Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 11CA2205 |
| Citation | 2012 COA 160 |
| Parties | Kyle W. Larson Enterprises, Inc., Roofing Experts, d/b/a The Roofing Experts, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
City and County of Denver District Court No. 10CV6064
JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Opinion by JUDGE TERRY
¶1 As an issue of first impression, we conclude that a repair vendor that brought a claim against an insurer on behalf of its insured is a "first-party claimant" under section 10-3-1115, C.R.S. 2012, and is entitled to sue the insurer under section 10-3-1116, C.R.S. 2012.
¶2 Plaintiff, Kyle W. Larson Enterprises, Inc., doing business as The Roofing Experts (Roofer), appeals only a portion of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). Because Roofer does not appeal the trial court's judgment for Allstate on Roofer's claims for breach of contract, account stated, and unjust enrichment, we express no opinion on that part of the judgment. We reverse the court's judgment against Roofer on its claim under section 10-3-1116 and remand for further proceedings on that claim.
¶3 Roofer contracted with the owners of four homes insured by Allstate to repair their roofs. The contracts provided that the repair costs would be paid from insurance proceeds and granted Roofer full authority to communicate with Allstate regarding all aspects of the insurance claims. Roofer met with Allstate adjustors to discuss the four homes and to determine the amount of each claim. Roofer began each repair after receiving approval from Allstate for the claims. It was later determined that additional repairs were necessary to comply with applicable building codes and to maintain certain manufacturers' warranties. Roofer made the repairs and invoiced Allstate for them. Allstate paid the claim amounts that were agreed to during the original adjustment, but refused to pay for the additional repairs.
¶4 Pursuant to sections 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116, Roofer filed suit as a first-party claimant against Allstate for unreasonable delay and denial of benefits. The trial court ruled that Roofer was not a first-party claimant entitled to seek relief under the statutes and granted Allstate's summary judgment motion.
¶5 Roofer moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court erred in interpreting the legislative history of section 10-3-1115. That motion was denied.
¶6 Roofer now appeals the portion of the summary judgment dismissing its cause of action under section 10-3-1116, as well as the denial of its motion for reconsideration.
¶7 Roofer contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Allstate because section 10-3-1115 is unambiguous, and, under the plain language of the statute, Roofer qualifies as a first-party claimant. We agree.
¶8 Review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397, 402 (Colo. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Colo. 2002). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, and all doubts are resolved against the moving party. A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 114 P.3d 862, 865 (Colo. 2005).
¶9 Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365, 367 (Colo. 2009); Colo. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Priem, 272 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Colo. App. 2012). "We read words and phrases in context and construe them literally according to common usage unless they have acquired a technical meaning by legislative definition." People v. Yascavage, 101 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 2004). When interpreting a statute, we must read and consider the statute as a whole and interpret it in a manner giving "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts." Lujan v. Life Care Centers, 222 P.3d 970, 973 (Colo. App. 2009). Conversely, we "should not interpret the statute so as to render any part of it either meaningless or absurd." Id.
¶10 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond its plain terms and must apply the statute as written. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 328 (Colo. 2004). We do not resort to extrinsic modes of statutory construction unless the statutory language is ambiguous. Colo. Ethics Watch v. City & County of Broomfield, 203 P.3d 623, 625 (Colo. App. 2009). Nonetheless, we may consider legislative history when there is substantial legislative discussion surrounding the passage of a statute, and the plain language interpretation of a statute is consistent with legislative intent. Kisselman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Colo. App. No. 10CA1453, Dec. 8, 2011).
¶11 A statute is ambiguous only if it is fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation. See Support, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 968 P.2d 174, 175 (Colo. App. 1998). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." People v. Nance, 221 P.3d 428, 430 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
¶12 We conclude that, given the facts of this case, the "first-party claimant" definition in section 10-3-1115(1)(b), C.R.S 2012, unambiguously includes Roofer.
"First-Party Claimant"
¶13 Section 10-3-1115 addresses the "[i]mproper denial of claims." We are concerned here with the following provisions of that statute:
§ 10-3-1115(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2012 (emphasis added).
¶14 Our task is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, looking first at the language of the statute. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 42 P.3d 23, 27 (Colo. 2002); People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 778 (Colo. 2000). The General Assembly's intent in passing sections 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116 was to create a statutory duty for insurers to refrain from unreasonable delay or denial of payment of any claim for benefits owed. See § 10-3- 1115(1)(a). That duty would be breached if the insurer had no reasonable basis to delay or deny the claim. See § 10-3-1115(2), C.R.S. 2012 (); Kisselman, ___ P.3d at ___. The legislature also intended to create an express private right of action by first-party claimants for violation of these statutes. See § 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2012 (); Kisselman, ___ P.3d at ___; see also § 10-3- 1115(2).
¶15 Consistent with that intent, we construe section 10-3- 1115(1)(b) to include vendors such as Roofer who are authorized to assert, and do assert, claims on behalf of insureds.
¶16 We begin our analysis with the first clause of section 10-3- 1115(1)(b)(I). By listing broad categories of persons and entities that may "assert[] an entitlement to benefits," the legislature made it clear that persons and entities other than the insured are included as potential "first-party claimants."
¶17 As stated in the next clause of that subsection, a qualifying person or entity must "assert[] an entitlement to benefits owed directly to or on behalf of an insured under an insurance policy." § 10-3-1115(1)(b)(I) (emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" further indicates that the party asserting a claim for policy benefits may be a party other than the insured, so long as that party does so "on behalf of an insured."
¶18 Because "on behalf of" is not specifically defined in the statute, we read it according to its common usage. Yascavage, 101 P.3d at 1093. The phrase "on behalf of" means "in the interest of; as the representative of; for the benefit of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary198 (2002).
¶19 Here, Allstate's insureds gave Roofer authority to communicate directly with Allstate regarding their claims based on repair work done by Roofer on the insureds' property. Roofer's assertion of claims against Allstate for payment for such repair work was necessarily made "on behalf of" the insureds, as this arrangement relieved the insureds of any obligation to assert the claims themselves. Roofer thus meets the statutory criteria for a "first-party claimant."
¶20 The legislative declaration contained at section 10-3-1101, C.R.S. 2012, reinforces our interpretation. It states in relevant part:
The purpose of this part 11 is to regulate...
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