Kurtz v. Denniston
Decision Date | 19 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. C 92-0212.,C 92-0212. |
Citation | 872 F. Supp. 631 |
Parties | Douglas E. KURTZ and Larry E. Ross, Plaintiffs, v. Richard E. DENNISTON and John Doe, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Plaintiffs pro se.
Layne M. Lindebak, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Iowa, for defendants.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................... 633 II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................... 634 A. Undisputed Facts ..................................... 636 B. Disputed Facts ....................................... 636 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................... 636 A. Mootness Of Injunctive Relief ........................ 636 B. Qualified Immunity ................................... 636 1. Plaintiffs' Assertion Of An Issue Of Fact ........ 637 2. Denniston's Claim Of Qualified Immunity .......... 637 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................... 643
Plaintiff prison inmates brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of their rights to freedom of religion by denial of their requests for "non-pork" cards by defendant prison chaplain. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that his decision was in accord with prison policy and a prior ruling of the district court, and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant has also moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the ground that department of corrections policy has been changed, and prisoners are no longer required to obtain a "non-pork" card to receive pork-free meals. The prison now provides a non-pork alternative for each meal. Plaintiffs resist the motion on the ground that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the alternative non-pork meals currently provided are nutritionally adequate.
On April 13, 1992, plaintiffs, Douglas E. Kurtz and Larry E. Ross, who at the time were both prisoners at the Iowa Men's Reformatory (IMR) in Anamosa, Iowa, filed an application to file a complaint in this matter in forma pauperis. The court granted the application on November 20, 1992, but also dismissed plaintiffs' complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Following appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the matter was remanded to the district court on March 1, 1993, with instructions to allow this matter to proceed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs were not required to plead membership in a religious organization which required abstinence from pork in order to state a claim that their religious beliefs were sincerely held and that their rights under the First Amendment had been violated. The application to proceed in forma pauperis was therefore granted on March 4, 1993, and the court ordered service of process to issue and appointed counsel for plaintiffs.
Defendant Richard Denniston answered the complaint on August 12, 1993, and moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity on September 16, 1993. Plaintiffs resisted the motion on September 24, 1993, but moved to hold open the record until affidavits could be filed. The affidavits in question were filed on October 4, 15, and 28, 1993. Plaintiffs counsel was granted leave to withdraw in this matter, citing irreconcilable differences with his clients, on August 15, 1994, and plaintiffs were ordered to proceed pro se. On September 13, 1994, the court ordered that all matters, including a motion to compel and extensions of time to file trial statements, should be held in abeyance until the court ruled on defendant's motion for summary judgment.1 On November 10, 1994, Ross filed a motion for voluntary dismissal that states his desire not to proceed with this matter, but also sets forth a number of "stipulations" to be agreed to by all parties. In a letter to counsel for defendant filed with the court, Kurtz also sought to settle this case. Both plaintiffs assert that the reason for their desire to abandon or settle this litigation is that the department of corrections has terminated the policy of requiring non-pork cards in order for prisoners to obtain a pork-free meal. The court concludes that Ross has not made a voluntary dismissal of his interest in the action, because he has demanded a stipulation to certain facts or conditions as part of his "`voluntary' dismissal." The court will therefore address the motion for summary judgment as it pertains to both plaintiffs. This matter is now fully submitted, and the court enters its ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
The Eighth Circuit recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years "motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992).
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).2 A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, here Kurtz and Ross, and give them the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992).
Procedurally, the moving party, here Denniston, bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). Denniston is not required by Rule 56 to support his motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id.
"When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. Kurtz and Ross are required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, ... to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Impro Products, Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 798, 88 L.Ed.2d 774 (1986). The necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1994).
In Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56, the Supreme Court established that a summary judgment motion should be interpreted by the trial court to accomplish its purpose of disposing of factually unsupported claims,...
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