Lacroix v. Howard
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-1956-WQH-BLM |
| Decision Date | 18 September 2023 |
| Parties | DYLAN RIVERS LACROIX, CDCR #BU-7713, Plaintiff, v. TRAVIS HOWARD, Detective; MR. MCCARTHY, Police Officer; DOES 1-X, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff Dylan Rivers Lacroix, a state inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) located in Susanville, California, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff sought $10 million in general and punitive damages based on claims that he was unlawfully searched at the El Cajon Police Department Station on December 2, 2020. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.)
On February 24, 2023, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissing the Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court's Order.
On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 9.)
As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
On December 20, 2020, Plaintiff was placed under arrest by Defendant McCarthy, an El Cajon police officer. Plaintiff was taken to the El Cajon Police Station and escorted by McCarthy and Defendant Howard, another El Cajon police officer, “into a temporary holding cell” for a “full body cavity search.” (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Howard, knowing that Plaintiff is a transgender individual,[1] “forced [Plaintiff] to get down on the floor completely naked on all fours” and “demanded” that Plaintiff “dig in deep!” Id. Plaintiff complied with Howard's commands to “stick [Plaintiff's] fingers into [Plaintiff's] anal cavity ‘over and over,' ‘deeper and deeper.'” Id. McCarthy “[f]acilitated” the “sexual[] assault[].” Id. Plaintiff “was finally allowed to get up when [] Howard said ‘okay we are done.'” Id.
During the cavity search, Plaintiff “cut [himself] with [his] fingernails inside [his] anus.” Id. at 5. For eight days following the search, Plaintiff had “blood in [his] sto[ol] and anal leakage.” Id. Plaintiff also had mental and emotional suffering.
Following the cavity search, Plaintiff told Howard he intended to file a report under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) against Howard for sexual assault. Howard responded: “good luck with that.” Id. at 7. After arriving at “central jail,” Plaintiff attempted to seek medical help and file various requests, grievances, claims, and reports relating to the incident with jail officials “to no avail.” Id. When Plaintiff was “finally” able to file a PREA report on December 25, 2021, Plaintiff's complaint was “determined to be unfounded,” despite him not having been interviewed about the incident, in violation of PREA. Id. at 9. Plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against Howard and McCarthy[2] for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and seeks $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and “anything the Court deems reasonable.” Id. at 12.
Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).
While Plaintiff brings the claims related to the cavity search under the Eighth Amendment, the Court finds that these claims arise under the Fourth Amendment because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the time the actions described in the FAC occurred. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (); Bull v. City of San Francisco, et al., 595 F.3d 964, 974-75, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ().
Determining if a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires that a court conduct a case-by-case “balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). “The required factors for courts to consider include: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in which it is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating it, and (4) the place in which it is conducted.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the government's “strong interest in preventing contraband from entering its prisons and jails, . . . visual body cavity searches may be performed without a warrant during the jail intake process.” United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2015). However, “searches that require intrusion into a person's body implicate greater constitutional concerns.” Id. “Therefore, while visual cavity searches that do not require physical entry into a prisoner's body are generally permissible without a warrant during the jail intake process, physical cavity searches generally are not.” United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2015).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Howard required Plaintiff to “get down on the floor” of a holding cell “completely naked on all fours” and to “stick [Plaintiff's] fingers into [Plaintiff's] anal cavity ‘over and over,' ‘deeper and deeper.'” (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Although Plaintiff does not allege that Howard physically touched him, the allegations that Howard compelled Plaintiff to physically intrude on his own body in the manner alleged are sufficient for Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against Howard to survive the “low threshold” for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123.
Defendant McCarthy's liability for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983 must be predicated on his “integral participation” in the alleged violation. Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996). This does not require that McCarthy's “actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004), but he must have “some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007).
McCarthy's alleged involvement in the cavity search was limited to escorting Plaintiff to the temporary holding cell where the search was conducted, being present during the course during the search while Howard ordered Plaintiff to repeatedly penetrate himself, and “[f]acilitat[ing]” Howard's conduct. (ECF No. 9 at 3.) While “the integral participant doctrine does not implicate government agents who are mere bystanders to an unconstitutional search,” Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal...
To continue reading
Request your trial