LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co.

• Decision Date: 18 February 2022
• Docket Number: B305494
• Citation: 75 Cal.App.5th 388,290 Cal.Rptr.3d 447
• Parties: Jill LAFACE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

75 Cal.App.5th 388

290 Cal.Rptr.3d 447

Jill LAFACE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

B305494

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed February 18, 2022

Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, André E. Jardini, K.L. Myles, Greta T. Hutton, Glendale; Capstone Law, Ryan Y. Wu, Melissa Grant, John Stobart, Los Angeles; Law Offices of Michael V. Jehdian and Michael V. Jehdian, Glendale, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Morrison & Foerster, Tritia M. Murata, Wendy J. Ray, Los Angeles, Karen J. Kubin, James R. Sigel, San Francisco, and Michael F. Qian for Defendant and Respondent.

Fisher & Phillips, Christopher C. Hoffman, Megan E. Walker and Darcey M. Groden, San Diego, for California New Car Dealers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

MICON, J.^*

Plaintiff Jill La Face appeals from the judgment entered following a bench trial in her representative action against Ralphs Grocery Company under the Private Attorneys General Act seeking civil penalties for alleged violations of labor law workplace seating requirements. We reject her contention that she was entitled to a jury trial and affirm the trial court's finding that Ralphs was not required to provide seating for its cashiers.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

The Private Attorneys General Act ( Lab. Code, § 2698, et seq. (PAGA)) allows employees to bring a civil action for penalties against their employer on behalf of themselves and other current and former "aggrieved" employees for Labor Code-related violations.² (§ 2699, subds. (a), (f).)

Appellant Jill La Face worked as a cashier at a store owned by respondent Ralphs Grocery Company. She brought a PAGA action against Ralphs on behalf of herself and other current and former Ralphs cashiers, alleging that Ralphs violated an Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage order that required employers to provide suitable seating when the nature of the work reasonably permitted the use of seats, or, for a job where standing was required, to provide seating for employee use when their use did not interfere with an employee's duties.³

The trial court set the matter for a jury trial but later granted Ralphs's motion for a bench trial after finding that PAGA actions were equitable in nature and were therefore not triable to a jury.⁴ A 12-day bench trial was held between November and December 2019, where ergonomics experts and Ralphs employees and supervisors testified for both sides. The trial court found that Ralphs had not violated the applicable wage order because the evidence showed that even when lulls occurred in a cashier's primary duties, the cashiers were still required to move about the store fulfilling various other tasks.⁵

DISCUSSION

A. The Right to a Jury Trial

1. PAGA

California's Labor Code includes numerous statutes "designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers." ( Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 80, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 459 P.3d 1123 ( Kim ).) Some statutes allow employees to sue for damages, typically in the form of wage compensation. (See, e.g., § 1194.) Others allow the Labor Commissioner to issue citations and bring administrative proceedings to recover lost wages on behalf of affected employees or to impose regulatory penalties for various forms of employer misconduct. (See, e.g., § 225.5.) Others vest the right to assess and recover statutory penalties in the Labor Commissioner only. (See, e.g., § 226.3.)

The Labor Commissioner's ability to enforce these provisions was hampered by several factors. Some code sections were designated as misdemeanors, as to which no penalties attached. Others included penalty provisions, but a shortage of government resources hampered enforcement. (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 459 P.3d 1123 ; Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 379, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 ( Iskanian ).) The Legislature enacted PAGA in 2003 to address these issues by adding penalties in specified amounts for statutes that did not provide for them, with penalties remaining in the amounts statutorily set for other provisions. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 ; § 2699, subds. (a), (f) & (g).)⁶

PAGA provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor Workforce Development Agency [(LWDA)] or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3." (§ 2699, subd. (a).) The same is true of aggrieved employees seeking PAGA relief based on Labor Code statutes that do not provide for civil penalties. (§ 2699, subds. (f), (g).)

Penalties recovered in a PAGA action are divided between the state and all employees on whose behalf the action was maintained, with 75 percent going to the state and the rest divided among the aggrieved employees. (§ 2699, subd. (i).) Whenever the LWDA or any of its constituent organizations has discretion to assess a civil penalty, "a court is authorized to exercise the same discretion, subject to the same limitations and conditions, to assess a civil penalty." (§ 2699, subd. (e)(1).) In any PAGA action, however, whether under a statute that provides for a penalty or one that does not, "a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amounts specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory." (§ 2699, subd. (e)(2).)

Section 2699.3 sets forth the procedures to be followed to pursue a PAGA action. Before commencing a PAGA action, the would-be plaintiff must give notice to the LWDA, and no action can be brought until the LWDA either notifies the plaintiff that it does not intend to investigate the claim, or 60 days have passed without such notice being given. Actions based on PAGA code violations not listed in section 2699.5 are also subject to being cured by the employer against whom the PAGA action is proposed. (§§ 2699.3, subds. (a)(c); 2699.5.)

2. Determining the Right to a Jury Trial In Civil Cases

Under California law, the right to a jury trial may be afforded by statute or pursuant to Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. ( Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 296-297, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 713, 462 P.3d 461 ( Nationwide Biweekly ).) Although the Legislature may grant that right where the state constitution does not require it, the Legislature's decision to expressly deny that right is trumped where the constitutional right exists.⁷ ( Id. at p. 297, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 713, 462 P.3d 461.)

Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution states that "[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all...." This provision was intended to preserve the right to a civil jury trial as it existed at common law in 1850 when this section became part of the state's constitution. ( Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 315, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 713, 462 P.3d 461, citing People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283, 286-287, 231 P.2d 832 ( One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe ).) That right " ‘is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact. The right is the historical right enjoyed at the time it was guaranteed by the Constitution.’ " ( Ibid., citation and fn. omitted.) Whether a jury trial right exists here under the state constitution is an issue of law subject to de novo review. ( Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 904, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 503.)

As a general matter, therefore, the California Constitution affords a right to a jury trial in common law actions at law that were triable by a jury in 1850, but not to suits in equity that were not triable by a jury at that time. ( C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8-9, 151 Cal.Rptr. 323, 587 P.2d 1136.) Under this test, it is the substance of a cause action – not its title or form – that is controlling. ( Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 315, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 713, 462 P.3d 461.) In making this evaluation we look to the gist of the action: whether the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the particular case show that it is legal and therefore cognizable at law. ( Ibid . )

At early common law, actions at law typically involved lawsuits to recover money damages for injuries caused by breach of contract or tortious conduct. Equitable causes of action typically sought relief such as injunctions, orders for specific performance, or the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, which were unavailable in actions at law. ( Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 292-293, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 713, 462 P.3d 461.)⁸

A leading case in this area is One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal.2d 283, 231 P.2d 832. At issue there was whether a lawsuit by the government seeking forfeiture of a car allegedly used to transport drugs required a trial by jury. The court held that a jury trial was required because, at common law, similar causes of action for the forfeiture of lawful property used for unlawful purposes were triable to a jury. ( Id. at pp. 297-300, 231 P.2d 832.) Nor did it matter that the statute at issue was enacted after 1850. Because the constitutional right to a jury trial is broadly construed, it applies to newer causes of action that are of like nature or of the same class as a pre-1850 common law cause of action. ( Id. at p. 300, 231 P.2d 832 ; Franchise Tax Board v. Superior...