Kryder v. State, 26510.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1938
• Docket Number: No. 26510.,26510.
• Citation: 57 Ga.App. 200,194 S.E. 890
• Parties: KRYDER. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

57 Ga.App. 200

194 S.E. 890

KRYDER.

v.STATE.

No. 26510.

Court of Appeals of Georgia,

Division No. 1.

Jan. 8, 1938.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; John D. Humphries, Judge.

J. P. Kryder, alias Red Pope, was convicted of possession of burglary tools, and he brings error.

Reversed.

B. J. Dantone, and James R. Vcnable, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., and J. Walter LeCraw, both of Atlanta, for the State.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

GUERRY, Judge.

1. Where, in the trial of one of three persons jointly charged with the possession of burglary tools, Code, § 26-2701, one of the other joint defendants who had entered a plea of guilty, appeared and testified for the State, the charge of the judge to the jury, as follows, "Now, gentlemen, the defendant Charles McDonald appeared here as a witness in this case for the State and as a witness against the defendant James Pope Kryder, Charles McDonald of course admits he is an accomplice. He has filed a plea to this crime, and he being an accomplice in the case or a partner with the defendant, and having admitted to have been there, you would not be authorized to convict James Pope Kryder on the testimony of McDonald alone, " was erroneous as an expression or intimation of an opinion by the trial judge as to what had been proved, and such error requires the grant of a new trial. Section 81-1104; Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407 (2, 3), 37 S.E. 747; Golden v. State, 45 Ga.App. 501, 165 S.E. 299; Sellers v. State, 41 Ga.App. 572, 153 S.E. 782; Edwards v. State, 4 Ga.App. 167, 60 S.E. 1033.

2. After stating the requirements of the Code, § 38-110, the judge charged the jury as follows: "You will notice the words reasonable doubt is used. A reasonable doubt means a doubt that arises in the mind of a reasonable man, not an unreasonable man. The State is not required to convince you beyond every possible doubt, every imaginary doubt, every fanciful doubt. The State is not required to convince you to a mathematical certainty as sure and certain as four and four are eight. All that the law requires and demands in this case is that you, as reasonable and impartial jurors, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, before you would convict the defendant, you must be satisfied as to his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." This charge correctly expresses the legal meaning of the term reasonable doubt, and is not erroneous for any reason assigned. Carr v. State, 84 Ga. 250 (4), 10 S.E. 626; Cobb v. State, 11 Ga.App. 52, 74 S.E. 702; Campbell v. State, 144 Ga. 224 (3), 87 S.E. 277; Flan-nigan v. State, 13 Ga.App. 663 (2), 79 S. E. 745; Lampkin v. State, 145 Ga. 40 (3), 88 S.E. 563; Wall v. State, 153 Ga. 309 (6), 112 S.E. 142; Newsome v. State, 25 Ga.App. 191 (6), 102 S.E. 876; Loyd v. State, 26 Ga.App. 259 (7), 106 S.E. 601.

3. Conspirators are responsible for the acts of each other in carrying out the common purpose or design, although such acts may constitute another criminal offense. Consequently, where two or more persons enter into a conspiracy to commit burglary, and in attempting to carry out such felonious design either one of them has in his possession burglary tools, such possession is the possession of all, and each is guilty of a violation of the Code, § 26-2701, prohibiting and punishing the possession of such tools. The judge's charge, setting out substantially the above principle, was not erroneous.

4. There is no requirement in our Code as to the particular form and order in which a judge should give applicable principles of law in charge to the jury. The thing of paramount importance is that the jury be given the...