L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH.

• Citation: 645 F.Supp.2d 888
• Decision Date: 06 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH.,CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH.
• Parties: L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated juvenile parolees in California, Plaintiffs, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor, State of California, et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

645 F.Supp.2d 888

L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated juvenile parolees in California, Plaintiffs, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor, State of California, et al, Defendants.

No. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

March 6, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Carole Shauffer, Corene Thaedra Kendrick, Susan Lynn Burrell, Briana Lynn Morgan, Geoffrey Thomas Holtz, Kristen A. Palumbo, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Elizabeth Hope Eng, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Loren Grey Stewart, Maria V. Morris, Meghan Regina Lang, Michael Bien, Sarah Laubach, Shirley Huey, Rosen, Bien & Galvan, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Donald Specter, Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Paul B. Mello, Sally Anne Johnson, Hanson Bridgett LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs are a class of juvenile parolees who sued various state officials and agencies in order to obtain changes in parole revocation procedures. Upon the stipulation of the parties, the court awarded injunctive relief several months ago. Plaintiffs now seek attorney's fees and costs. Also pending is plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees associated with the magistrate judge's May 14, 2008, 2008 WL 2073958, discovery sanctions order. The court resolves the motions on the papers and after oral argument.

I. BACKGROUND¹

This action was filed on September 13, 2006 as a class action challenging the parole revocation process for juvenile parolees as violating due process and the mandates of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The action was brought after the court had on September 6, 2006, denied plaintiffs permission to amend their complaint in Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, which addresses due process requirements of parole revocation proceedings in the adult parole system, to add allegations regarding the juvenile parole system.

In the, approximately, two years of the case, the parties engaged in significant motion practice. Defendants moved to dismiss and to require plaintiffs to use their full names in all court filings, both of which were denied on February 23, 2007. Plaintiffs moved for class certification, which was granted on February 28, 2007. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the central legal issue of the case, whether defendants were violating plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights in the parole revocation process, which was granted in part on September 19, 2007, with the court denying the motion as to remedy. Defendants were ordered to submit a proposed remedial plan, which the court found to be inadequate and ordered continued efforts by both plaintiffs and defendants in crafting an appropriate alternative. When they were unable to accomplish this and in response to plaintiffs' motion for entry of a remedial order, the court appointed a settlement judge on January 29, 2008.

In the meantime, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and to amend the complaint. The court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, providing for effective counsel at juvenile parole revocation hearings. The court denied in part the motion to amend; inter alia, the court denied plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint to encompass other hearings and proceedings beyond revocation hearings.

In March 2008, plaintiffs moved to enforce the court's prior orders and for appointment of a special master. The court granted the motion, appointing Chase Riveland as Special Master on May 22, 2008. Just prior to that order, plaintiffs had filed three motions for partial summary judgment and a motion for a remedial order. Two of those motions were then referred to the Special Master for resolution.

Discovery in this case was not uneventful, either. Plaintiffs moved for a protective order, which was granted by the magistrate judge on May 14, 2007. Plaintiffs also filed several motions to compel, most of which were granted.² Plaintiffs were twice awarded attorney's fees by the magistrate judge for motions to compel, the magistrate judge concluding both times that defendants' nondisclosure of certain discovery was groundless. See Order, Sept. 21, 2007, 2007 WL 2781132; Order, May 14, 2008.

On June 13, 2008, the parties moved for approval of their settlement. The court issued an order of preliminary approval of the settlement on June 17, 2008. The court approved the settlement on October 7, 2008, which included an order for permanent injunctive relief. The injunction provides for due process, provision of counsel, and accommodation of disabilities during juvenile parole revocation proceedings. Order, Oct. 7, 2008 at 7-17. It also provides that plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the action and that they could accordingly move for attorneys fees. Id. at 18.

II. STANDARD

The Supreme Court has articulated the standard for a finding of prevailing party as whether the party has "succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The Ninth Circuit, in discussing whether a party has achieved prevailing status, has noted that a party can achieve that status by establishing a clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.1983).

The Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged approach to the calculation of a reasonable attorneys' fees under any statute that permits recovery of attorneys' fees. See Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("The standards set forth in this [§ 1988] opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a prevailing party."); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 650 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988). A court must first calculate a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990). While this lodestar figure is presumed to represent an appropriate fee, under certain circumstances a court may adjust the award upward or downward to take into account special factors. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs seek $5,021,475.40 in attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons stated herein, the court awards $4,421,173.46 in fees and $349,034.12 in costs, reduced by the amount of the November 14, 2008 interim fee award. The court also awards in full the fees sought by plaintiffs pursuant to the magistrate judge's May 14, 2008 sanction order.

A. Plaintiffs' Entitlement to Fees

As a threshold matter, plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the litigation, as the entry of the injunction provided plaintiffs the relief they sought in the litigation. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Defendants acknowledged this by stipulation as a term of the injunction and they do not oppose the instant motion on this basis. Moreover, defendants do not oppose the award of attorneys' fees on the grounds that their position was substantially justified or that there are any special circumstances that would render the award of fees unjust. See id. at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs.

B. Amount of the Fee Award

The amount of the fee award is determined by a lodestar, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The lodestar may be adjusted upward when there is evidence that that is merited. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir.1996). Generally, however, the reasonableness of the prevailing party's rates and the reasonableness of the time expended in the suit should accurately reflect most of the considerations relevant for the fees award. Id. Here, plaintiffs do not seek an upward adjustment of the lodestar.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

The prevailing party should be awarded a reasonable hourly rate given the relevant legal community. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). Typically, the relevant legal community is that in which the forum district is located. Id. The prevailing party may be awarded the reasonable rates of another legal community when it has tendered evidence that attorneys adequate to conduct the litigation at issue were unavailable in the forum market. Id. Finally, a reasonable rate should reflect not only the market rates, but the skill and experience of the prevailing party's counsel. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-99, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).

a. Plaintiffs' Counsel

Plaintiffs contend that the relevant legal community for the purposes of this suit is the San Francisco Bay Area, rather than Sacramento. The court agrees. Consistent with plaintiffs' description, the suit was a complicated one requiring expertise in class action litigation, civil rights litigation, and youth law. It sought injunctive relief as its primary goal, rather than damages. Plaintiffs have tendered evidence that there were no Sacramento firms experienced and capable enough and willing to undertake such a suit. Decl. of Mark Chavez in Support of Pls.' Mtn. ("Chavez Decl.") ¶¶ 28-29; Decl. of Sidney Wolinsky in Support of Pls.' Mtn. ("Wolinsky Decl.") ¶ 28; Decl. of Joshua Konecky in Support of Pls.' Mtn. ("Konecky Decl.") ¶ 18; Decl. of Linda Dardanian in Support of Pls.' Mtn. ("Dardanian Decl.") ¶¶ 20-21; Decl. of Daniel Mason in Support of Pls.' Mtn. ("Mason Decl.") ¶ 11; Reply Decl. of Jay Allen Eisen In Support of Pls.' Mot. ("Eisen Reply Decl.") ¶¶ 18-19; Reply Decl....