Ladd v. Du Bose
| Decision Date | 20 February 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 7026,7026 |
| Citation | 344 S.W.2d 476 |
| Parties | J. L. LADD et al., Appellants, v. Frank F. DU BOSE, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Gibson, Ochsner, Harlan, Kinney & Morris, Amarillo, for appellants.
Underwood, Wilson, Sutton, Heare & Berry, Amarillo, for appellee.
This case presents questions of ownership of an undivided one-fourth mineral interest in Sec. 40, Block A-3, H. & G. N. R. R. Co. Survey, Wheeler County.
Appellants, J. L. Ladd and wife, Dollie Ladd and Lavenia Sheppard and husband, J. Hall Sheppard conveyed by general warranty deed dated December 8, 1947 the described section of land to appellee, Frank F. DuBose. That part of the language of the deed pertinent hereto, and that part giving rise to the controversy reads as follows:
'Have granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, sell and convey unto the said Frank F. DuBose of the County of Wheeler, State of Texas all that certain tract or parcel of land situated in Wheeler County, Texas, the same being all of Section 40, Block A-3, H&GN RR Co. Survey, containing 670 acres of land, more or less.
'It is agreed and understood that a one-fourth mineral interest has been heretofore sold and it is further understood and agreed that a one-fourth mineral interest in said land together with the right of ingress and egress thereon, is reserved to the grantors, their heirs and assigns, and is excepted from this grant.
'It is the intention of this instrument to convey the vendee a one-half mineral interest, together with all surface rights.
'To Have And To Hold the above described premises, together will all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, unto the said Frank F. DuBose, his heirs and assigns, forever; and we do hereby bind ourselves and our heirs, executors and administrators to Warrant and Forever Defend, all and singular the said premises unto the said Frank F. DuBose, his heirs and assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same, or any part thereof.'
The one-fourth mineral interest recited in the deed as having been 'heretofore sold' was an erroneous recitation in that appellants' predecessor in title, Republic Insurance Company, in a deed dated March 1, 1943 deeded the subject section to Porter and Bosworth and reserved and excepted for a 15-year term one-fourth of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the section with the provision that the mineral interest would terminate at the end of the 15-year term unless at said expiration oil, gas and/or other minerals were being produced in paying quantities. There having been no oil, gas or other minerals produced on the section by the end of the 15-year term, Republic Insurance Company filed its disclaimer of its term interest. Therefore, the sole question here to be decided is whether appellants or appellee own the one-fourth mineral interest that reverted at the termination of the 15-year term reservation on March 1, 1958.
From the pleadings and stipulations and the trial briefs presented the trial court found that the one-fourth mineral interest in question belonged to appellee DuBose, the grantee in the deed. It is from that judgment appellants have perfected their appeal, contending that the deed simply, plainly and unambiguously conveys to appellee the surface and only 'one-half of the minerals in and to the land in question; that it requires no construction; and that there is no necessity to look beyond its 'four corners' to determine the interest in the land this deed passes to appellee.'
Appellee contends appellants conveyed the full fee simple title to the land to him excepting only the one-fourth mineral interest specifically reserved and excepted; that the sentence which says: 'It is the intention of this instrument to convey to vendee a one-half mineral interest, together with all surface rights' is intended only as a limitation on appellants' warranty; and that 'such sentence covers and includes all of the estate which appellants could have possibily conveyed except the one-fourth mineral interest reserved to themselves, since the words 'together with all surface rights' include the unsevered possibility of reverter of the one-fourth mineral interest now in dispute.'
The reservation of one-fourth of the minerals by Republic Insurance Company in its deed to Porter and Bosworth created a determinable fee in one-fourth of the minerals under the land, the termination thereof to be contingent upon there being no production of oil, gas or other minerals from the land in paying quantities at the end of 15 years from the date of the deed. Robinson v. Jacobs, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309. Thus, appellants held the possibility of reverter in an undivided one-fourth of the oil, gas and other minerals on the section of land at the time of their conveyance to appellee. The intriguing question presented then is whether from this record the possibility of reverter was an attribute of fee surface ownership, thus passing with the grant of full fee surface rights.
We do not see any indication in the instrument of appellants' intention to reserve the possibility of reverter of the Republic Insurance one-fourth interest. In a one-sentence paragraph of the instrument the grantors stated that a one-fourth mineral interest had been sold and they were retaining a one-fourth mineral interest, which they then specifically reserved and excepted from the grant and which appellee admits appellants own. This is the only place in the deed where any reservation or exception from the grant is mentioned. Then in a separate and distinct paragraph they stated they were conveying to appellee a one-half mineral interest, together with all the surface rights, which we believe from this record was and constituted appellants' limitation of warranty.
Our Supreme Court in Sharp v. Fowler et ux., 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154, has held: The reservation of the one-fourth mineral interest admittedly now owned by appellants was in clear language but to say that they reserved or excepted any other from the grant would have to be by...
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Templeton v. Dreiss
...In fact, a deed will be construed to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will permit. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1961, no writ). An unambiguous deed will be enforced as written, even though it does not express the ori......
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Mafrige v. US, Civ.A. No. L-91-95.
...this language is not an express reservation of a royalty interest to the grantors but was only a limitation on their warranty. Ladd v. Du Bose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1961, no As further proof that the deed does not reserve a royalty interest, the Government points to ......
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