Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc.

• Citation: 14 Cal.5th 993,531 P.3d 924,310 Cal.Rptr.3d 97
• Docket Number: S274191
• Decision Date: 06 July 2023
• Parties: Corby KUCIEMBA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Supreme Court

14 Cal.5th 993
531 P.3d 924
310 Cal.Rptr.3d 97

Corby KUCIEMBA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

S274191

Supreme Court of California.

July 6, 2023

Venardi Zurada, Mark L. Venardi, Orinda, Martin Zurada, Oakland, and Mark Freeman, Orinda, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Alan Charles Dell'Ario, Napa, for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Hinshaw & Culbertson and William Bogdan, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

O'Connor Thompson McDonough Klotsche and John W. Klotsche, Sacramento, for Construction Employers’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Eimer Stahl and Robert E. Dunn, San Jose, for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Federation of Independent Business, National Association of Manufacturers, the California Workers’ Compensation Institute, the California Chamber of Commerce, the Restaurant Law Center and the National Retail Federation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Malcolm A. Heinicke, Benjamin J. Horwich, San Francisco, Joseph Lee, Los Angeles, and Donald B. Verrilli for See's Candies, Inc., and See's Candy Shops, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for the Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

14 Cal.5th 1003

Here we answer two questions of California law certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning the scope of an employer's liability when an employee's spouse is injured by transmission of the virus¹ that causes the disease known as COVID-19. The questions are: (1) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at the workplace and

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brings the virus home to a spouse, does the California Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA; Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq. ) bar the spouse's negligence claim against the employer? (2) Does an employer owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread

310 Cal.Rptr.3d 105

of COVID-19 to employees’ household members?²

The answer to the first question is no. Exclusivity provisions of the WCA do not bar a nonemployee's recovery for injuries that are not legally dependent upon an injury suffered by the employee. The answer to the second question, however, is also no. Although it is foreseeable that an employer's negligence in permitting workplace spread of

531 P.3d 931

COVID-19 will cause members of employees’ households to contract the disease, recognizing a duty of care to nonemployees in this context would impose an intolerable burden on employers and society in contravention of public policy. These and other policy considerations lead us to conclude that employers do not owe a tort-based duty to nonemployees to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

I. BACKGROUND

Because this matter is presently on appeal from a dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6) (28 U.S.C.), we recite the facts as alleged in the operative complaint. (See Papasan v. Allain (1986) 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209.) The question at this stage of the litigation is the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. We treat the factual allegations as true for purposes of addressing the certified questions. (See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 555–556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929.)

COVID-19 is a highly contagious and potentially fatal respiratory illness spread through airborne droplets, like those produced from coughs or sneezes. The complaint alleges the disease can also be spread by contact with virus particles left on the surface of objects. The disease was recognized in early 2020 and spread rapidly across the globe. In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and Bay Area counties issued shelter-in-place orders prohibiting nonessential travel. Eventually, these orders were relaxed and replaced with orders tailored to specific industries. As relevant here, the City and County of San Francisco's health officer issued an order on April 29, 2020 prescribing health and safety guidelines to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at construction jobsites.

14 Cal.5th 1005

On May 6, 2020, Robert Kuciemba began working for defendant Victory Woodworks, Inc. (Victory) at a construction site in San Francisco. About two months later, without taking precautions required by the county's health order, Victory transferred a group of workers to the San Francisco site from another location where they may have been exposed to the virus. After being required to work in close contact with these new workers, Robert became infected.³ He carried the virus home and transmitted it to his wife, Corby, either directly or through her contact with his clothing and personal effects. Corby was hospitalized for several weeks and, at one point, was kept alive on a respirator.⁴

310 Cal.Rptr.3d 106

On October 23, 2020, the Kuciembas sued Victory in superior court. Corby asserted claims for negligence, negligence per se, premises liability, and public nuisance. Robert asserted a claim for loss of consortium. Victory removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint reasserting the same causes of action except the public nuisance claim. The district court granted a renewed motion to dismiss, this time without leave to amend, concluding: (1) claims that Corby contracted COVID-19 through direct contact with Robert were barred by the WCA's exclusive remedy provisions; (2) claims that Corby contracted COVID-19 through indirect contact with infected surfaces were subject to dismissal for failure to plead a plausible claim; and (3) to the extent the claims were not barred by statute or insufficiently pleaded, they failed because Victory's duty to provide a safe workplace did not extend to nonemployees, like Corby, who contract a virus away from the jobsite.

Plaintiffs appealed, and on June 22, 2022, we agreed to answer the certified questions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

The California's workers’ compensation system is a comprehensive statutory scheme through which employees may receive

531 P.3d 932

prompt compensation for costs related to injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. ( Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq. ; see

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Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, 14 P.3d 234 ( Vacanti ).) The system is premised on a theoretical exchange we have called the " ‘compensation bargain.’ " ( Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) Under this bargain, "the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort." ( Ibid . )

To effectuate this exchange, the WCA limits an employee's remedies for covered injuries. When the statutory conditions for recovery are met, an employer's liability to pay compensation under the WCA is "in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person." ( Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) Similarly, with limited exceptions not relevant here, "the right to recover compensation is ... the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer." ( Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) A basic prerequisite to the payment of compensation, and triggering of these exclusivity provisions, "is that the compensation sought is for an injury to an employee. In some circumstances, however, the bar on civil actions based on injuries to employees extends beyond actions brought by the employees themselves." ( Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 996, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 476, 945 P.2d 781 ( Snyder ).) As noted, the relevant statutes provide that an employer's compensation obligation is "in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person " ( Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a), italics added), and such compensation is "the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer" ( Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a), italics added). "This statutory language conveys the legislative intent that ‘the work-connected injury engender[ ] a single

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remedy against the employer, exclusively cognizable by the compensation agency.’ " ( Snyder , at p. 997, 68...