LaFaye v. Presser

• Decision Date: 20 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-837,89-837
• Citation: 554 So.2d 610
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D31 Vernon A. LaFAYE, Gary F. Hannon, Richard D. Brock, and Presser, LaFaye & Hannon, P.A., Appellants, v. Neil N. PRESSER, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 610

554 So.2d 610

15 Fla. L. Weekly D31

Vernon A. LaFAYE, Gary F. Hannon, Richard D. Brock, and Presser, LaFaye & Hannon, P.A., Appellants, v. Neil N. PRESSER, Appellee.

No. 89-837.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Dec. 20, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990.

Steven A. Werber and James M. Riley, of Commander, Legler, Werber, Dawes, Sadler and Howell, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellants.

George L. Hudspeth, of Mahoney, Adams, Milam, Surface & Grimsley, Jacksonville, for appellee.

ERVIN, Judge.

Following our prior decision in this cause, LaFaye v. Presser, 535 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), remanding the case to the trial court with directions that it award prejudgment interest on the judgment imposed at the contractual rate, rather than at the statutory rate, the trial court on remand found that the amount of contractual interest from the date of loss, July 31, 1986, through the date of the initial final judgment, November 23, 1987, was $13,376.02. The court also imposed the statutory rate of interest on this $13,376.02 sum for the period from November 23, 1987 through the date of the amendment to the final judgment (March 7, 1989), added the two amounts together and directed that the total sum should thereafter bear interest at the annual statutory rate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Initially, we disagree with appellants' contention that the trial court erred in establishing the date of loss, for purposes of calculating prejudgment interest, as of the date appellee filed his complaint, July 31, 1986. This issue is controlled by our prior opinion in this cause, which gave the trial court the discretion on remand to determine whether the date of loss was July 31, 1986, the date previously identified.

Having thus properly determined that the date of loss in this case was July 31, 1986, the court was also correct in awarding prejudgment interest of $13,376.02, which was based upon the value of the stock ($171,307.00), and which was computed at the contract rate of six percent, running from the date of the loss (July 31, 1986) through the date of the judgment (November 23, 1987).

However, the trial court erred in awarding interest at the statutory rate on the prejudgment interest award of $13,376.02 for the period from November 23, 1987 to March 7, 1989. First, appellee's right to prejudgment interest ended at the time the judgment was entered (November 23, 1987), and the taking of the appeal did not extend appellee's right to prejudgment interest. ¹ Second, the award is an inappropriate award of compound interest, because it required interest to accrue "on a sum that is itself interest." See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Smith, 527 So.2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment awarding the statutory rate of interest on all interest that accrued after November 23, 1987, is reversed and the case remanded for the entry of a corrected judgment.

We have considered the remaining arguments of appellants and, finding them without merit, affirm.

AFFIRMED in PART, REVERSED in PART, and REMANDED.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs.

ZEHMER, J., dissents and concurs with written opinion.

ZEHMER, Judge (Dissenting and concurring).

Under the circumstances shown in this case, I concur in the majority's decision to reverse the ruling awarding interest on prejudgment interest, and I agree that any interest due, whether prejudgment or post-judgment, is payable only at the contract rate of 6 per cent. However, I do not agree that the date of loss occurred on July 31, 1986, the date appellee filed his complaint. Because appellee's claim is based solely on contract, the date of loss could not have occurred earlier than the date payment was due under the contract, that is, only after agreement as to the valuation of the stock and delivery of the stock in accordance with the agreement.

Our prior opinion in this case, LaFaye v. Presser, 535 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), reversed the first judgment finding the date of loss to be the date the complaint was filed, and remanded to the trial court to redetermine when the date the loss occurred for purposes of commencing prejudgment interest. Had this court agreed that the date of loss was necessarily the date the complaint was filed, it should and would have affirmed on this issue. This issue was reversed, however, and remanded to afford appellee a further opportunity to demonstrate, or the trial court to articulate, on what basis the appellants' contractual obligation to pay for the stock was activated by the filing of appellee's complaint. Only by explicating a legally sufficient basis for treating the filing of the complaint as the event fixing the date of loss could the trial court award prejudgment interest from that time. Our opinion did not direct that the filing date be accepted, and I reject appellee's argument that this issue was decided on the last appeal. The date of loss clearly was left open for redetermination upon remand. Yet, neither the trial court nor appellee's brief on appeal has explained any legal basis for tying the date of loss to the filing of the complaint.

The trial court ruled that the parties' rights in this case are governed by their agreement, and that ruling has been...