Kurz v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1991
• Citation: 571 N.Y.S.2d 533,174 A.D.2d 671
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: In the Matter of Thomas KURZ, etc., Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Appellant.

Page 533

571 N.Y.S.2d 533

174 A.D.2d 671

In the Matter of Thomas KURZ, etc., Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

June 17, 1991.

Victor A. Kovner, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Leonard Koerner and Fay Leoussis, of counsel), for appellant.

Pegalis & Wachsman, P.C., Great Neck (Stephen E. Pegalis and Rhonda L. Meyer, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and BRACKEN, KUNZEMAN and MILLER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leviss, J.), dated October 27, 1989, which granted the petitioner's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the contentions of the appellant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (hereinafter HHC), we find that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the petitioner leave to serve a late notice of claim. The record reveals that the petitioner's two infant children, fraternal twins, were born in November 1979, at the appellant's Elmhurst General Hospital. The first twin born, Amanda, was delivered with the aid of forceps. The second twin, Thomas, was in a breech position, yet was delivered vaginally. Both children allegedly received negligent treatment from hospital personnel, causing them to sustain cerebral palsy.

Because of the twins' condition, the petitioner and his wife brought the children to Elmhurst General Hospital for continuing treatment. Hospital employees reportedly advised the petitioner and his wife that the condition of the children was due to the fact that they were born approximately two months prematurely. Consequently, no legal action was taken. In March 1989, however, the petitioner and his wife met another parent of prematurely born twins, one of whom was afflicted with cerebral palsy, who informed them that the condition of the children could be the result of malpractice. The petitioner thereafter consulted with counsel and the instant proceeding was commenced by order to show cause signed May 9, 1989, i.e., within 10 years of the accrual of any potential birth-related malpractice cause of action.

Upon the foregoing facts we cannot agree with the HHC that the court improvidently exercised its discretion. While ordinarily an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim must be brought within the one-year and 90-day period provided for by General Municipal Law § 50-e, that time period is subject to a toll for infancy of up to 10 years (CPLR 208; see, Matter of Daniel J. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 630, 569 N.Y.S.2d 396, 571 N.E.2d 704; Trejo v. City of New York, 156 A.D.2d 164, 548 N.Y.S.2d 208; see also, Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, 434 N.Y.S.2d 138, 414 N.E.2d 639). It is uncontroverted that in the instant case the petitioner's application was brought within the appropriate period of limitation, as tolled by the twins' infancy.

Furthermore, there is no merit to the HHC's contention that the petitioner has failed to make the requisite showing that the delay in filing a notice of claim was a product of the children's infancy, and that absent such a showing, leave to serve a late notice of claim must be denied. This requirement existed under a predecessor version of current General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) (see, Matter of Murray v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9, 282 N.E.2d 103). That predecessor section did indeed contain an express requirement limiting a court's discretion over late notice applications to situations, inter alia, "[w]here the claimant is an infant * * * and by reason of such disability fails to serve a notice of claim within the time specified" (General Municipal Law former § 50-e[5]. As amended, however, this requirement was deleted (L.1976, ch. 745). A petitioner is no longer required to establish that the delay is a product of the infancy (see, Matter of Lannon v. Town of Henrietta, 109 A.D.2d 1067, 488 N.Y.S.2d 327; Matter of Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 70 A.D.2d 422, 427, 421 N.Y.S.2d 447, affd. 51 N.Y.2d 957, 435 N.Y.S.2d 720, 416 N.E.2d 1055) as infancy is now but one consideration and "the decision to grant or deny an extension under section 50-e (subd. 5) is still purely a discretionary one" (Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, 265, 434 N.Y.S.2d 138, 414 N.E.2d 639, supra; see also, Matter of...