L.F. Noll Inc. v. Eviglo

Citation816 N.W.2d 391
Decision Date29 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–1677.,10–1677.
PartiesL.F. NOLL INC., Appellee, v. Dope EVIGLO, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Andrea Hiatt Buckley of Iowa Legal Aid, Sioux City, for appellant.

Jessica R. Noll, Sioux City, for appellee.

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, the plaintiff L.F. Noll filed an action against defendant Dope Eviglo, a resident of Nebraska, for damages related to the termination of an apartment lease in Sioux City, Iowa where Eviglo formerly resided. L.F. Noll attempted to serve notice under Iowa's long-arm statute, Iowa Code section 617.3 (2007), by certified mail at a forwarding address provided by Eviglo upon the termination of his tenancy in the apartment. The notice, however, was returned by postal authorities with the annotation “Attempted—Not Known” and “Unable to Forward.” L.F. Noll took no further action to achieve service, and the district court entered a default judgment against Eviglo. Based on the default judgment, L.F. Noll sought to garnish Eviglo's wages at his Nebraska employer. Eviglo sought to quash the garnishment on the ground that L.F. Noll failed to comply with the requirements of Iowa Code section 617.3 in connection with the underlying action that produced the default judgment. In the alternative, Eviglo argued that Iowa Code section 617.3 is unconstitutional as applied in this case on due process and equal protection grounds. An associate district court judge denied Eviglo relief, and the district court affirmed. Eviglo appealed. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

I. Factual and Procedural History.

In March 2006, Dope Eviglo and Bisse Ndim entered into a six-month lease with Candlewick Apartments. Eviglo and Ndim renewed their lease for an additional six months, but moved out three months early. At the time of termination of the lease, Eviglo and Ndim signed a document entitled “NOTICE TO VACATE APARTMENT.” The notice generally provided information about a move-out inspection and procedure related to return of a security deposit. The notice declared that the signatories understood that if they did not supply management “with a mailing address or instructions” within one year of the termination of the tenancy, the security deposit would revert to the landlord. The forwarding address provided on the notice was 2242 Florence Boulevard, Omaha, Nebraska, 68110.

On October 2, 2007, L.F. Noll, an assignee of Candlewick Apartments, filed an action in small claims court for $1662.65, plus interest, against Eviglo and Ndim. L.F. Noll sent original notice to the Iowa Secretary of State and attempted to serve notice of the filing by certified mail to Eviglo and Ndim. The notice addressed to Eviglo was sent to the Florence Boulevard address in Omaha. The notice was returned by postal authorities as “Attempted—Not Known” and “Unable to Forward.”

Judgment was entered against both Eviglo and Ndim on January 28, 2008. After entry of judgment, L.F. Noll garnished Eviglo's wages from Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. in Dakota City, Nebraska. On January 27, 2010, Eviglo filed a motion to quash garnishment. Eviglo argued the judgment entered against him was void because L.F. Noll failed to comply with Iowa Code section 617.3 when it attempted to serve process on him. Eviglo also raised facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 617.3 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions. The small claims court overruled the motion to quash, and Eviglo appealed to the district court.

The district court affirmed. The district court reasoned that L.F. Noll satisfied the requirements of Iowa Code section 617.3 because it mailed service by certified mail to the forwarding address Eviglo provided to Candlewick Apartments in the notice to vacate. Additionally, the court held that section 617.3 does not require notification to be delivered or rejected by the addressee. Instead, according to the district court, section 617.3 is satisfied so long as the address used was reasonably calculated to give notice. The district court also rejected Eviglo's due process claim, reasoning that the statute is reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of notice. Further, the district court concluded Eviglo's equal protection claim failed because the statute did not infringe on a fundamental interest and had a rational basis for imposing different notice requirements on residents and nonresidents. Eviglo applied for discretionary review, which we granted.

II. Standard of Review.

The district court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Madison, 785 N.W.2d 706, 707–08 (Iowa 2010).

III. Discussion of Statutory Claim.

A. Introduction. The statutory claim in this case focuses on the language of the Iowa long-arm statute, which provides, in relevant part:

Service of such process or original notice shall be made (1) by filing duplicate copies of said process or original notice with said secretary of state ... and (2) by mailing to the defendant ... by registered or certified mail, a notification of said filing with the secretary of state.... Such notification shall be mailed ... to each such nonresident person at an address in the state of residence.

