Laborers' Internat. Union of North America v. El Dorado Landscape Co.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1989
• Docket Number: LOCAL,AFL-CI,No. D007707,D007707
• Citation: 208 Cal.App.3d 993,256 Cal.Rptr. 632
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION NORTH AMERICA,89 et al., Plaintiffs, v. EL DORADO LANDSCAPE COMPANY et al., Defendants. Donald A. HON, Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT of California, County of San Diego, Respondent. Attorney General of California et al. as Amici Curiae, For Respondent.

Page 632

256 Cal.Rptr. 632

208 Cal.App.3d 993

LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 89 et al., Plaintiffs, v. EL DORADO LANDSCAPE COMPANY et al., Defendants.

Donald A. HON, Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT of California, County of San Diego, Respondent.

Attorney General of California et al. as Amici Curiae, For Respondent.

No. D007707.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

March 16, 1989.

Review Denied May 23, 1989.

Donald A. Hon, San Diego, pro se and for plaintiffs

No appearance for respondent.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Jacobs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, San Diego, Daniel J. Wallace, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Barbara Baird, Deputy County Counsel, as amici curiae, on behalf of respondent.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

Attorney Donald A. Hon represents the plaintiffs Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local 89 et al. in this lawsuit against El Dorado Landscape Company et al. Appealing an order imposing sanctions, Hon challenges the constitutionality of the San Diego County "Fast Track" rules (Fast Track rules) enacted to implement the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act of 1986 (the Act). (Gov.Code, § 68600, et seq.) ¹

Procedurally, Hon failed to timely file the required joint at-issue memorandum under Fast Track rule 10.7(a) or a certificate as to why one was not filed in this case pursuant to Fast Track rules 10.7(b)(1)-10.7(b)(4). ² The trial court thus issued an order to show cause (OSC) under Fast Track rule 10.7(b)(5) which provided at that time: "Failure to timely file a joint at issue memorandum or a Certificate: At Issue Memorandum Not Filed will result in the issuance of an order to show cause why any party or counsel shall not be sanctioned for failure to do so." ³ At the scheduled OSC hearing, the court imposed $150 sanctions against Hon for failing to timely file the joint at-issue memorandum and directed Hon to file one within two weeks.

A week later, the court, finding good cause shown, granted Hon's ex parte request for relief from the sanctions order and stated the joint at-issue memorandum must be filed no later than February 9, 1988. Hon, however, again failed to file the joint at-issue memorandum. The court then issued a second OSC as to why sanctions should not be imposed, ordering Hon Although Hon subsequently filed the memorandum February 18, 1988, the trial court at the second OSC hearing found it untimely and ordered sanctions against Hon in the amount of $150. Hon appeals ⁵ from this second order.

to appear and give any legal reason why the time standards under the Fast Track rules were not met and giving notice the issue of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 177.5 and 575.2 would also be before the court. ⁴

Hon specifically contends the Fast Track rules are unconstitutional because they violate article 6, section 1a of the California Constitution, because this court has already ruled the Fast Track rules do not annul or make inoperative previous statutes and case law, because the Fast Track rules violate Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 and violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution, and because the nine counties that have adopted "Fast Track" rules pursuant to the Act have established arbitrary and variable standards in violation of article 6, section 1a, subsection 5, of the California Constitution and section 68070. San Diego County Counsel and the Attorney General of California have each filed briefs as amicus curiae in support of respondent San Diego Superior Court. As we shall discuss, Hon's contentions have no merit and we affirm the order of the trial court imposing sanctions against him.

DISCUSSION

Before separately addressing Hon's various arguments, we make some general comments about the California Constitution, the Act and Hon's apparent misconceptions regarding the Act and how it relates to the California Constitution.

A

To digress for a moment, the California Constitution contains both restrictive and enabling provisions. Because it delineates a separation of powers among the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government, it is generally considered a restriction upon the powers of the state. (7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 51, p. 93.) As such, we look to it only to determine whether the Legislature is prohibited from doing a certain act and not whether the Legislature is authorized to do the act. (Ibid.; see also Sheehan v. Scott (1905) 145 Cal. 684, 686-687, 79 P. 350, overruled on another point by Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 718, 94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578.) Accordingly, all intendments favor legislation and constitutional limitations are strictly construed. (Sheehan v. Scott, supra, 145 Cal. at p. 686, 79 P. 350.)

