Lach v. U.S.A
| Decision Date | 02 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08 cv 251 |
| Parties | GREGORY J. LACH, CONNIE R. LACH, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, through its Department of the Interior and its National Parks Service, Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, through its Department of the Interior and its National Parks Service, Counter Claimant v. GREGORY J. LACH, Counter Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29] filed by the defendant and counterclaim plain-tiff, the United States of America, on July 16, 2010, and the Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 39] filed by the plaintiffs, Gregory J. Lach and Connie R. Lachs, on September 7, 2010. For the following reasons, the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29] is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 39] is DENIED.
Gregory and Connie Lach own real estate commonly known as 5525 Stagecoach Road, Portage, Indiana. Connie's family leased and farmed the property from 1940 until her father, Charles Ewen, purchased it on April 29, 1994. Ewen maintained the property up to the southern edge of Stagecoach Road and, as a member of the public, accessed Stagecoach Road at various points. Ewen con-veyed a parcel of the property to the Lachs on November 22, 2 006, and the Lachs now seek to quiet title to the parcel of land dividing their property from Stagecoach Road.
In 1978, the National Park Service took ownership of two parcels of land to the north of and adjacent to the Lach and Ewen parcels. One of these parcels runs parallel to Stagecoach Road and separates the Lachs' property from Stagecoach Road. The deed identifies this parcel as Tract 09-102 and provides that it is subject to roads and highways. The only road located on or through this parcel is Stagecoach Road. The United States recorded the deed on January 17, 1978.
On October 2, 2005, a surveyor requested permission on behalf of the Lachs to construct a driveway across Tract 09-102 so the Lachs could access Stagecoach Road from their property.
The National Park Service denied the request because it could not grant an easement without congressional approval. However, the Lachs built a permanent driveway through Tract 09-102 and filed this action to quiet title.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.E. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1610, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786. A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. There must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d
202, 212 (1986); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith, and other subjec-tive feelings play dominant roles. Ashman v. Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006). Upon review, the court does not evalu-ate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of wit-nesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter; rather, the court will determine whether there exists a genuine issue of triable fact. Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial.
The inquiry performed is the threshold in-quiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.
[T]his standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reason-able conclusion as to the verdict.
See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, 120-122 (2000) (setting out the standard for a directed verdict); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (); Springer v. Durfling-er, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)( that a genuine issue exists and summary judgment is inappropriate if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party).
As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether it retains subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The court previously addressed this issue in its May 26, 2009 Order, and determined that it retained subject matter jurisdiction over the limited issue of whether the Lachs had an easement across the United States' property. Because the Lachs' primary theory of recovery extends beyond the issue of easements, the court must re-address this argument.
The United States is immune from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity. Dep't of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260, 119 S.Ct. 687, 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986). Title 28 U.S.C. §1346(f) waives sovereign immunity to the extent that a civil action is brought "under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States." A quiet title action must be filed by someone claiming an interest in the title of the property. Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159, 160 (10th Cir. 1978); Rock Island Oil & Refining Co. v. Simmons, 386 P.2d 239, 240 (N.M. 1963). Members of the public do not hold an interest in the title to public roads and cannot bring an action to quiet title under 2 8 U.S.C. §1346(f). See Kinscherff, 586 F.2d at 160 ( that members of the public do not have title to public roads); Sw. Four Wheel Drive Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 363 F.3d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir. 2004)( that members of the public cannot maintain actions to quiet title to public roads); Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2001) ().
The Lachs' primary theory of recovery rests on Stagecoach Road extending beyond the paved portion and overlapping their property line. In particular, the Lachs argue that Stagecoach Road is a public road, and pursuant to Indiana Code §8-20-1-15, it must extend 2 0 feet from the centerline, overlapping with their property. Although the Lachs' property abuts Stagecoach Road, their interest in the road is one vested in the public generally. See Kinscherff, 586 F.2d at 160 ( that the owner of land abutting a public highway does not have an interest in the highway beyond that which is invested in the public generally). Therefore, the Lachs cannot claim title to Stagecoach Road. Because a litigant must claim an interest in title to bring a suit under 28 U.S.C. §1346(f), the court lacks the authority to adjudicate this matter under this theory. See Kinscherff, 586 F.2d at 160; Long, 236 F.3d at 915 ("[T]he right of an individual to use a public road is not a right or interest in property for purposes of the Quiet Title Act").
Assuming, arguendo, that the court retains subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter under the Lachs' primary theory of recovery, their argument fails. The Lachs maintain that Stagecoach Road is a public road, and because of this Indiana law imposes a right of way easement of either 15 or 20 feet on each side of the centerline of Stagecoach Road so that Stagecoach Road overlaps with their parcel. The Lachs base their argument on their interpretation of Indiana Code §8-20-1-15, which provides that "A county highway right-of-way may not be laid out that is less than twenty (20) feet on each side of the centerline, exclusive of additional width required for cuts, fills, drainage, utilities, and public safety."
Prior to 1988, §8-20-1-15 provided that a highway could be created when a path is used as such for a period of twenty years or more. The relevant inquiry was whether the public used the road in a continuous manner for the statutory time period. Zakutansky v. Kanzler, 634 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. App. 1994). The record reflects that Stagecoach Road was used by the public since the 1940s. (Aff. of Craig Hendrix pp. 2-3); (Aff. of Robert Thompson p. 2) Therefore, when the United States obtained title to this property in 1978, Stagecoach Road had been used as a public highway for the statutory time period and was vested in the public prior to the time the statute was amended to eliminate the provision that allowed for a public highway to be formed by continuous public use for 20 years. See Zakutansky, 634 N.E.2d at 79 ( that the amendment to §8-20-1-15 did not divest the public of the right to use a public highway formed prior to the amendment).
Although Stagecoach Road is a public...
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