Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center Hospital

• Decision Date: 25 February 1980
• Citation: 103 Misc.2d 98,425 N.Y.S.2d 244
• Parties: Raymond R. Lafferty, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Anna E. Lafferty, deceased, and Helen M. LAFFERTY, Plaintiffs, v. MANHASSET MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL, Kiran Shah, Marjorie Foley, Deseri Martindale, Nancy Kirshenhecter and Mary Ryzak, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 244

425 N.Y.S.2d 244

103 Misc.2d 98

Raymond R. Lafferty, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Anna E. Lafferty, deceased, and Helen M. LAFFERTY, Plaintiffs, v. MANHASSET MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL, Kiran Shah, Marjorie Foley, Deseri Martindale, Nancy Kirshenhecter and Mary Ryzak, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County, Part I.

Feb. 25, 1980.

Bloom & Amrod, Garden City, for plaintiffs.

Howard S. Davis, New York City, for defendants.

HOWARD E. LEVITT, Justice.

This action arises out of an alleged medical malpractice resulting from the transfusion of mismatched blood into Anna E. Lafferty. The entire transfusion and Anna E. Lafferty's reaction thereto were witnessed by her daughter-in-law, plaintiff Helen M. Lafferty. The amended complaint reveals four causes of action. The first two causes of action are on behalf of plaintiff Raymond R. Lafferty in which recovery for the personal injuries and wrongful death to the decedent is sought. The third and fourth causes of action are on behalf of the plaintiff Helen M. Lafferty, and seek to recover money damages for the alleged emotional anguish with resulting manifestations she sustained.

Defendant seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissing the third and fourth causes of action contained in the amended complaint. Taken alone, the amended complaint does not provide sufficient grounds to dispose of the motion. However, on such a motion, "the court is (not) limited to a consideration of the pleading itself but may consider extrinsic matter submitted by the parties in disposing of the motion." (Kelly v. Bank of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 875, 302 N.Y.S.2d 60). Helen M. Lafferty's examination before trial raises an important factual issue which was left unaddressed by the pleadings, i. e. whether Helen M. Lafferty was an observer of or participant in the occurrence. Viewing the pleadings and examination before trial in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, this Court finds that Helen M. Lafferty may very well have been a participant in the occurrence. The significance of this determination is discussed in depth below. Accordingly, the third and fourth causes of action are recognized.

The courts in the State of New York are now long past difficulty in accepting psychic trauma as compensable even if such trauma be the sole result of a physical event or accident suffered by a plaintiff (Matter of Griffiths v. Shaffrey, 308 N.Y. 729, 124 N.E.2d 339; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730). The core problem in the instant case is, however, whether psychic trauma will be accepted as a basis for recovery in tort where the trauma to the plaintiff is caused by a physical event or accident which happens to another (cf. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419).

Currently, New York recognizes "no cause of action lies for unintended harm sustained by one solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship and whether the one was an eyewitness to the incident which resulted in the direct injuries." (Tobin, supra, at 611, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555, 249 N.E.2d at 420). In Tobin, the Court held that a mother was not entitled to recover for emotional and physical injuries from shock resulting when her child was negligently struck by defendant's automobile within hearing distance of the mother. The mother neither saw nor participated in the occurrence. Thus, according to the rule in Tobin, a mere witness to an occurrence or one particularly vulnerable to psychic injury may not recover for his or her psychic trauma.

However, where the plaintiff is directly involved in the traumatic experience as a participant and not as a mere onlooker, liability has been found to exist by our courts. For example, in Wolfe v. Sibley & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603, worker's compensation benefits were awarded to a secretary who discovered her supervisor in his office after his suicide. Distinguishing Tobin on two grounds, the Court in Wolfe indicated that the tort concept of foreseeability was not relevant in a worker's compensation case, and that the Wolfe claimant, having been told by the deceased to summon the police immediately before the incident, was not merely a bystander, but rather was an active participant in the events surrounding the occurrence.

Helen Lafferty, the plaintiff herein, was not only an observer of, but, to a much greater extent, a participant in the occurrence at the hospital. While Wolfe is a worker's compensation case, the majority opinion indicates a willingness to expand a party's rights to recover for psychic injury suffered as a result of witnessing injury to another where the witness is an active participant. This seems to be an extension of the doctrine enunciated in Yates v. South Kirkby Collieries (2KB 538 (910)) where a worker went to the aid of his fellow worker to whom the accident occurred, and was permitted to recover after suffering only mental trauma from the occurrence. Deriving from this theory, plaintiff contends that a "danger invites rescue" theory applies to the case at bar. The Court of Appeals (Cardozo, J.) has held that the rescuer may recover in tort on a nexus of liability (Wagner v. International Ry. Co. 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437). While this theory is not without some merit, the simple and traditional standard of reasonable foreseeability applies to the present case and is sufficient to allow recovery.

Soon after Wolfe, in Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590, the Court of Appeals unanimously allowed recovery by a daughter who had been negligently and erroneously...