Kyle v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 40034.,40034.
• Parties: HUGH C. KYLE v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, and ROBERT E. LEE BUILDING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

201 S.W.2d 912 HUGH C. KYLE
v.
KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, and ROBERT E. LEE BUILDING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellants. No. 40034. Supreme Court of Missouri. Division One, April 12, 1947. Rehearing Denied May 12, 1947.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Brown Harris, Judge.

REVERSED.

Ray B. Lucas and Jos. R. Stewart for appellants.

(1) Respondent failed to produce a purchaser as required by his listing contract. Ensler v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 324 Mo. 530, 23 S.W. (2d) 1034; Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1018, 170 S.W. (2d) 407; Webster's New International Dictionary, 1925, p. 1712; J.C. McCray & Son v. Pfost, 118 Mo. App. 672, 94 S.W. 998; Easton-Taylor Trust Co. v. Goodman, 43 S.W. (2d) 874 (2) Respondent was not the procuring cause of the sale of the property in question, and is not entitled to a commission thereon. Gamble v. Grether, 108 Mo. App. 340, 83 S.W. 306; Warren v. Fritsch. 14 S.W. (2d) 29; Reitz v. Oglebay, 213 Mo. App. 611, 251 S.W. 771; Tyler v. Parr, 52 Mo. 249; 34 Words & Phrases, p. 179; Crain v. Miles, 154 Mo. App. 338, 134 S.W. 52; A.J. Meyer & Co. v. Schulte, 189 S.W. (2d) 183. (3) The verdict of the jury is based upon speculation and conjecture, and it is not based upon any substantial evidence in the case. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 361, 98 S.W. (2d) 969; Watkins v. Bird-Sykes-Bunker Co., 322 Mo. 830, 16 S.W. (2d) 38; Bates v. Brown Shoe Co., 342 Mo. 411, 116 S.W. (2d) 31; Stofer v. Dunham, 208 S.W. 641; Griffith v. Continental Cas. Co., 299 Mo. 426, 253 S.W. 1043.

Harry L. Jacobs and Robert J. Coleman for respondent.

(1) Notice of prospect's identity unnecessary if broker was procuring cause of consummated sale. Lasoya Oil Co. v. Jarvis, 191 Okla. 213, 127 Pac. (2d) 142, 142 A.L.R. 270; 142 A.L.R. 275; Bryan v. Abert, 3 App. Cases (D.C.), 180; Stinde v. Blesch, 42 Mo. App. 578; Reynor v. Mackrill, 181 Iowa 210, 164 N.W. 335, 1 A.L.R. 523; 12 C.J.S. 212, sec. 91. (2) Missouri cases holding notice unnecessary. Tyler v. Parr, 52 Mo. 249; Goffe v. Gibson, 18 Mo. App. 1; Millan & Abbott v. Porter, 31 Mo. App. 563; McCormack v. Henderson, 100 Mo. App. 647, 75 S.W. 171; Glade v. Eastern Ill. Min. Co., 129 Mo. App. 443, 107 S.W. 1002; Bell v. Kaiser, 50 Mo. 150; Hovey v. Aaron, 133 Mo. App. 573, 113 S.W. 718; Lane v. Cunningham, 171 Mo. App. 17, 153 S.W. 525; Stinde v. Blesch, 42 Mo. App. 578. (3) See, also: 1 Restatement of Law of Agency, sec. 448, p. 1055; Mechem on Agency (2 Ed.), sec. 2436, p. 2018; 12 C.J.S. 217, sec. 93(b); 8 Am. Jur. 1101, sec. 189; Clifford v. Meyer, 33 N.E. 127; Clifford v. Meyer, 6 Ind. App. 633, 34 N.E. 23. (4) "Produce" in cases of consummated sales has same meaning as "procure" and does not require notice. The agreement should be construed in favor of the broker. Webster's New International Dictionary, 1926, p. 1712; Elmer v. Rubenstein, 24 S.W. (2d) 657; 12 C.J.S. 134, sec. 60; Duncan v. Borden, 13 Colo. App. 481, 59 Pac. 60; Sessions v. Pac. Improvement Co., 57 Cal. App. 1, 206 Pac. 613. (5) Parties themselves construed word "produce" as not requiring notice. Corder v. O'Neill, 176 Mo. 401, 75 S.W. 764. (6) "Produce" has several meanings. Jury's verdict settled its meaning here. Belt v. Good, 31 Mo. 128; Edwards v. Smith, 63 Mo. 119; Deutmann v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App. 24. (7) Courts hold "produce" and similar words all have same meaning. 8 Am. Jur., pp. 1087, 1088, sec. 172; Wachtel v. Harkless, 112 Ind. App. 279, 44 N.E. (2d) 510; Vigeant v. Bank, 158 S.W. (2d) 184; Low v. Paddock, 220 S.W. 969; Reitz v. Oglebay, 251 S.W. 771, 213 Mo. App. 611; McCormack v. Henderson, 100 Mo. App. 647, 75 S.W. 171; Mechem on Agency, 2nd Ed. (1914). sec. 2431; Low Moor Iron Co. v. Jackson, 84 S.E. 100. (8) Appellants' cases discussed and distinguished. J.C. McCray & Son v. Pfost, 118 Mo. App. 672, 94 S.W. 998; Easton-Taylor Trust Co. v. Goodman, 43 S.W. (2d) 874; Sprague v. Feldman, 284 S.W. 155. (9) Respondent did not conceal his efforts. Appellants and purchaser got together and closed deal secretly. (10) Respondent was the procuring cause of the sale. There was substantial evidence to this effect. This made it a jury question. Buhrmester v. Ind. Plb. & H. Supp. Co., 151 S.W. (2d) 509; Vining v. Mo.-La. Oil Co., 312 Mo. 30, 278 S.W. 747; Crain v. Miles, 134 S.W. 52. (11) Immaterial that respondent was not the first agent to mention the property to the purchaser. Gilchrist v. Stark, 41 S.W. 888; Goffe v. Gibson, 18 Mo. App. 1; Gamble v. Grether, 108 Mo. App. 340, 83 S.W. 306. (12) Immaterial that terms of sale were changed by the owner itself in consummating the deal. Stinde v. Blesch, 42 Mo. App. 578; Hovey v. Aaron, 133 Mo. App. 573, 113 S.W. 718; Glade v. Min. Co., 129 Mo. App. 443, 107 S.W. 1002; McCormack v. Henderson, 100 Mo. App. 647, 75 S.W. 171; Bailey v. Hercules, 22 S.W. (2d) 855; Rowland v. Progressive Inv. Co., 202 S.W. 257. (13) Real estate board rule immaterial. Volkmann v. Wortham, 189 S.W. (2d) 776. (14) Immaterial that respondent did not obtain the contract and that appellants...