Ky. State Univ. v. Mucker
| Decision Date | 20 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2018-CA-001817-MR,2018-CA-001817-MR |
| Parties | KENTUCKY STATE UNIVERSITY AND CHRISTOPHER CRIBBS APPELLANTS v. CHARLES MUCKER APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
When Mucker enrolled at KSU in the summer of 2014 and took up residence in university housing, he was required to, and did, sign a "Resident Zero Tolerance Acknowledgment." (Record (R.) 137). He accepted the rule of campus housing that his "using and/or trafficking in drugs . . . will result in my immediate eviction and that I will be subject to suspension or dismissal without a right of appeal."
On April 13, 2016, while he was in his dorm room, Mucker was told a campus police officer was parked next to his vehicle. Mucker approached the officer. After a discussion, Mucker consented to the officer's search of his vehicle. The officer recovered marijuana cigarettes, individual bags of marijuana, and a small scale. This was reported to KSU officials.
Christopher Cribbs, KSU's Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs, met with the campus police officer to assess the situation. On Thursday,April 14, 2016, Cribbs decided to suspend Mucker and prepared a letter to him stating, in pertinent part:
(R. at 9).
The following day, Friday, April 15, Cribbs met with Mucker to discuss the suspension and then met with Mucker's parents and the Chief of the KSU Police Department.
On May 3, 2016, Mucker filed suit against KSU and Cribbs, in his official and individual capacities, seeking damages and injunctive relief. On May 9, 2016, the circuit court denied Mucker's motion for a temporary restraining order to immediately reinstate him. He then amended his complaint to assert state law claims and a claim alleging the defendants violated 42 U.S.C.2 § 1983. He specifically alleged: (1) a deprivation of his due process and equal protection rights under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1 and 2 of the Kentucky Constitution; (2) illegal civil forfeiture; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of implied or quasi contract; (5) quantum meruit; and (6) promissory estoppel. He sought both monetary relief and injunctive relief, including reinstatement as a KSU student.
KSU and Cribbs moved for summary judgment on several grounds, but specifically asserted governmental and qualified immunity. Mucker also moved for summary judgment. The circuit court discussed immunity but declined to recognize its application, stating it was unable to "accurately determine if KSU or Cribbs, in his official capacity, are entitled to immunity." Regarding Cribbs'immunity defense in his individual capacity, the circuit court concluded "[a]t this time with the information that the court has been provided, the Court cannot make a determination if Cribbs is entitled to qualified immunity." The circuit court denied both motions for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rowan Cty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Ky. 2006); CR 56.03. "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo." Peterson v. Foley, 559 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Ky. 2018).
As a threshold matter, Mucker asserts this is an interlocutory appeal not ripe for review. Generally, our appellate jurisdiction is restricted to final judgments. CR 54.02. And, "an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment would not be permitted because it is regarded as interlocutory." Steffan v. Smyzer by and through Rankins, 540 S.W.3d 387, 390-91 (Ky. App. 2018). However, in Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, the Kentucky Supreme Court created an exception to this general rule. 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009). It held "anorder denying a substantial claim of absolute immunity is immediately appealable even in the absence of a final judgment." Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
Mucker contends the circuit court did not "deny" KSU and Cribbs immunity. Rather, says Mucker, it denied summary judgment without ruling on the issue of immunity. Therefore, Mucker argues, this appeal falls outside the Prater parameters. We disagree.
When a party moves the circuit court for an order recognizing that party's immunity from suit, any order that addresses the motion without granting the relief sought is a denial. The circuit court's failure to grant KSU's and Cribbs's motions is no less a denial of immunity than if express words were used.
If this were not so, the policy undergirding interlocutory appeals of orders denying immunity would be thwarted. Immediate, interlocutory appeal is necessary because immunity, when it applies, insulates a party "from the burdens of defending the action, not merely" from judgment. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d at 474. This includes the "cost of trial and the burdens of broad-reaching discovery." Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ky. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the circuit court concluded a genuine dispute remains regarding at least one fact material to the decisions regarding the appellants'immunity claims. It is this Court's duty to review those conclusions. The Court's jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal has been properly invoked.
This circuit court's factfinding could be clearly erroneous for either of two reasons. First, the circuit court could have concluded a genuine dispute exists, but only regarding a non-material fact or facts. That would require reversal. See Prather v. Immanuel Baptist Church, 296 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Ky. 1956) (). Second, the circuit court could have concluded the plaintiff presented sufficient proof that a material fact is in dispute, when no such proof can be found in the record on appeal. That would require reversal. Neel v. Wagner-Shuck Realty Co., 576 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Ky. App. 1978) .
We first consider the circuit court's conclusion that KSU was not entitled to immunity.
The participants in this case confuse sovereign and governmental immunity. Sovereign immunity, per se, is not an issue in this case.
Sovereign immunity "is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its consent or otherwise waived its immunity." Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky. 2001). Mucker has not sued the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Sovereign immunity Id. at 518 (citations omitted). Mucker has sued none of these officers. Sovereign immunity, per se,3 does not apply.
KSU is claiming governmental immunity. "Governmental immunity is granted to agencies that have been established by an immune entity [such as the Commonwealth of Kentucky] and that perform a '"function integral to state government."'" Transit Authority of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Ky. App. 2013) (quoting Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp.v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky. 1990))). From this rule of law, we know the material fact questions are limited to determining: (1) whether KSU is a state agency and (2) whether KSU was...
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