Ladnier v. Murray

• Decision Date: 31 July 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-6668,s. 83-6668
• Citation: 769 F.2d 195
• Parties: Peter E. LADNIER, Appellant, v. Fred Eugene MURRAY, Jr., individually and in his official capacity as Police Officer for the City of Greenbelt, Maryland; John Doe, Richard Roe, Police Officers for the City of Greenbelt, Maryland, the identity and number of whom is presently unknown to Plaintiff; William Lane, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief of the City of Greenbelt, Maryland; and City of Greenbelt, Maryland, Appellees. Peter E. LADNIER, Appellee, v. Fred Eugene MURRAY, Jr., individually and in his official capacity as Police Officer for the City of Greenbelt, Maryland, Appellant, and John Doe, Richard Roe, Police Officers for the City of Greenbelt, Maryland, the identity and number of whom is presently unknown to Plaintiff; William Lane, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief of the City of Greenbelt, Maryland; and City of Greenbelt, Maryland, Defendants. (L), 83-6669.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 195

769 F.2d 195

Peter E. LADNIER, Appellant, v. Fred Eugene MURRAY, Jr., individually and in his official

capacity as Police Officer for the City of Greenbelt,

Maryland; John Doe, Richard Roe, Police Officers for the

City of Greenbelt, Maryland, the identity and number of whom

is presently unknown to Plaintiff; William Lane,

individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief of

the City of Greenbelt, Maryland; and City of Greenbelt,

Maryland, Appellees.

Peter E. LADNIER, Appellee, v. Fred Eugene MURRAY, Jr., individually and in his official

capacity as Police Officer for the City of

Greenbelt, Maryland, Appellant,

and

John Doe, Richard Roe, Police Officers for the City of

Greenbelt, Maryland, the identity and number of whom is

presently unknown to Plaintiff; William Lane, individually

and in his official capacity as Police Chief of the City of

Greenbelt, Maryland; and City of Greenbelt, Maryland, Defendants.

Nos. 83-6668(L), 83-6669.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 5, 1985.

Decided July 31, 1985.

Arthur G. House, Bethesda, Md. (Hadley & House, David H. Martin, Norris C. Ramsey,

P.A., Baltimore, Md., on brief) for appellant

William J. Kobokovich, Jr., Baltimore, Md., Kenneth S. Watson, Upper Marlboro, Md. (George L. Huber, Jr., Huber, Lutche & Wilson, Baltimore, Md., Benjamin R. Wolman, Wolman, Gushee & Newman, Upper Marlboro, Md., Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., Clapp, Somerville, Honemann & Beach, Baltimore, Md., on brief) for appellee.

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and SPROUSE and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.

HARRISON L. WINTER, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Peter Ladnier sued Fred Murray, a Greenbelt, Maryland police officer; William Lane, Greenbelt's Chief of Police; and the City of Greenbelt. He alleged a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and further alleged the Maryland common law torts of negligence, assault, and battery. The suit arose from an incident in which a police car defendant Murray was driving struck a motorcycle plaintiff was riding. Murray then arrested plaintiff, and allegedly kicked, stomped, and handcuffed him with excessive force.

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a special verdict--"a special written finding upon each issue of fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). The jury found that Murray had applied physical force to plaintiff "that was so disproportionate to the need presented as to be shocking to the conscience," and that plaintiff was injured as a result. The jury also found that Murray assaulted plaintiff and that Murray's application of force to plaintiff was not reasonably necessary to preserve the peace, maintain order, or overcome plaintiff's resistance to Murray's authority. The jury further found, however, that Murray did not commit a battery on plaintiff, and that Murray's use of force was not inspired by an evil purpose or malicious intent. The jury fixed compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000.

Based upon the jury's special verdict findings, the district court gave judgment to plaintiff on the Sec. 1983 claim for $65,000. ¹ It gave judgment to Murray on the assault claim because the jury found no malice, 572 F.Supp. 544. Both parties appeal. Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to judgment on his assault and battery claims notwithstanding the jury's finding of no malice. Murray contends that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on his Sec. 1983 claim because the jury found with respect to plaintiff's claim of assault that Murray had not acted maliciously and found for defendant on plaintiff's claim of battery. We conclude that the jury's answers to the special verdict questions are irreconcilably contradictory, and that consequently the judgment against Murray must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Following entry of judgment on the merits, plaintiff sought an award of counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The district court sharply reduced the amount requested, and plaintiff appeals. Because we reverse the underlying judgment, it cannot now be said whether plaintiff is a "prevailing" party. We therefore vacate the award.

I.

