Kugler v. Yocum

• Citation: 445 P.2d 303,71 Cal.Rptr. 687,69 Cal.2d 371
• Parties: , 445 P.2d 303 Carol J. KUGLER et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Norma YOCUM et al., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 29549.
• Decision Date: 01 October 1968
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

Page 687

71 Cal.Rptr. 687

69 Cal.2d 371, 445 P.2d 303

Carol J. KUGLER et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Norma YOCUM et al., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 29549.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 1, 1968.

Don D. Bercu, City Atty., for defendants and appellants.

Weinstein, Shelley & Proctor, Weinstein & Shelley and Robert C. Proctor, Jr., Alhambra, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Charles P. Scully, San Francisco, as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.

TOBRINER, Justice.

We hold here that an ordinance which decrees that the salaries of certain city employees shall be no less than the average of those of an adjoining city and those of an adjoining county does not unlawfully delegate legislative power because the power to legislate has been expressed and exerted in the enactment of the policy of such parity; future adjustment in salaries pursuant to that formula is no more than the automatic execution of that policy; that process is protected from any abusive or arbitrary consequences by its own inherent safeguards.

Plaintiffs, residents of the City of Alhambra, bring mandate to compel defendants, as members of the city council of that city, either to adopt a proposed initiative ordinance or to call a special citywide election to vote upon it. Although plaintiffs had obtained the required number of signatures to secure the election, the city council refused to hold it; the council likewise rejected the proposed ordinance.

The proposed ordinance reads, in relevant part, as follows: 'Except as otherwise provided for herein the monthly salaries of the members of the Fire Department in each classification shall not be less than an amount computed as follows: Beginning January 1, 1965, and the first day of each succeeding year thereafter, the City Manager of the City of Alhambra shall determine the then existing monthly salaries of each classification of like or comparable grades or ranks of the Fire Departments of the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. The average of the salaries for the comparable grades or ranks of the members of the Fire Departments of the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles shall be the minimum salaries payable by the City of Alhambra to the members of its Fire Department of the same or comparable grades or ranks.' Thus the proposed ordinance provides that in setting the salaries of the firemen, the council could not fix them at an amount less than the average of the salaries received by the firemen of the City of Los Angeles and the salaries received by the firemen of the County of Los Angeles.

After the council's refusal to submit the ordinance to the electorate plaintiffs brought this action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel defendants to do so. That court found that plaintiffs had followed the proper procedure, ¹ that the proposed ordinance was a proper subject for the exercise of the initiative power of the Alhambra electors, and that, if enacted, the ordinance would not improperly delegate the council's legislative power. Accordingly, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the defendants to call a special election for consideration of the ordinance. Defendants have appealed from this judgment.

The trial court correctly concluded that the subject matter of the proposed ordinance, that is the salaries of city firemen, falls within the electorate's initiative power. The city charter provides that the 'Council * * * shall have power to * * * establish * * * the amount of (the fire division's) * * * salaries' (§ 81) and that the 'electors * * * shall have the right to * * * adopt * * * any ordinance which the council might enact' (§ 176). Since, in dealing with wage rates, the city council acts in its 'legislative' rather than its 'administrative' capacity (Spencer v. City of Alhambra (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 75, 77, 111 P.2d 910; Collins v. City and County of San Francisco (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 730, 247 P.2d 362; City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd (1943) 22 Cal.2d 685, 140 P.2d 666), wage rates are a proper subject for adoption as an ordinance by a city council and, accordingly, pursuant to section 176, for enactment by an initiative.

Defendants' main contention rests upon the proposition that the enactment of the ordinance by either the council or the electorate would constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. ² They point out that no representative of Alhambra can either predict or control the exact wage rates that will be established in the City or the County of Los Angeles. Accordingly, they argue, the proposed ordinance, in fixing the Los Angeles rates as the minimum for Alhambra firemen's salaries, would unlawfully delegate legislative power to those parties who establish salaries for Los Angeles firemen.

