A.L. v. Holliday
| Decision Date | 25 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:18CV76-LG-RHW |
| Parties | A.L. and A.B., minors, by and through their friend, parent, and guardian James Daniel Luster PLAINTIFFS v. ANTHONY HOLLIDAY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
BEFORE THE COURT are the [22] Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim filed by Jess Dickinson, the [24] Motion to Dismiss filed by John Barnett and Glen East, and the [34] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Anthony Holliday. These three motions address all of the plaintiffs' claims against all of the defendants, and each motion has been fully briefed. Additionally, Plaintiff Luster filed a [31] Motion to Provide Counsel, which is unopposed.
After due consideration of the submissions and the relevant law, it is the Court's opinion that this case presents no exceptional circumstances justifying court-appointed counsel. Luster's Motion for appointment of counsel will therefore be denied. However, Luster cannot represent the minor children A.L. and A.B. The Court elects to dismiss their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 without prejudice. Further, Luster's allegations do not give rise to valid claims of statutory or constitutional violations on his own behalf. As a result, the defendants are entitled to dismissal of Luster's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. Finally, the attempted 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 claims will be dismissed with prejudice as legally frivolous in regard to all plaintiffs.
This lawsuit concerns Luster's objections to an investigation of child abuse conducted by the Mississippi Department of Child Protective Services (MDCPS). As part of the investigation, Defendant Holliday interviewed Luster's two daughters at their school, Anniston Avenue Elementary. Luster alleges that his daughters' constitutional rights were violated by school and MDCPS officials when Holliday interviewed and photographed the girls, unaccompanied, in a conference room at the school. Luster's claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging a conspiracy by the defendants to adopt an agreement that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and certain school and MDCPS policies.
The named defendants are two City of Gulfport School District officials: Anniston Avenue Elementary principal John Barnett and Superintendent Glen East, and two MDCPS officials: Investigator Anthony Holliday and Commissioner Jess Dickinson. Because Luster also makes allegations of wrongful action by the agencies through the individual officials, the Court construes the Complaint to allege claims against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Luster seeks injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
Luster requests that the Court provide him with counsel to pursue his claims. He argues that he is indigent, not educated in the law, and proceeding pro se. He contends that he will be prejudiced without counsel to assist with ensuring the integrity of the proceedings in this case.
Indigent litigants in federal civil rights cases generally possess no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. See Salmon v. Corpus Christi ISD, 911 F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent party in a civil rights lawsuit unless the case presents truly exceptional circumstances. See Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988); Good v. Allain, 823 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1987); Feist v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'rs Court, 778 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1985).
Although no comprehensive definition of "exceptional circumstances" is practical, the existence of such circumstances will necessarily turn on two basic considerations: (1) the type and complexity of the case and (2) the abilities of the individual bringing it. See Freeze, 849 F.2d at 175; Good, 823 F.2d at 66; Feist, 778 F.2d at 253. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has directed trial courts to consider whether the appointment of counsel would be of service not only to the plaintiff, but also possibly to the court and the defendant, through sharpening of issues, theshaping of the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and, thus the shortening of trial and assisting in a just determination. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cty, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 1986); Feist, 778 F.2d at 253. It is also appropriate for the court to consider whether the indigent plaintiff has demonstrated an inability to secure the assistance of private counsel, especially in view of the opportunity for a prevailing Section 1983 plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees. See Cain, 864 F.2d at 1242.
The Court is given considerable discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1982). As the discussion to follow explains, Luster's pleadings contain no novel points of law which would indicate the presence of "exceptional circumstances." Luster has demonstrated through his pleadings that he is able to communicate his position effectively. Accordingly, the Court finds no justification for appointment of counsel to pursue Luster's claims in this case.
The Court has endeavored to construe the allegations of the Complaint liberally and to separate Luster's claims from those of A.L. and A.B. It appears to the Court that Luster's allegations primarily concern purported violations of his minor daughters' rights. He only minimally alleges violation of his own constitutional rights.
Luster may conduct his own case personally, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, but he cannot act as a representative of A.L. and A.B. One pro se person cannot represent another. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020-22 (5th Cir.1998). Therefore, a minor child generally cannot bring suit through a pro se next friend or guardian as A.L. and A.B. have done in this case. Aduddle v. Body, 277 F. App'x 459, 462 (5th Cir. May 7, 2008) (); Myers v. Loudon Cty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1990); Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986). But see, Harris ex rel. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000) ().
If a lawyer is not secured to bring suit on a minor's behalf, the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice so the minor may bring the action upon reaching the age of majority. Johns, 114 F.3d at 878. Because the Court has concluded that Luster's request for appointment of counsel should be denied, most of A.L. and A.B.'s claims will be dismissed without prejudice. However, since the Court finds below that the 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 claims are legally frivolous, those claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The heart of Luster's Complaint are his allegations of the defendants' violation of his family's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections. Hecomplains that Investigator Holliday frightened his wife by ringing their doorbell and "a five minute beating of the door to my home" on January 29, 2018. (Compl. 5 (¶13), ECF No. 1.) Luster's wife did not answer the door, but Luster later contacted Holliday through the information on the business card Holliday left. Holliday informed Luster that he was investigating an anonymous report of child abuse. (Id. at 5 (¶14), 7 (¶24).) Holliday told Luster he wanted to meet with the entire family just after three o'clock that afternoon at their residence. (Id. at 5 (¶13).) Unbeknownst to Luster, Holliday then went to Anniston Avenue Elementary School, where he photographed and interviewed each child separately and alone in a conference room at the school. (Id. at 5 (¶¶15, 17); 6 (¶¶18-22).) Holliday did not attend the scheduled meeting at Luster's residence later that afternoon, and there appears to have been no further investigation into the report of child abuse. (Id. at 7 (¶24).)
(Compl. 7 (¶27), ECF No. 1.) Luster contends that the actions of the defendants violated his right to pursue happiness without unwarranted interference from government. (Id. at 8-9 (¶39).)
The school official defendants seek dismissal of Luster's claims on Rule 12(b)(6) and qualified immunity grounds, arguing that Luster's allegations do notshow a constitutional violation. For the same reasons, the MDCPS officials seek dismissal on Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and qualified immunity grounds. Additionally, the MDCPS officials argue that in their official capacities as agents of the state they are entitled to assert the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
"Although constitutionally protected, the rights to family integrity and to be free of conscience-shocking governmental action are not absolute or unqualified." Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 1999) (...
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