The evidence of what transpired before plaintiff's arrest in the early morning hours of August 14, 1981 was sharply in dispute. Plaintiff's version is that he was riding a friend's expensive, customized motorcycle when the engine and lights became inoperative. Once he was able to restart the engine, he decided to ride the vehicle home without lights rather than to leave it beside the road and risk its theft. While riding home, he saw the red flash of a police vehicle behind him. He accelerated to get out of the police car's path but was hit from behind.

Defendant Murray's version is that he was in hot pursuit of plaintiff's motorcycle What transpired after the collision was also in dispute, but it is sufficient to state that plaintiff's evidence, corroborated in large part by several uninvolved civilian eyewitnesses, was that plaintiff lay on the ground on his back after being thrown from the motorcycle and cried out that his back was injured. Murray got out of the police car, ran over to plaintiff and began kicking him in the side. Despite plaintiff's cries of pain, Murray rolled plaintiff over, kicked him some more, and stomped on his back. Murray then handcuffed plaintiff, and, with the help of another officer, lifted plaintiff up behind the back by the handcuffs and placed him in the back of the police car. When plaintiff continued to complain of injury, Murray and the other officer took plaintiff out of the police car and lowered him to the ground, dropping him the last several inches.

which was being operated in excess of the speed limit and without lights. The chase lasted for several miles and reached speeds as high as 90 miles per hour when plaintiff suddenly braked, fell over to one side of the vehicle, righted himself without stopping and then fell over to the other side. At this point Murray's vehicle ran into the motorcycle.

Plaintiff was hospitalized for four days. He was later found not guilty of four of the eight charges Murray filed against him, and the other four eventually were dismissed. There was evidence that Murray had had several disciplinary actions taken against him for accidents involving police vehicles and for the use of excessive force against a person in police custody.

The jury answered the pertinent special verdict questions as follows: ²

# 6--Did Officer Murray apply physical force to Peter Ladnier that was so disproportionate to the need presented as to be shocking to the conscience?

Yes X No

If your answer is yes, proceed to # 7. If your answer is no, please notify the Bailiff and return your verdict.

# 7--Did Officer Murray's use of physical force cause injuries to Peter Ladnier?

YES X NO

If your answer is yes, proceed to # 8. If your answer is no, proceed to # 12.

# 12--Did Officer Murray commit an "assault" on Peter Ladnier which caused Peter Ladnier to sustain injuries?

YES X NO

Proceed to # 13

# 13--Did Officer Murray commit a "battery" on Peter Ladnier which caused Peter Ladnier to sustain injuries?

YES NO X

Proceed to # 14.

# 14--Was Officer Murray's use of force or threatened use of force on Peter Ladnier reasonably necessary to preserve the peace, maintain order or overcome resistance to his authority?

YES NO X

Proceed to # 15.

# 15--Was Officer Murray's use of force or threatened use of force on Peter Ladnier inspired by an evil purpose or malicious intent?

YES NO X

Proceed to # 16.

# 16--If you answered 7, 12 or 13 yes, regardless of your answers to any other questions, in what amount do you assess damages for injuries that Peter Ladnier suffered as a result of the events subsequent to the collision?

$15,000.00

Proceed to # 17.

# 17--If you answered 7, 12 or 13 yes, regardless of your answers to any other questions, in what amount, if any, do you assess punitive damages against Officer Murray?

$50,000.00

After the jury returned its verdict, neither party requested that the jury be instructed to deliberate further to resolve apparent inconsistencies in its answers. ³ Four days later, plaintiff moved for the entry of judgment in his favor. The district court gave judgment to plaintiff on his Sec. 1983 claim for damages in the amount assessed by the jury. It gave judgment for Murray on the assault and battery claims. In a written opinion, the district court set forth its reasons for the action it took. It ruled that judgment for Murray must be entered with regard to plaintiff's assault claim, because under Maryland law police officers are immune from liability unless they act with malice. See Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979); Ann.Code of Md., Art. 23A Sec. 1B(a). Despite the jury's finding of lack of malice with respect to the assault claim, however, the court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Murray on plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim. It reasoned that implicit in the finding that Murray used force shocking to the conscience was the finding that Murray knew or should have known that his actions violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thus the jury's award of punitive damages was held tantamount to a finding that Murray acted with legal malice, which under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), would render Murray not immune to damages under Sec. 1983 for the use of excessive force. The court further noted that under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), actual malice was no longer necessary to render a public official not immune to damages in a Sec. 1983 action if he knew or should have known that his conduct violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights.

II.

When a special verdict form is used and the jury's findings apparently conflict, the court has a duty to harmonize the answers, if it...