Ky. River Foothills Dev. Council, Inc. v. Phirman
| Decision Date | 17 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2013-CA-001858-MR,2013-CA-001858-MR |
| Parties | KENTUCKY RIVER FOOTHILLS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, INC. APPELLANT v. CATHY PHIRMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of MELISSA STEFFEN; JOANNE GILLIAM and DARYLL GILLIAM as Guardians of CONNER KEITH GILLIAM, And CARTER RAY GILLIAM, unmarried infants APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
Kentucky River was created by Articles of Incorporation filed with the Secretary of State on October 22, 1962, as a private nonprofit corporation. In 1968, Kentucky River was designated as the community action agency to combat poverty for Clark County, and since that time has also become the community action agency for Estill County, Madison County, and Powell County.
Melissa Steffen committed suicide after leaving a substance abuse recovery program operated by Kentucky River, the Liberty Place Recovery Center for Women ("Liberty Place"). Melissa was apparently being treated at Liberty Place pursuant to a contract that Liberty Place had in place with the Kentucky Department of Corrections. On May 17, 2011, Melissa's Estate and minor children filed a wrongful death action in the Madison Circuit Court alleging that Kentucky River's negligence caused Melissa's death.1 According to the complaint, among other tortuous actions, Melissa alleges that Liberty Place should not have accepted Melissa as a patient, failed to properly administer Melissa her psychiatricmediations, and did not notify the proper persons of Melissa's departure from the facility.
On July 22, 2013, Kentucky River moved for summary judgment, arguing that the wrongful death action filed by the Estate and minor children was barred by immunity. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on August 20, 2013, and denied that motion by order rendered September 23, 2013, finding that Kentucky River did not qualify as an entity entitled to immunity under Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91 (Ky. 2009).
Kentucky River now appeals.
A party moving for summary judgment must establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996); CR2 56.03. Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable. Battoe v. Beyer, 285 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1955). Nevertheless, an order denying a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable. Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886-87 (Ky. 2009).
Whether a defendant is protected by immunity is a question of law, which we review de novo. Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky.2006); Estate of Clark ex rel. Mitchell v. Daviess County, 105 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Ky. App. 2003).
In Kentucky, the law distinguishes between two distinct, but related, forms of immunity: sovereign immunity and governmental immunity. See Furtula v. Univ. of Ky., 438 S.W.3d 303, 306, fn.1 (Ky. 2014).
Sovereign immunity derives Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted). "Sovereign immunity affords the state absolute immunity from suit and 'extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.'" Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Ky. App. 2013) (citations omitted). "Counties, which predate the existence of the state and are considered direct political subdivisions of it, enjoy the same immunity as the state itself." Comair, 295 S.W.3d at 94.
Governmental immunity is "a policy-derived offshoot of sovereign immunity," Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 801 (Ky. 2009), that seeks to protect government agencies andentities from liability. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519. Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, "a state agency [or entity] is entitled to immunity from tort liability to the extent that it is performing a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, function." Id. Simply put, while a county government is wholly immune from suit, immunity is a conditional status for a government agency or entity that turns on whether the agency or entity is performing an essential government function. Caneyville, 286 S.W.3d at 804.
It is apparent that Kentucky River is not entitled to sovereign immunity. It is neither the Commonwealth nor a county thereof. The question we must resolve is whether Kentucky River's status as a community action agency entitles it to governmental immunity. This appears to be an issue of first impression in Kentucky. To place this issue in the proper context, we believe that it is necessary to briefly review the law as related to the formation of community action agencies.
The community action agency concept originated in Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1962 ("the EOA"), 42 U.S.C.3 §§ 2781-2837 (1976) (repealed 1981). Through the EOA's provisions, Congress sought to encourage the creation of community operated agencies that would coordinate federal, state, and private resources to combat poverty at a local level. U. S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 818, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1977, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Under the EOA, funding flowed directly from the federal government to community action groups that were properly designated as such by state or local authorities and that complied with federal statutory and administrative requirements. See Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 975 (5th Cir. 1981). While Congress defined the basic structure and functions of these agencies and established requisites for federal funding, it largely left discretion in administering the programs and funding to the community action groups themselves. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Cmty. Action Program, 710 F.2d 632, 634 (10th Cir. 1983).
In 1981, Congress repealed the community action agency provisions of the EOA and established the Community Services Block Grant Program, ("CSBGP") 42 U.S.C.A.4 §§ 9901-9912 (1983 & Supp.1989). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9912(a). The distinguishing feature of the CSBGP was that it shifted theresponsibility for running the program from the federal government to the States. Guilford County Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Instead of giving funds directly to community action agencies, funds to reduce poverty were allocated to the States through block grants. Id. Id.
The CSBGP permitted the States to opt out of the block grant program for the fiscal year 1982 and instead have the Secretary of Health and Human Services directly fund State and local community action agencies under the former law. 42 U.S.C. § 9911. Beginning in fiscal year 1983, all States were required to operate under the CSBGP or lose funding.
In response to the CSBGP, the Commonwealth of Kentucky enacted a set of statutes, KRS5 273.405 to 273.453, to govern the establishment and administration of community action agencies. The statutes, which mirror in large part the federal scheme under the EOA, became effective July 15, 1982.
By statute, the Commonwealth mandated that "[t]here shall be established community action agencies throughout political subdivisions of the Commonwealth." KRS 273.405. A "community action agency" is defined as "acorporation organized for the purpose of alleviating poverty within a community or area by developing employment opportunities; by bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, and work; and by conducting, administering, and coordinating similar programs." KRS 273.410 (2). The duties of community action agencies are set forth as follows in KRS 273.441(1):
(a) Plan systematically for an effective community action program, develop information as to the problems and causes of poverty in the community; determine how much and how effectively assistance is being provided to deal with those problems and causes; and establish priorities among projects, activities, and areas as needed for the best and most efficient use of resources;
(b) Provide planning or technical assistance to agencies; and generally, in cooperation with community agencies and officials, undertake actions to improve existing efforts to reduce poverty, such as improving day-to-day communications, closing service gaps, focusing resources on the most needy, and providing additional opportunities to low-income individuals for regular employment or participation in the programs or activities for which those community agencies and officials are responsible;
(c) Initiate and sponsor projects responsive to needs of the poor which are not otherwise being met, with particular emphasis on providing central or common services that can be drawn upon by a variety of related programs, developing new approaches or new types of...
To continue reading
Request your trial