Iowa Code § 617.3 (emphasis added).

Eviglo contends that under the statute, the term “an address” must mean a “valid address.” In this case, Eviglo argues, the certified letter was returned because the address was an invalid address, at least for the purpose of attempting to serve Eviglo with the notice. Eviglo claims that our case of Barrett v. Bryant, 290 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa 1980) and a decision of the court of appeals, Calinger v. Konz, No. 05-0041, 2006 WL 2418910 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug. 23, 2006), support his argument. In Barrett, we concluded, as to one defendant, that service was invalid under the long-arm statute where notice was sent to an address where the defendant did not live. Barrett, 290 N.W.2d at 922. A similar result occurred in Calinger, where notice was sent to a location where a putative defendant had no demonstrable connection. Calinger, 2006 WL 2418910, at *3 n. 3.

In the alternative, Eviglo argues that in order for service to be perfected, the return receipt must either be signed or refused. In support of this argument, Eviglo cites our decision in Emery Transportation Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d 272 (1963) and Calinger. In Emery, we held under our nonresident motorist statute that service must be achieved either through actual delivery or offered delivery of the notification. Emery, 254 Iowa at 750, 119 N.W.2d at 276–77.

L.F. Noll recognizes that under Barrett, “clear and complete compliance” with the statutory requirements of Iowa Code section 617.3 is required. Barrett, 290 N.W.2d at 922. L.F. Noll asserts that nothing in the language of Iowa Code section 617.3 requires actual notice. L.F. Noll emphasizes that service was attempted at an address which was provided by the defendant to which the defendant had a connection. As a result, L.F. Noll distinguishes Bryant and Calinger. Further, L.F. Noll distinguishes Emery, noting that the statutory language in the nonresident motorist statute varies significantly from that in Iowa Code section 617.3.

B. Overview of Iowa Law. We begin our discussion by recognizing a strongly held and frequently repeated principle that we strictly construe statutes providing extraordinary methods of securing

jurisdiction over nonresidents. See Buena Vista Manor v. Century Mfg. Co., 221 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Iowa 1974) (citing Matney v. Currier, 203 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1973)). It is thus not surprising that our cases regarding service under Iowa Code section 617.3 reflect the view that extraordinary service of process must be carefully circumscribed by the courts.

We have had only a few occasions to interpret the notice requirement in Iowa's long-arm statute, Iowa Code section 617.3. The first case of significance is Bentley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Pump Co., 203 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1972). In this case, the plaintiff attempted to serve notice at the home office of a corporation at an address informally provided by an employee in the secretary of state's office in a foreign state. Bentley, 203 N.W.2d at 312. Although the corporation had moved to another location and had filed an appropriate change of address document with the foreign secretary of state, the employee providing the address to the plaintiff overlooked the change. Id. at 313. Nonetheless, the notice sent to the wrong address was accepted by an employee of a stranger corporation located at the address and was forwarded by the employee to the defendant corporation. Id. Thus, actual notice was achieved, albeit not by service “at the address of [the defendant corporation's] principal office.” Id. at 312.

We held in Bentley that the service was invalid. Id. at 314. Citing Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199, 1206, 110 N.W.2d 241, 244 (1961), we reasoned that if we took a contrary approach, we “would approve service of notice by ordinary mail, by telegram, word of mouth or by reading of the suit in a newspaper.” Bentley, 203 N.W.2d at 314. Instead, we insisted that jurisdiction must be achieved as provided by law. Id.

Our next notice case under the long-arm statute is Buena Vista. In this case, the first attempt at notice on a nonresident company was returned “unclaimed.” Buena Vista, 221 N.W.2d at 288. The plaintiff did additional research, found a better address, and served another notice. Id. On this second attempt, the notice was served on the defendant and the plaintiff received a return receipt. Id. The defendant claimed that his notice was not received within ten days of filing with the secretary of state under the statute. Id.

We held that while the statute appeared to contemplate actual receipt, the ten-day period should be measured from the date of mailing of the first letter. Id. We...

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