Kumar v. New Jersey
| Decision Date | 25 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-13927 (FLW) |
| Parties | SHILPI KUMAR, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Shilpi Kumar (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against New Jersey Schools Development Authority (the “NJSDA”), Jane Kelly, Don Guarriello, Jr. Colleen Connolly, Manuel Da Silva, Lizette Delgado, and Maribel Osnayo-Lytle (collectively “Defendants”), alleging racial and ethnic discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). Defendants move to dismiss[1]for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Kumar has not alleged facts showing discriminatory conduct. Defendants also argue that many of Kumar's factual allegations are time-barred. I GRANT Defendants' motions in part and DENY them in part as follows: I DISMISS Kumar's § 1981 and NJLAD claims with prejudice; I DISMISS her § 1983 claim, Title VII race discrimination claim, and Title VII hostile work environment claim without prejudice; and she may proceed with her Title VII retaliation claim.
The following are the relevant facts based on Kumar's Amended Complaint. The NJSDA employed Kumar for eleven years, beginning February 17, 2009, as a Benefit Specialist in Human Resources (“HR”). Am. Compl., ¶ 17. Osnayo-Lytle supervised Kumar. Id. ¶ 26. Kelly and Guarriello were Vice Presidents, while Da Silva and Delgado were CEOs. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-8.
According to Kumar, she was the only Indian[2] employee in her department, and Defendants repeatedly mistreated her on that basis. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. During a meeting in October 2017, for example, Kumar alleges that Kelly called her “unprofessional, “stupid, ” and “too smart (sarcastically).” Id. ¶ 26. Around the same time, Kumar alleges that Kelly instructed her not to pursue professional growth opportunities or a promotion within the NJSDA, at which point Kumar realized Kelly's and Osnayo-Lytle's “hatred, retaliation and discrimination.” Id. ¶ 26. Furthermore, in November 2017, Osnayo-Lytle and Kelly purportedly attempted to suspend Kumar without pay and transfer her to a different department. Id. ¶ 25. The following month, all employees in HR apparently received a promotion and raise, except Kumar. Id. ¶ 27. Then, in February 2018, Kelly and Osnayo-Lytle sought to hire a new Deputy Director, but when Kumar expressed interest in the position, they excluded internal applications altogether. Id. ¶ 28.
Kumar further asserts that a newly hired white colleague received a $10, 000 raise in early 2018, while Guarriello and Osnayo-Lytle gave Kumar just $2, 000. Id. ¶ 30. In fact, according to the Amended Complaint, Guarriello and Osnayo-Lytle failed to pay Kumar's full raise. Id. ¶ 31. Delgado initiated an ethics investigation into the incident, after which Delgado fired Osnayo-Lytle and Kumar received a title change and $10, 000.[3] Id. ¶ 39. Nevertheless, in July 2019, although Kumar handled most day-to-day HR operations, the NJSDA hired a white employee named Connolly as “Managing Director - Program Operations.” Id. ¶ 33. According to Kumar, Connolly had no formal training or qualifications at the time. Id. ¶ 33.
Kumar avers she was again denied an opportunity for professional advancement in September 2019, when another open position—this time for Director of HR—was changed to only allow for external applicants. Id. ¶ 35. The NJSDA cited no qualified internal applicants as the reason, which Kumar disputes. Id. ¶ 37. Da Silva, Connolly, Kelly, and Guarriello apparently participated in this decision. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. In October 2019, Kumar filed a formal complaint with NJSDA's EEO Director, Manuel Castillo, alleging harassment, discrimination, and “hostility.” Id. ¶ 36. That same month, Kelly allegedly promoted one of Kumar's white subordinates, Peter Green, to a director position over Kumar. Id. ¶ 38. Kumar alleges that, thereafter, hostility and harassment from Connolly, Guarriello, and Da Silva increased. Am. Compl., ¶ 36.
In February 2020, four months after learning that the NJSDA's legal department was investigating her for possible policy violations and “allegations involving [the] HRIS system ABRA, ” Am. Compl., ¶ 40, Kumar filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).[4] Ten days later, the NJSDA terminated Kumar. Id. ¶ 43. According to Kumar, this was not the first time the NJSDA took such action against an Indian employee: Sameer Shah was allegedly terminated for demanding equality in job advancement opportunities. Id. ¶ 40.
Kumar filed her original Complaint on October 5, 2020, and the Amended Complaint on January 5, 2021. Count I alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against Osnayo-Lytle, Kelly, Guarriello, Connolly, Da Silva, and Delgado. Count II alleges Title VII violations against the NJSDA. Count III alleges violations of the NJLAD against the individual defendants. The crux of Kumar's claims under all statutes is that Defendants intentionally denied her career advancement opportunities, declined to promote her, and terminated her because she is Indian; created a hostile work environment throughout her time at NJSDA; and retaliated against her for filing a Charge with the EEOC. The NJSDA, Kelly, Guarriello, Connolly, Da Silva, and Delgado moved to dismiss on March 16, 2021. ECF No. 23. Osnayo-Lytle then moved to dismiss on April 19, 2021. ECF No. 28. Together, Defendants argue that Count I fails because Kumar does not allege a deprivation of a federal right, Count II fails because Kumar cannot assert individual liability under Title VII[5] and her allegations do not rise to the level of intentional discrimination, and Count III fails because Kumar has not pled employer liability against the NJSDA itself. They also argue that various allegations fall outside the applicable statutes of limitation.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” is grounds for dismissal. Id. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief” when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). The allegations set out in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A complaint must instead “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547. The Third Circuit has developed a test to determine whether a pleading meets the standard set out in Twombly. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). First, the Court outlines the elements the plaintiff must plead to be entitled to relief. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365. Second, the plaintiff's allegations must be more than mere conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. Third, the Court must determine whether the well-pleaded facts “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365.
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue the statute of limitations restricts Kumar's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJLAD. I agree. In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. Bradford v. Bolles, 645 F. App'x157, 159-160 (3d Cir. 2016); O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006) (). The statute of limitations under the NJLAD is the same. Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 45 Fed. App'x. 163, 165 (3d. Cir. 2002); Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 298 (1993). This forecloses all discrete discriminatory acts or practices, such as failure to promote or termination, which occurred outside the limitations period and became actionable on each of the dates they happened. See infra. Because Kumar filed her original Complaint on October 5, 2020, her claims under these statutes cannot depend on factual allegations occurring before October 5, 2018, [6] including the following:
Additionally under Title VII, a plaintiff must file an EEOC Charge within 300 days of an adverse employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2001). Courts treat this as a statute of limitations, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982), and construe it strictly. Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1999). For “discrete...
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