852 So.2d at 227–28. In T.E.J., the Second District Court of Appeal held that the State's failure to prove an essential element of an offense constituted fundamental error. Id. at 228 (citing T.E.J., 749 So.2d at 558 ).
We approved the Fourth District's analysis and rejected that of the Second District. Id. at 231
. We explained that parties must ordinarily raise a specific, contemporaneous objection to a perceived error during trial to preserve the error for appellate review. Id. at 229 (cit...
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