At the outset, we note that the doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative power, although much criticized as applied (see, e.g., Witkin, Summary of California Law (7th ed. 1960) p. 1834; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 2.01), is well established in California. 'The power * * * to change a law of the state is necessarily legislative in character, and is vested exclusively in the legislature, and cannot be delegated by it * * *.' (Dougherty v. Austin (1892) 94 Cal. 601, 606--607, 28 P. 834, 29 P. 1092, 1093, 16 L.R.A. 161; see also People v. Johnson (1892) 95 Cal. 471, 475, 31 P. 611; People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Wheeler (1902) 136 Cal. 652, 655, 69 P. 435; Coulter v. Pool (1921) 187 Cal. 181, 190, 201 P. 120; Duskin v. State Board of Dry Cleaners (1962) 58 Cal.2d 155, 161--162, 23 Cal.Rptr. 404, 373 P.2d 468.) Moreover, the same doctrine precludes delegation of the legislative powers of a city (City of Redwood City v. Moore (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 563, 576, 42 Cal.Rptr. 72, and cases cited therein; see generally 2 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1966) § 10.39, p. 843, and cases cited at fn. 63).

Several equally well established principles, however, serve to limit the scope of the doctrine proscribing delegations of legislative power. For example, legislative power may properly be delegated if channeled by a sufficient standard. 'It is well settled that the legislature may commit to an administrative officer the power to determine whether the facts of a particular case bring it within a rule or standard previously established by the legislature * * *.' (Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty (1925) 196 Cal. 468, 484, 238 P. 703, 709; see also State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 448, 254 P.2d 29; Case Note (1959) 6 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 312 and cases cited therein.)

A related doctrine holds: 'The essentials of the legislative function are the determination and formulation of the legislative policy. Generally speaking, attainment of the ends, including how and by what means they are to be achieved, may constitutionally be left in the hands of others. The Legislature may, after declaring a policy and fixing a primary standard, confer upon executive or administrative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect * * *.' (First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty (1945) 26 Cal.2d 545, 549, 159 P.2d 921, 923.) Similarly, the cases establish that '(w)hile the legislative body cannot delegate its power to make a law, it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.' (Wheeler v. Gregg (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 363, 203 P.2d 37, 47.)

We have said that the purpose of the doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated is to assure that 'truly fundamental issues (will) be resolved by the Legislature' and that a 'grant of authority (is) * * * accompanied by safeguards adequate to prevent its abuse.' (Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349, 369, 55 Cal.Rptr. 23, 36, 420 P.2d 735, 748, see also Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (1947) 47 Colum.L.Rev. 359, 561; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, supra, § 2.15; Gaylord v. City of Pasadena (1917) 175 Cal. 433, 437, 166 P. 348; Warren v. Marion County (1960) 222 Or. 307, 313--315, 353 P.2d 257; Lien v. City of Ketchikan (Alaska 1963) 383 P.2d 721, 723--724; Group Health Insurance v. Howell (1963) 40 N.J. 436, 445, 447, 193 A.2d 103; Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (1946) 187 Md. 296, 303, 49 A.2d 799 (dictum).) This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions.

In the instant case, the adoption of the proposed ordinance, either through promulgation by the Alhambra City Council or by initiative, will constitute the legislative body's resolution of the 'fundamental issue.' Once the legislative body has determined the issue of policy, i.e., that the Alhambra wages for firemen should be on a parity with Los Angeles, that body has resolved the 'fundamental issue'; the subsequent filling in of the facts in application and execution of the policy does not constitute legislative delegation. Thus the decision on the Legislative policy has not been delegated; the implementation of the policy by reference to Los Angeles salaries is not the delegation of it.

Whatever the motivation for the legislative policy, Alhambra will have rendered and pronounced it. The policy may be based upon the recognition that Alhambra could not recruit firemen at Lesser rates than those paid in the adjoining County and City of Los Angeles. The policy may rest upon the fact that Los Angeles possesses a superior...