If a person challenges the constitutionality of a legislative act, we presume the act to be constitutional. Any unconstitutionality of a legislative enactment or statute must be clearly shown, with doubts being resolved in favor of its validity. (Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory (1943) 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725; People v. Globe Grain & Mill, Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 121, 127, 294 Cal. 121.) Furthermore, we will not usually consider the constitutionality of a statute or rule at the request of a person not aggrieved by it. The burden is on the party to show some injury, actual or threatened, by operation of the statute or rule. (People v. Perry (1931) 212 Cal. 186, 193, 298 P. 19.)

At the outset, we note that Hon fails to recognize these well established principles and the fact that it is the Legislature and not the Judicial Council that is unrestricted in its power by the California Constitution to legislate, i.e., to enact laws, for the State of California. (Cal. Const., art. 4, § 1.) Because of this failure, Hon has not recognized the significance of the Legislature's enactment of the Act and its decision to grant to the project courts under the Act wide procedural latitude in developing their own rules and procedures to implement the Act in "response to the urgent public need to reduce litigation delays that have reached, in some counties, scandalous proportions." (Beverly Union Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 40, 43, 253 Cal.Rptr. 359.) The Act as adopted declared the "expeditious and timely resolution of civil ... actions is an integral and necessary function of the judicial branch of state government under Article VI of the California Constitution." ( § 68601(a).)

The Act mandates that nine exemplary delay reduction programs be established ( § 68605) and continued for a period of three years. ( § 68608.) The judges in each program are given the responsibility to "eliminate delay in the progress and ultimate resolution of litigation, to assume and maintain control over the pace of litigation, to actively manage the processing of litigation from commencement to disposition, and to compel attorneys and litigants to prepare and resolve all litigation without delay, from the filing of the first document invoking court jurisdiction to final disposition of the action." ( § 68608.) To carry out these duties, the Act charges the judges of each program to establish procedures consistent with the policies of the Act. ( § 68608(a)-(g).)

The Act additionally mandates the Judicial Council to collect and maintain statistics during the three-year experimental period and requires the council to report to the Legislature on the results of the delay reduction program at the end of that time and recommend whether the program, and which procedures, should be adopted in trial courts statewide. ( § 68611.) The Judicial Council is also charged with reviewing all local delay reduction rules adopted or revised by the various program courts and is given discretion to develop or adopt procedures, standards or policies of the trial courts on a statewide basis. ( § 68612.) The Judicial Council further may, "to the extent desirable ", make suggestions to the program courts of revisions of their rules consistent with other court rules. ( § 68619(a).)

Moreover, the Act also permits voluntary participation in the program by counties under the Trial Court Funding Act of 1985 ( § 68618) and other specified counties. ( § 68618.5.) The Judicial Council is required to adopt uniform rules for those counties adopting a voluntary program under section 68618. ( § 68619(b).)

Where, as here, the Legislature has clearly laid down its broad policy and plan and authorized the Judicial Council and trial courts to experiment and work out procedures to carry out that plan and set limits on their authority, this delegation by the Legislature to the courts and Judicial Council is proper and does not violate the constitutional separation of powers. (American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Com. (1946) 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103; Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 376-379, 381-384, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.)

Moreover, it is assumed the Legislature had existing laws in mind when it passed the Act, which must be construed to give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting it as law. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1859; Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837-839, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874.) While local rules of court and court policies adopted pursuant to legislative authority generally have the force of procedural statutes as long as they do not conflict with other legislative enactments (Mann v Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 28, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134; Estate of Brown (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1619, 239 Cal.Rptr. 147), "recent statutory amendment and case law has established that local rules regarding procedural time limits may deviate from statutory language in ways reasonably necessary to carry out the clearly stated and mandatory provisions and goals...