Sperry v. Field
| Decision Date | 13 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08SC438.,08SC438. |
| Citation | 205 P.3d 365 |
| Parties | Brenda SPERRY, Petitioner v. Sherry FIELD, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
In this action to recover damages for personal injuries, Petitioner Brenda Sperry appeals the court of appeals' decision holding that section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2008), entitles a judgment creditor to post-judgment interest from the date judgment is entered until the judgment is satisfied. Relying on the language of the statute both as written and re-written by this court in Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo.1996), Sperry argues post-judgment interest should run from "the date the claim accrues" until satisfaction of the judgment. Because we hold that this interpretation is contrary to the common understanding of the term "post-judgment interest" and does not serve the statutory goal of section 13-21-101, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On November 24, 1997, Sperry was injured in an automobile accident caused by Respondent Sherry Field. Sperry brought an action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries she suffered because of Field's negligence. She did not request pre-judgment interest in her complaint. After trial, a jury awarded Sperry $387,000 in damages, which included an award of pre-judgment interest. Field appealed the judgment, arguing there were deficiencies in the evidence and asserting that pre-judgment interest should not have been awarded because Sperry did not request it in the complaint. The court of appeals rejected the evidentiary argument, but held the trial court erred by awarding Sperry pre-judgment interest. Both parties petitioned this court for certiorari which was denied on November 13, 2006.
On remand to the trial court, Sperry filed a motion requesting a modified judgment and an award of post-judgment interest pursuant to section 13-21-101. Sperry argued she was entitled to post-judgment interest calculated at the market rate from the date of the accident until the date of satisfaction. Field agreed that Sperry was entitled to post-judgment interest under section 13-21-101; however, she contended the interest should be calculated from the date the original judgment was entered by the trial court, rather than the date of the accident. The trial court granted Sperry's motion for post-judgment interest, but awarded it from the date judgment was entered.
On December 15, 2006, Field entered into an agreement with Sperry to settle the undisputed amount, including interest from the date of judgment to the date of satisfaction. Sperry then appealed arguing that, based on the plain language of section 13-21-101, post-judgment interest should have been awarded from the date the claim accrued. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court. This appeal followed.
As written, section 13-21-101(1) states:
... if a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, interest, whether pre-judgment or post-judgment, shall be calculated on such sum at the rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section from the date the action accrued and shall include compounding of interest annually from the date such suit was filed.
Subsection (2)(a) continues, providing:
If a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is affirmed, interest, as set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, shall be payable from the date the action accrued until satisfaction of the judgment.
Subsection (2)(b) states:
If a judgment for money in an action to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, interest, as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, shall be payable from the date the action accrued until the judgment is satisfied. This interest shall be payable on the amount of the final judgment.
Subsections (3) and (4) provide a market-based method for calculation of interest. Accordingly, under section 13-21-101 as written, judgment debtors who do not appeal pay pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at a rate of nine percent, while judgment debtors who do appeal pay pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the market-determined rate.
In Rodriguez v. Schutt, this court held the distinction between judgments which are appealed and judgments which are not appealed in determining the rate of pre-judgment interest is unsupported by a rational basis and violates equal protection. 914 P.2d at 927. However, we held the distinction between judgments which are appealed and those which are not for purposes of post-judgment interest is permissible. Id. at 927-28. Therefore, we severed language in section 13-21-101(1) to read:
... if a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, post-judgment interest shall be calculated on such sum at the rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section from the date the action accrued and shall include compounding of interest annually from the date such suit was filed.
Id. at 929 ().
Relying on the language of section 13-21-101(1) as written, Sperry argues the plain language of the statute entitles her to post-judgment interest calculated from the date the claim accrued. She further argues section 13-21-101(1) as re-written by this court in Rodriguez clarifies that she is entitled to "post-judgment" interest from the date the claim accrued. Field argues this is an absurd result because the term "post-judgment interest" necessarily refers to interest commencing after judgment has been entered. Further, Field contends that Sperry's claim of post-judgment interest for the period between the accident date and the judgment date is merely a backhanded way of claiming pre-judgment interest to which she is not entitled because she waived her right to such interest by not requesting it in her complaint.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Klinger v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). Because an interest statute is in derogation of the common law, the language of the statute must be strictly construed by the court. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 925. A reviewing court begins the analysis with the plain language of the statute. If the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, then the court need look no further. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo.2002). If the statute is ambiguous, the court looks to the statute's legislative history, the consequences of a given construction, and the overall goal of the statutory scheme to determine the proper interpretation of the statute. People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 354 (Colo.2001).
As written by the General Assembly, subsection 13-21-101(1) states that "interest, whether pre-judgment or post-judgment, shall be calculated ... from the date the action accrued" until satisfaction of the judgment. Personal injury actions accrue on the date "the fact of the injury and its cause are known or should have been known" to the plaintiff. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo.1992). Therefore, as written by the General Assembly, the statute appears to suggest that post-judgment interest must be calculated from the date the cause of action occurs or its ill-effects are discovered. However, the plain meaning of "post-judgment interest" suggests that it is interest calculated post—or after—a court has entered judgment.
In section 5-12-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2008), addressing interest calculation in non-personal injury contexts, post-judgment interest accrues "from the date of entry of judgment in the trial court until satisfaction." Similarly, section 5-12-106(1)(b) defines post-judgment interest as accruing "from the date judgment was first entered in the trial court until the judgment is satisfied." Further, Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (8th ed.2004), defines the prefix "post" to mean "after."
Accordingly, the language of section 13-21-101(1) is ambiguous because the common understanding of the term "post-judgment interest," and the term's unambiguous usage in similar statutes, is in tension with the statute's statement that such interest shall be calculated from the "date the action accrued." Consequently, subsection 13-21-101(1) is ambiguous and contradictory on its face.1 We therefore examine the statute's legislative history, the consequences of a given construction, and the overall goal of the statutory scheme to determine the proper interpretation of section 13-21-101.
In 1975, the General Assembly amended section 13-21-101 to provide for interest from the date a personal injury suit is filed to the date of satisfaction, thus encompassing for the first time interest from the date of filing until the date of satisfaction. See Ch. 151, sec. 1, § 13-21-101, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 569. In 1979, section 13-21-101 was further amended to allow a personal injury plaintiff to claim interest from the date the action accrued instead of from the date the suit was filed. Ch. 55 sec. 2, § 13-21-101, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 315. Thus, following the 1979 amendment, assuming a personal injury plaintiff claimed interest in the complaint, she would be entitled to interest from the date the action accrued to the date of satisfaction of the judgment.
In 1982, section 13-21-101 was amended to its current form...
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