Redwood City v. Moore
| Decision Date | 07 January 1965 |
| Citation | 42 Cal.Rptr. 72,231 Cal.App.2d 563 |
| Parties | REDWOOD CITY, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner. v. Helen C. MOORE, as City Clerk of the City of Redwood City, Respondent. Civ. 22288. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Nathan D. Rowley, Thomas R. Sherarer, Jr., Orrick, Dahlquist, Herrington & Sutcliffe, San Francisco, for respondent.
This is a proceeding in mandamus brought by the City of Redwood City to
compel its City Clerk, respondent herein, to cause the printing of certain 'Reclamation Bonds' and certain 'Facilities Bonds' in the aggregate principal amount of $5,000,000. Respondent has refused to proceed with such printing on the ground that she has been advised by counsel that the issuance of said bonds may be unwarranted by law. An alternative writ of mandate was issued by this court, and we now proceed upon the order to show cause thereon to determine whether a peremptory writ should be granted directing respondent to cause the printing of said bonds.
The chronological background of these proceedings is as follows: On March 9, 1964, the City Council of the City of Redwood City, a municipal corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Council'), adopted Ordinance No. 1128 known as the 'Redwood City General Improvement District Ordinance' (hereinafter referred to as 'the ordinance'), which provided for the formation of general improvement districts within the City of Redwood City (hereinafter referred to as 'the City'); for the adoption of improvement projects in said districts; for the financing of such projects through the issuance of bonds; and for the Council to be the governing body of any district formed pursuant to the ordinance. Pursuant to this ordinance, the Council, on April 13, 1964, passed Resolution No. 4255 which determined that public interest and convenience required the formation of a proposed general improvement district to be known as 'Redwood City General Improvement District No. 1-64' (hereinafter referred to as 'the District'), provided for five separate projects for said District, 1 and stated that the gross estimated cost of said projects was the sum of $168,000,000. The resolution also provided the time and place for the hearing of objections by persons interested in the formation of the proposed District, in the lands to be included therein, or the proposed projects. Thereafter, on May 4, 1964, the hearing provided for in said resolution was held, no written or oral objections were presented, and the Council thereupon passed Resolution No. 4274 determining that public interest and convenience required the five projects and the formation of the District, and established the District and fixed its boundaries. On the same day the Council passed Resolution No. 4277 providing that it was its intention that the District incur a general bonded indebtedness in specified amounts for each of said projects, 2 and fixing a time and place for the hearing of the questions whether the whole District would be benefited and whether the tax basis for such projects should be land only, or real property, or all taxable property. On May 25, 1964, the hearing provided for in the last-mentioned resolution was held and three persons, none of whom were property owners in the District, appeared and made oral objections. At the conclusion of the hearing the Council adopted Resolution No. 4298 determining that the public interest and convenience required the incurring of the aforementioned bonded indebtedness for the five projects; that the whole of the District would be benefited by each of said projects; and that the tax base for The District covers 4,382 acres, and, as disclosed by the tax records, Leslie Salt Co., a corporation, was the sole owner of all the lands in the District. Accordingly, notice of the passage of the afforesaid resolutions was only given to said corporation. A portion of said lands had, however, on April 6, 1964, been conveyed by unrecorded deed to Leslie Properties, Inc., a corporation. On June 4, 1964, and prior to the holding of the bond election, both corporations executed a 'Waiver of Notice' whereby they expressly waived any and all notice of the Council hearings held on May 4 and May 25, 1964, and agreed that they would not assert or urge in any proceeding 'now or hereafter pending in any court of competent jurisdiction' that they did not received notice of any such hearings.
Project A (Reclamation and Drainage Project) should be land only, and that for the other projects, real property. Following the passage of Resolution No. 4298, and on the same day, the Council adopted Resolution No. 4299 providing for the calling of a general obligation election on June 16, 1964 for the purpose of submitting to the voters of the District five measures for incurring the said bonded indebtedness for the five projects. This resolution provided that because the District was uninhabited and had no registered electors residing within its boundaries, the voters entitled to vote at said bond election should be 'owners' as that term was defined in the ordinance.
The District bond election was held on June 16, 1964 at which the two corporate owners of the land in the District were the only voters. 3 Upon canvass of the voters, the Council adopted a resolution that a majority of all the votes cast were in favor of and approved the respective measures. Thereafter, and on July 6, 1964, the Council passed resolutions authorizing the issuance of the bonds for each project. 4 Respondent refused to cause said bonds to be printed on the grounds that the Council did not have the power to enact the ordinance; that the District was not validly formed; and that the election approving the issuance of the bonds was invalid. Accordingly, the questions raised here may be divided into three parts--those relating to the validity of the procedural ordinance; those having to do with the creation and formation of the District; and those involving the validity of the bond election.
a. Is the Procedural Ordinance Invalid Because Section 74 of the City's Charter Precludes the use of Such an Ordinance to Make the Contemplated Improvements?
No. The City is a chartered city organized pursuant to sections 6 and 8 of Article XI of the California Constitution. Section 74 of its charter deals with streets and other public improvements. With respect to the instant inquiry the pertinent provisions are as follows: 'The improvement, widening, extending, opening and closing of streets or rights of way * * * and the making of any other improvements authorized by the laws of the state may be done and assessments therefor may be levied in conformity with and under the authority conferred by the general laws of the state * * *; provided, however, that the council may by ordinance adopt a procedure for the improvement of streets, alleys, rights of way or other public places, the laying of pipe and conduits and the removal from buildings, lots, and grounds and Respondent contends that section 74 precludes the use of the procedural ordinance to create four of the five contemplated projects because they are not the types of improvements which can be provided for by procedural ordinance. The thrust of respondent's argument is that these improvements are not specifically mentioned as the types of work which may be done under a procedural ordinance, and that the words "other public places" must, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, be interpreted to mean other public places in the nature of types of work specifically mentioned. Accordingly, it is respondent's position that the projects which are the subject of the present proceeding may only be performed, pursuant to section 74, in conformity with the general laws of the State. Petitioner responds to these contentions with the assertion that the subject provisions of section 74 are merely permissive, and that, in any event, section 74, which was a part of the original charter adopted in 1929, is controlled by the provisions of section 3 of the charter adopted in 1954. 4a
the sidewalks opposite thereto, of dirt, rubbish, weeds and other rank growth and materials * * *. It is the intention of this charter to permit the council of said city to proceed in all matters referred to in this section under the general laws of the state * * *.' St.1929, p. 2202. (Emphasis added.)
When the City framed and adopted its charter in 1929 it did not avail itself of the 'home rule' provisions of the California Construction (§§ 6 and 8 of Art. XI); 5 and it was not until 1954 when it adopted section 3 of the charter (ratified by the Legislature in 1955), that the City elected to accept the privilege of autonomous rule. It is clear from the language of section 3 that the City has availed itself of the 'home rule' provisions of the Constitution 'to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters * * *.' (See Civic Center Assn. v. Railroad We thus have a situation, prior to the adoption of section 3 in 1954, where, insofar as the City's charter provided for matters solely of municipal concern, it was paramount to general laws, but where, as to municipal affairs for which it did not provide and upon affairs not municipal, it was still subject to the operation of general law. (Civic Center Assn. v. Railroad Comm., supra, 175 Cal. p. 447, 166 P. 351.) Upon the adoption of section 3, however, the City's power over exclusively municipal affairs became all-embracing, restricted and limited only by its charter, and free from any interference by the State through general laws. (Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.2d 276, 291, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 185...
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